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AG. He was my mentor over the course of the project and the time after the project
ended. I am very grateful for his time and advice during that time. Our regular meetings
provided me with strength, confidence and insight to tackle all obstacles on the path to
this thesis.
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Abstract
We have to face a simple, yet, disturbing fact: current computing is inherently insecure.
The systems we develop and maintain have outgrown our capacity to prove them secure
in every instance. Moreover, we became increasingly dependent on these systems. From
small firmware running in cars and household appliances to smart phones and large-scale
banking systems, software systems permeate our every day life. We rely on the safety
and security of these systems, yet, we encounter threats to these properties every day.
Therefore, systems have be secure by construction and not by maintenance. The
principles to achieve this are well known. The Principle of Least Privilege [SS75] has
been published in 1975, yet, software systems do not generally apply it. We argue
that new, lightweight methods based on sound theory have to be put forward so that
developers can efficiently check that their software is secure in their domain context.
In this thesis, we present three analysis techniques that help programmers develop
more secure software by informing them about the current state of unsafe operation
usage, extensive capability use in third-party components, and suspicious dead software
paths that point to programming errors that could lead to insecurity. These three
analyses inspect the full stack of a Java program from the application code over library
and base-library code down to the native code level. If programmers use the information
provided by the analyses, they are able to reduce the attack surface of their applications
and provide more safe and secure systems to their users.
Furthermore, we contribute two concepts for automated isolation. While the first
concept reduces the attack surface by slicing third-party components to their necessary
parts, the second concept is more fundamental and aims at achieving a fine-grained
privilege separation.
We believe that the software engineering discipline needs more research on these
language-based approaches that tackle the problem of software security at its root cause:
defective implementation. Using formal methods to construct these tools is necessary,
yet, software developers cannot be overburdened with new requirements to their work
process. Automated tools need to derive security properties from program code by them-
selves with as little input required from the programmer as possible. By these means
software can be developed reliably secure in an efficient fashion.
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Zusammenfassung
Der stetige Strom an Exploit-Meldungen scheint es zu besta¨tigen: Aktuelle Software-
Systeme sind unsicher. Die Gro¨ße der Systeme, die wir entwickeln und warten hat
unsere Mo¨glichkeiten u¨berstiegen ihre Sicherheit nachzuweisen. Dazu sind wir sehr
viel abha¨ngiger von diesen Systemen geworden, als noch vor zehn Jahren. Software-
Systeme durchziehen unser ta¨gliches Leben angefangen von Firmware in Automobilen
und Haushaltsgera¨ten u¨ber Smartphones bis zu großen Banktransaktions-Systemen. Wir
verlassen uns auf die Sicherheit dieser Systeme, jedoch erfahren wir tagta¨glich die Gefahr,
die von diesen Systemen ausgeht.
Daher meinen wir, dass Software-Systeme durch Konstruktion sicher sein mu¨ssen und
nicht durch Wartung. Die dafu¨r notwendigen Prinzipien sind bekannt. Das ”Principle
of Least Privilege” [SS75] wurde 1975 publiziert, jedoch wird es in aktuellen Systemen
immer noch nicht konsequent umgesetzt. Wir vertreten die Ansicht, dass neue, leicht-
gewichtige Methoden, welche auf tragfa¨higen theoretischen Ansa¨tzen beruhen, eingesetzt
werden mu¨ssen, damit Entwickler die Sicherheit der von ihnen entwickelten Software in
ihrem Kontext effizient u¨berpru¨fen ko¨nnen.
In dieser Arbeit pra¨sentieren wir drei Analyse-Techniken, die es Programmierern
ermo¨glichen sichere Software zu entwickeln, in dem sie u¨ber den aktuellen Zustand der fu¨r
das System relevanten Sicherheitkriterien informiert werden. Dies sind im Einzelnen die
Nutzung unsicherer Programmiermethoden, die u¨berma¨ßige Nutzung von Betriebsystem-
Ressourcen in Drittanbieter-Komponenten und verda¨chtige tote Softwarepfade, die auf
Programmierfehler hindeuten, welche auch Sicherheitslu¨cken beinhalten ko¨nnen. Diese
drei Analysen decken alle Schichten einer Java-Applikation vom Applikationscode u¨ber
Bibliotheks- und Basis-Bibliothekscode bis zur nativen Codeebene ab. Programmierer
sind in der Lage die Angriffsfla¨che ihrer Applikationen signifikant zu reduzieren, in dem
sie die Informationen aus diesen Analysen nutzen, und somit sicherere Software fu¨r ihre
Endanwender bereit zu stellen.
Weiterhin zeigen wir zwei neuartige Konzepte fu¨r automatisierte Isolation vor. Wa¨hrend
das erste Konzept die Angriffsfla¨che einer Anwendung dadurch reduziert, in dem es
Drittanbieter-Komponenten auf den tatsa¨chlich genutzten Programmcode reduziert, stellt
das zweite Konzept einen fundamentaleren Eingriff dar und hilft dabei eine fein-granulare
Berechtigungskontrolle herzustellen.
Wir sind der Meinung, dass Softwareentwicklung weitere Forschung in diesem Bereich
programmiersprachlich-basierter Ansa¨tze fu¨r Sicherheit beno¨tigt, um die Probleme an
ihrem Kern anzugehen: fehlerhafte Implementierung. Wa¨hrend der Einsatz formaler
Methoden fu¨r die Entwicklung von Werkzeugen hierfu¨r notwendig ist, du¨rfen Softwa-
reentwickler nicht mit weiteren Anforderungen fu¨r die ta¨gliche Arbeit u¨berfordert wer-
den. Automatisierte Werkzeuge mu¨ssen Sicherheitsattribute selbststa¨ndig aus dem Pro-
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grammcode ableiten ko¨nnen und sollten dabei auf mo¨glichst wenig zusa¨tzliche Eingaben
des Softwareentwicklers bauen. Durch diese Techniken wird es mo¨glich sein nachweisbar
sichere Software in effizienter Weise zu entwickeln.
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1. Introduction
Computer systems permeate our every-day life. They have become an integral part of
the fabric of society. From the small mobile device in our pockets over household appli-
ances to traffic management and industrial plants, hardware and software of increasingly
distributed computer systems are driving our world. A flaw in the confidentiality, in-
tegrity, or availability (CIA) of these systems will not only be a minor disturbance, but
will indeed cause a major disruption, when mitigation strategies are missing or fail. Al-
ready industrial sites are known to have been compromised and infrastructure, such as
hospitals, have fallen prey to extortion by criminals using their computer systems.
Even our economic system has become dependent on the proper operation of computer
systems. Stock markets, logistics, manufacturing, and communications would not be
able to function without them. Attackers controlling algorithmic trading systems, for
instance, can have disastrous effects on the stock market. Especially when considering
the interconnectedness of computer systems, they need to live up to high CIA standards,
as even industrial control systems (ICS) are frequently connected to the Internet to
enable remote access and control. Security flaws can have catastrophic consequences,
including the loss of human life.
Moreover, computer systems increasingly rely on software, as it can be developed,
tested, and deployed more rapidly than new hardware. Hardware becomes more config-
urable (e.g., software-defined radio) and more dependent on software running it. This
puts a large obligation on the quality of software.
Fortunately, software systems can be protected by a multitude of protection mecha-
nisms. For example, software that interacts with networks can be protected from unau-
thorized or malicious usage by firewalls, intrusion detection systems, or access control
systems. In addition, software can be hardened against possible attacks by inspecting
it either statically or dynamically to find security flaws during its development or in a
deployed state.
In the following sections, we will discuss the relevant terms for the construction of
secure systems. Using these terms, we derive a problem statement and present the
contributions of this thesis.
1.1. The Security of a System
A general principle for the construction of secure software is the Principle of Least
Privilege [SS75]. This principle states that every program in a computer system should
operate under the smallest set of privileges that is necessary to fulfill its purpose. While
this does not prevent implementation flaws, it minimizes the impact of a corrupted
13
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program to these privileges a program needs for normal operation. For example, an
administrative program used for filesystem management needs the privilege to read and
modify the entire filesystem, but a program that displays some file will just be privileged
to read that file.
The security of a system can be characterized using the relationship between three
terms: attacks, defenses, and policies [Sch11]. This relationship can be expressed in
sentences like ”Defenses of type D enforce policies in class P despite attacks from class
A”. Defenses, policies and attacks can also be combined to express more complex security
systems. These relationships have to be treated as hypotheses, which can be proven or
disproven.
Policies are the guarantees that a system can still give despite attacks. Conversely, we
may state that some attack may break one or more policies. A customer relationship
management system, for instance, enforces the policy that customer data is only disclosed
to authenticated and authorized users of the system. Thus, the policy of the system
expresses a confidentiality property on the customer data. Policies can express properties
in either dimension of confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
Attacks are directed against a system’s interface. When taking a common Android
smartphone as an example, this can be the ability for users to input data via the touch-
screen interface, the network connection, or even the temperature of the device [MS13].
The complete set of all attackable interface is called the attack surface. The goal of an
attack is always the infringement of at least one policy of a system. For instance, the
infamous Distributed-Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks flooding Internet servers mostly
target the availability of a system. However, even though the loss of availability is the
most significant effect of such an attack, it might also be intended to break authen-
tication systems to gain access to data and, thus, breaking the confidentiality of the
system.
Defenses protect policies on systems from attacks. For instance, a firewall can protect
a system from an unauthorized external access, while allowing access from inside the
same network.
At the heart of all defenses there are three basic mechanisms: isolation, monitoring,
and obfuscation. Isolation describes the physical or logical separation of a (sub)system’s
interfaces from each other or the environment. For example, a virtual machine is some-
what isolated from other virtual machines running on the same physical machine. Mon-
itoring describes the observation of a system’s interfaces and state in order to enforce
policies as soon as a possible violation is detected or predicted. A firewall, for instance,
observes the incoming and outgoing traffic of a network and, depending on the traffic’s
contents and the firewall’s ruleset, decides to allow or block network traffic. Obfuscation
protects data by making it unreadable without the knowledge of a secret. For instance,
an encryption algorithm protects data from being understood without the knowledge of
14
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a key. Therefore, an arbitrary amount of data can be protected digitally with a small
piece of data – the key – which has to be protected physically.
In the design of defenses and policies for systems the Principle of Least Privilege
should be the guiding factor. When systems are provided with policies and the defensive
mechanisms to enforce them that limit the privilege of the system to the necessary
minimum, attacks are less likely to succeed or to be harmful. These defensive mechanisms
have to be carefully considered to enforce the policies in an effective way and can use
isolation, monitoring, or obfuscation techniques or a combination of either of them.
1.2. Problem Statement
Software development has changed dramatically since 1975 when Saltzer and Schro¨der
postulated the Principle of Least Privilege. Software became less monolithic and con-
sists of various (reusable) parts. Library-based reuse is widely accepted and became
an exigence for efficient software production [Boe99, SE13, HDG+11]. But this means
developers introduce third-party code into the security context of their applications.
We, therefore, have modularity in the construction of software, but no separation of
principal1. However, we believe that library code must also be limited to its necessary
privileges to avoid exploitation. This evolved situation needs to influence the Principle
of Least Privilege, which we reformulate as follows (changes in bold typeface):
Every program, every part of the program, and every user of the system
should operate using the least set of privileges necessary to complete the job.
Therefore, we need methods to express and enforce policies for program libraries. Ap-
plication developers have to be made aware of possible vulnerabilities in libraries and
the impact they might have, when they want to include the libraries into their pro-
grams. Aside from the apprehension of vulnerabilities, developers also need mechanisms
to deactivate or remove parts of libraries they deem too risky for their applications.
During the development of software, various techniques from program analysis and
rewriting can be used to establish defenses before a program is released into the wild.
This class of defenses is called language-based security and can also be used for program
libraries. Static analysis can be used to infer properties of a program from its static
representation including, but not limited to, running time, space requirements, power
consumption, and correctness w.r.t. bugs or vulnerabilities. Formal methods, such as
information flow analysis, can be used to infer non-interference properties of a program.
Compilers and type systems can be used to produce safe low-level code that can be
easily verified and safely executed. A large-scale example for the latter is the Java
compiler, which produces verifiable Bytecode that can be compiled to assembly code by
the runtime engine.
1an authenticated entity in a computer system
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1.3. Contributions of this Thesis
This thesis makes contributions to the field of analytical security defenses applied during
development of software. The techniques presented in this thesis make security sensitive
areas or security flaws obvious to a developer, who may then take action to remove
these flaws or add checks to sensitive areas. Thus, they can be used to monitor the
security of a software system in the development process. Other techniques presented
in this thesis help developers in reducing the attack surface of a program by removing
unnecessary parts or allowing a fine-grained object communication control. Therefore,
these techniques provide isolation mechanisms to software developers.
Detection of Unsafe Programming Practices In our first contribution in the field of
monitoring, we identify and detect programming practices that can lead to vulnerable
code and evaluate our approach on the native part of the Java Class Library (JCL),
which is written in C and C++. These languages, unlike languages such as Java, allow
for the direct manipulation of memory. Safeguards, such as array-bounds checks, are not
in place here. This makes some programming practices unsafe, but also unavoidable. For
instance, an array access in C is basically a pointer-arithmetic operation with a pointer
to the start of the array and the index as an offset from this pointer to the requested
array element. Therefore, user supplied array indices always have to be checked to
prevent arbitrary read or write operations on memory areas. A well-known example of
a vulnerability involving this programming practice is the Heartbleed bug [DKA+14].
Here, a remote attacker could read the complete memory of a server, opening the door
for other attacks with more severe consequences. The cause of this vulnerability was a
function that takes a string (which is an array of characters) and a number, which should
coincide with the length of the string, and echoes that string back to the client. As the
length parameter was not checked for correctness, a client could instruct the function to
read beyond the bounds of the string.
A Capability Model for the Java Platform Our second contribution in the field of
monitoring is an analysis for system capability usage of Java libraries. Usually pro-
grammers use a large set of libraries for various purposes to develop applications. As
these libraries run in the same security context as the code developed by the application
programmer, they can also use the complete set of privileges given to the application,
even though it is not necessary for the operations the library offers. We consider this
excessive endowment of permission as a violation to the Principle of Least Privilege.
In order to alleviate the situation we contribute a static analysis that detects the use
of system capabilities in Java Bytecode. This helps understanding which privileges li-
braries actually might use and allows a policy system to limit the libraries privileges to
the permissions that are actually necessary.
Detection of Bugs through Dead Code Paths Our third contribution in the field of
monitoring is an analysis to detect code paths that can be proven to be unreachable.
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Assuming that well-written code will never contain such paths, we use this method to
point to a large variety of bug patterns, including bugs that can lead to critical security
vulnerabilities. We evaluate this method using it on the JCL, the very large basic library
shipped with the Java Runtime, and find 258 previously unknown bugs.
Library Slicing Programmers frequently use only parts of the functionality of a library.
For instance, the popular log4j logging library offers various logging targets to use.
In most scenarios developers only use one of them. Based on this observation, we
contribute a method of slicing libraries down to the actually used parts. This way, we
further limit the necessary permission set for the respective library and prevent possible
abuse of shipped but unused code. Thus, we allow developers to effectively isolate their
applications from unused code.
Fine-Grained Capability Control The effective isolation of systems is hard to guaran-
tee in object-oriented systems as authority can be transfered implicitly between com-
ponents. The Object-Capability Model [MS03, Mil06] provides a set of rules that only
allow explicit transfer of authority between objects. Therefore, we inspected capability
security more closely. Java’s guarantees for memory safety already fulfill the first as-
sumption of the Object-Capability Model that references must be an unforgeable entity.
Although Java as a language is quite close to the requirements of the Object-Capability
Model, it has three fundamental violations of this principle: Intrusive Reflection, Static
References, and Native Bindings. We use a static analysis to find instances of these
violations. We performed a preliminary experiment that suggests a strong correlation
between these instances and known security flaws. Furthermore, we present a design for
a study as future work. Based on a positive outcome of this study, we would be able
to enumerate these violations and suggest ideas to remove them allowing developers full
object-capability-based control over their complete application. This is a necessary step
towards provable and effective, yet flexible isolation.
1.4. Generality of Contributions
In the contributions of this thesis, we use the Java language and platform as the example
to evaluate our analyses and concepts. With the exemption of the detection of unsafe
programming practices the implementations of the analyses target programs written in
Java. However, the concepts behind the analyses can be adapted to other programming
languages and platforms.
For example, a capability model such as the one we constructed for Java can be de-
veloped for different platforms, e.g. the .NET platform. Many capabilities regarding
the underlying operating system will remain the same while capabilities such as class
loading or use of debugging facilities will have a different meaning depending on the
respective platform. The algorithms will be adaptable since they depend on a call graph
for the specific platform API, which can be constructed for most if not all platforms.
Our method of library slicing is build on top of the capability model analysis and should,
17
1. Introduction
therefore, be directly applicable to the new platform. However, the method of deploy-
ment of this new platform needs to be regarded when repackaging the sliced libary. For
example, in case of the .NET framework the emission of CIL code and the packaging to
assemblies needs to be handled.
Also the detection of dead code paths can be adapted to other programming languages
by adapting the underlying control-flow and data-flow analysis to the language specifics.
Since it is based on abstract interpretation, the adaption to the new language should be
straightfoward to implement.
Our detection of unsafe programming practices is very specific to the practices used in
C/C++. Yet, the analysis is not limited to our case study on the native part of the Java
platform, but can be directly applied to other codebases that are being used as platforms
such as the Linux kernel or the native part of the .NET framework. It is highly likely
to find similar results in a case study inspecting these platforms. We use the example
of Java in this thesis to provide a coherent, full-stack picture for the Java platform, yet,
the method is directly applicable to other platforms.
Our observations on the Object-Capability Model are indeed specific to Java. To
retrieve a similar result for a different language the method would have to be repeated.
Our findings for Java cannot be generalized.
1.5. Structure of this Thesis
This thesis is organized as follows. In Part I, we present the conceptual foundations of
secure software engineering in Chapter 2. Subsequently, we present applications of these
concepts, attacks and defenses in Chapter 3 which motivate our work and present open
challenges we address in this thesis.
To foster a systematic discussion of the contributions of this thesis, we organize it
using the notions of monitoring and isolation. In Part II of this thesis, we introduce three
analyses that aid the monitoring of programs under development. First, in Chapter 4, we
look into unsafe programming practices, stemming from the fact that low-level languages
like C or C++ trade type safety and memory safety for performance. We identify
unsafe programming practices and construct ways to detect these practices. Second,
we construct a course-grained capability model for system resources in Chapter 5 and
develop an analysis to detect their use in library code. Third, we present a detection
mechanism for dead paths in programs in Chapter 6. Developers can find complex
bugs that may cause vulnerabilities with this analysis. The part closes with a thorough
literature review for monitoring technologies for language-based security in Chapter 7
In Part III, we illustrate new ideas to install safeguards in programs to reduce their
attack surface. We present the concept for a mechanism for slicing Java libraries to their
actually-used parts to limit their permission footprint in an application in Chapter 8. We
then go deeper into the rabbit hole of capability-based security and explore the effect
of the Object-Capability Model on a more fine-grained level in Chapter 9. We close
this part with a review of related work for isolation in the Java Virtual Machine and
language-based isolation techniques in general (Chapter 10).
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Part IV summarizes this thesis and presents an outlook to areas of further future
work.
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Part I.
Programming Languages and
Security
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Hardening Systems During Development
Numerous techniques exist to secure systems in production. Firewalls filter malicious
network traffic, transport-layer encryption protects messages on a network from eaves-
dropping, and intrusion-detection systems alert administrators of suspicious system be-
havior. These defenses commonly treat the protected system as a black box. On the
one hand, this makes these protection mechanisms portable between different systems,
but on the other hand this approach dismisses the possibility to protect these systems
by removing their vulnerabilities. Systematically removing vulnerabilities from a system
during development is called hardening of the system.
Programming languages and runtime environments already provide a wide range of
defensive techniques to harden systems. In this part of the thesis, we provide an overview
of attacks and defenses that are based on programming languages or runtime principles.
In Chapter 2 we inspect the conceptual foundations of secure software engineering. We
start with a discussion of the field of language-based security and present the techniques
of certifying compilers, defensive execution, and the use of type systems for security.
Furthermore, we present techniques directed at information-flow control. The chapter
continues with a view on the topic of language-theoretic security. We present the idea
of weird machines and the question why protocols are not different from programming
languages. A constructive approach to the problem of effective authority assessment is
the Object-Capability Model. As we assess the security of some of our approaches using
this model, we present it in this chapter.
In Chapter 3, we then take a look at programming languages and specific methods
of software security. Therefore, we assume the point of view of an attacker and inspect
common attacks on programs compiled down to low-level languages. We also present
techniques modern operating systems offer to defend against those attacks. When de-
signing systems, security can be build in from the very beginning. We, therefore, present
two important principles: Least Privilege and Trusted Computing Base. We use and ex-
tend these principles throughout this thesis. They have also been used in the design of
the Java platform. As most of the approaches presented in this thesis are targeting the
Java platform, we extend on Java’s security model. An integral part of the security of
the Java platform is its high-level access control feature. This stack-based access-control
mechanism is responsible for guarding critical functionality, such as filesystem or net-
work operations. Other platforms (e.g., .NET CLR) use similar approaches. However,
despite the defenses protecting Java applications and the systems running them, the
platform has been (and probably still is) the target of specialized attacks. We present
some of these attacks that motivated our work. Specifically, we extend on a class of at-
tacks named Confused-Deputy Attacks. We illustrate this class of attacks using a specific
vulnerability that was present in the Java platform until 2012.
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The terminology and techniques presented in this part are helpful to understand the
contributions of this thesis. The insights from this study of previous attacks and state-
of-the-art defenses motivate our work presented in following parts of the thesis.
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In this chapter we present the conceptual foundations for our contributions and provide
the relation to our own work. This aids in putting the contributions of this thesis into
perspective. We start with techniques to secure low-level code, ranging from compilation
techniques over monitoring approaches to type system-based methods. We follow this
with a brief introduction to the idea of information flow and a more recent take on a
language-theoretic view of software security. We close this chapter with a description of
the Object-Capability Model.
2.1. Securing Low-Level Code
In the 1990s computer systems became more interconnected and accompanying this shift
software became increasingly mobile, meaning that not only data but also programs
are delivered through those new communication channels. An example for this is the
applet mechanism of Java: a user downloads a program from a website and executes it
immediately after. New questions about the trustworthiness of programs arose, which
were addressed with methods from the field of Language-Based Security [Koz99, SMH01].
It uses program analysis and rewriting to ensure security policies on programs.
2.1.1. Certifying Compilers
The execution of programs in native code can have a significant impact on the security
of a system (cf. Section 3.1), as they come with no guarantees on the safety of exe-
cuting them. Certifying Compilers can help to alleviate this problem and to provide
some guarantees on native code to be executed by an end user. In this model, a pro-
gram in low-level code (e.g., assembly code or Java Bytecode) is accompanied with a
certificate of some sort (cf. Figure 2.1). This can be a formal proof about some policy,
type annotations, or other forms of certificates. The certificates are created during a
compilation step when the program is rewritten from a high-level language (e.g., Java
or C++) to a low-level language. These certificates can then be validated against the
delivered program code and checked for desired properties. If the desired policies cannot
be guaranteed the program execution can be prevented, thus, protecting the system.
The certificate produced by the compiler enables the user of a program to verify
the information in the certificate against the program. Hence, the user receives a set of
guarantees the program conforms to. Kozen [Koz99] argues that the minimum a program
should guarantee are three fundamental safety properties: (i) Control-flow safety, (ii)
memory safety, and (iii) stack safety. Control-flow safety means a program should only
execute a jump or call within its own code segment and only to valid function entry
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Program in High-Level 
Programming Language
Certifying Compiler
Program in Low-Level 
Programming Language
Certificate
Verifier
Running program
End-userSoftware Developer
Figure 2.1.: General Workflow of a Certifying Compiler
points. Returns should only happen to the respective call site. Memory safety means
a program should only read or write within the limits of its own static data segment,
heap and valid stack frames. And finally, stack safety means a runtime stack should
always be preserved across function calls. However, in Kozen’s definition minor changes
to a runtime stack may be valid as this is necessary for efficiency (e.g., tail-recursion
elimination).
Kozen names Java as the first large-scale implementation of a certifying compiler.
The Java platform uses an intermediate Bytecode format that includes information that
a verifier can use to assert the type correctness, control-flow safety, stack safety, and
memory safety of the program to be executed (cf.Section 3.3). It is Java’s first line of
defense for mobile code.
The concept has been picked up many times. The .NET Framework also compiles to an
intermediate format (CIL) that is verified at load time. Several certifying compilers for
various other languages and protocols have been proposed [CLN+00, BNR06, ABB+10,
NL04, LZC+10].
Proof-Carrying Code The concept of proof-carrying code (PCC) [Nec97] takes this idea
one step further. Here, code is delivered with a formal proof of general safety properties.
A software provider is responsible for proof generation. A software consumer is then
responsible for checking the proof for correctness given the program code. Safety policies
are expressed in first-order logic that is augmented with symbols for the respective
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programming language or machine model.
The protocol (cf. Figure 2.2) consists of a two-phase interaction between the software
provider and the software consumer. First, the provider supplies the annotated object
code containing pre- and postconditions as well as loop invariants to the consumer.
These annotations are produced by a certifying compiler. It uses information gathered
during a compilation and program-analysis step to create loop invariants. The pre-
and postconditions have to supplied by the programmer. The software consumer then
produces a verification condition based on these annotations, which is a logical formula
on the safety conditions the program needs to fulfill. The supplier then produces a proof
for this formula which the consumer checks for validity with a proof checker.
Program in High-Level 
Programming Language
Certifying Compiler
Program in Low-Level 
Programming Language
Certificate
ConsumerProvider
Verifier
Verification ConditionProof Generator
Proof Proof checker
Running program
Figure 2.2.: Protocol of Proof-Carrying Code
As the PCC protocol requires a two-way interaction between the software developer
and the end user, it is considered unsuitable for the delivery of end-user software. How-
ever, the concept is applicable to code that is traversing trust boundaries inside a system.
For instance, a Linux kernel allows for code to be executed in kernel mode, which is able
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1 int fib(int n) {
2 if (n == 0) return 0;
3 else if (n == 1) return 1;
4 else return (fib(n-1) + fib(n-2));
5 }
Listing 2.1: The Fibonacci Function
Implemented in C
1 define i32 @fib(i32 %n) #0 {
2 switch i32 %n, label %2 [
3 i32 0, label %8
4 i32 1, label %1
5 ]
6
7 ; <label>:1 ; preds = %0
8 br label %8
9
10 ; <label>:2 ; preds = %0
11 %3 = add nsw i32 %n, -1
12 %4 = tail call i32 @fib(i32 %3)
13 %5 = add nsw i32 %n, -2
14 %6 = tail call i32 @fib(i32 %5)
15 %7 = add nsw i32 %6, %4
16 ret i32 %7
17
18 ; <label>:8 ; preds = %0, %1
19 %.0 = phi i32 [ 1, %1 ], [ 0, %0 ]
20 ret i32 %.0
21 }
Listing 2.2: The Fibonacci Function
Compiled to LLVM IR
with Optimization Level
3
to do considerably more harm to a system than a process running in user mode. With
proof-carrying code the kernel can verify that code provided by a user only performs the
tasks it is allowed to do. Thus, proof-carrying code is an important concept for code
that will be executed in an elevated privilege environment.
Typed Assembly Language In the compilation process of typed high-level program-
ming languages type information is mostly removed in the produced low-level code. In
typed assembly languages [MWCG99] this information is preserved, transformed, and
included in the object code in a low-level language. Proofs for type safety of the pro-
gram is provided with the program’s low-level code. Therefore, code in a typed assembly
language was certified by the compiler and can be safely run after a verification step.
The idea behind typed assembly languages is to provide automated facilities to check
programs will not violate the rules of their language. For instance, in conventional
stack-based instruction sets (e.g., x86) every operand is a fixed bit-length integer (e.g.,
16-bit, 32-bit, 64-bit, depending on the register model). All instructions work on these
operands, regardless of the underlying type of the operand. With TALx86 Morrisett
et al. [MCG+99] provide an implementation of a typed assembly language for the x86
instruction set, that augments instructions with type information in the form of pre-
and postconditions. It supports register, stack, and heap type safety. Even higher-order
constructs such as arrays, sums, or recursive types are supported.
Java Bytecode is a typed assembly language, but only provides some of these guar-
antees (cf. Section 3.3). In particular these are register, stack, and heap type safety,
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but higher-order constructs are missing. Interestingly, these guarantees are enough to
provide a memory-safe environment for programs to execute. Bytecode instructions are
typed and the Bytecode verifier checks whether all instruction work on correctly typed
data.
Another widely-used implementation of the idea of typed assembly languages is LLVM
IR [LA04]. Its underlying type system is designed to be language independent and allows
primitive types of varying length as well as the derived types pointers, arrays, structures,
and functions. Higher-level types such as classes are implemented using these types. We
show an example of C code and the compiled bitcode in Listing 2.1 and Listing 2.2.
Instructions in the LLVM IR instruction set are overloaded so that they can operate
on different types, yet only in the correct combination. LLVM provides register, stack,
and heap type safety to the degree that declared type information must not be trusted
and has to be checked with an integrated pointer analysis, as weakly-typed high-level
languages are supported by LLVM.
2.1.2. Defensive Execution
A different approach to the safe execution of possibly untrusted code is defensive ex-
ecution. A program is run regardless of its origin and closely observed by a reference
monitor. This reference monitor has the ability to pause or terminate program execution
and to incept any operation of the program with an external component. This gives it
the ability to enforce security policies and to secure the system.
References monitors can either be working outside of the address space of the program
running in a seperate process or they can be inlined by program rewriting. In the latter
case reference monitors become a language-based approach. During compile-time or
load-time a program can be rewritten, such that an inline reference monitor (IRM) is
installed into the program code.
The IRM is then executed as part of the possibly untrusted program. Typically, the
IRM is injected at specific operations that form security events regarding the policy to
be enforced. It tracks all of these intercepted operations in its own state. This allows for
state-based policies, e.g., to disallow operations after an allowed threshold is surpassed.
The obvious cost reference monitors entail is the runtime overhead stemming from the
event checks that have to be executed even when operations are legitimate.
A popular approach applying runtime monitoring is Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) [ABEL05].
In a first step, CFI computes a static over-approximation of the control-flow graph of
the program to be protected. This generates a policy for the runtime monitor, which,
in the second step, is responsible to monitor jumps and calls in the program (security
events) and intercepts them when they are not included in the pre-computed policy. We
present this approach in more detail in Section 3.1.
2.1.3. Type Systems
Type systems have an intrinsic application to security. They ensure that operations are
only applied to appropriate values. They effectively enforce memory and control safety
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as only appropriate memory locations can be used for operations and control can only
be transferred to appropriate points in the program. Moreover, type systems of most
programming languages allow the programmer to construct high-level abstractions that
prevent unauthorized access by means of type-level access control (cf. Section 3.3).
Type information is a valuable asset to reason about the security properties of a
program. In TAL, Java Bytecode, and other low-level languages it is preserved to be
used in later verification steps. Using type systems for security is a shift from putting
the burden of policy enforcement from the end user to the developer. The developer is
forced to write a program conforming to the type system automatically, ensuring that
it is safe to execute. It is also execution time efficient in the sense that most – if not all
– type soundness checks can be made at compile-time or load-time and do not require
costly runtime checks.
However, current mainstream type systems have limitations that lead to the need
for dynamic value checking. For instance, the type system of C++ does not check for
array-index constraints. Schneider et al. [SMH01] argue that this is just a matter of the
expressiveness of the underlying logic. They name work on dependent types to eliminate
array-bound checks [XP98] as an example for the dormant power in type systems.
2.2. Information-Flow Security
Defensive techniques for software security are distinguished by their protection goal,
i.e., what policies they protect from what kind of attacks. The approaches presented so
far protect the confidentiality of a part of the system. For instance, access control to
sensitive data effectively protects the release of that data. Only authorized subjects may
receive this data according to their privilege. However, access control does not protect
the proliferation of this data. Once it is released, the source of this sensitive data cannot
control any longer how this data is passed on to other, possibly unauthorized subjects.
For example, the confidentiality of an encrypted piece of data is guaranteed (assuming
the cryptography is unbreakable) only as long as the data is encrypted. Once the receiver
decrypts the data, the sender cannot control what the receiver does with it.
Methods from the field of information-flow security [DD77, SM03] aim to protect
confidentiality policies in an end-to-end design [SRC84], which means the confidentiality
of information is enforced in the system as a whole. Using such an enforcement for the
previous example means the piece of data is protected from its creation at the site of the
sender to its destruction on the site of the receiver. It can only be used in accordance
to its confidentiality policy. Information-flow security is a language-based technique,
as it either uses the semantics of the language or the type system to reason about the
confidentiality of a piece of information. An extensive inspection of stack-based access
control and information-flow security is given by Banerjee and Naumann [BN05]. They
also provide a static analysis for secure information flow that checks for the correct use
of access control in a program.
Type-system-based approaches use type checking to statically enforce confidentiality
policies. Implementations such as JIF [Mye99, MNZZ] augment regular types with
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annotations for specific security policies about the use of the such typed data. For
instance, a variable may be declared as an integer belonging to a principal p that also
grants access to principal q. These policies are then enforced during compilation by
the type checker. Any use of a variable in a context that does not conform to the
security policy does not type check and results in a compilation error. Just as type
checking is compositional, checking security types is too. Abstraction mechanisms such
as subtyping, polymorphism, dependent, or linear types can be used.
Semantic-based approaches have the ability to reason about non-interference or declas-
sification policies on a program using a formal model of security in the form of program
behavior rules. Non-interference means that an attacker cannot learn any information
about confidential data from the system. This entails that every information in the
system that depends on the sensitive data cannot be inspected by the attacker. As non-
interference is usually too restrictive for real-world applications, declassification policies
have been devised. They allow for the controlled declassification of information in the
four dimensions: what, who, where, and when.
The main advantage of information-flow approaches is that they track implicit flows,
meaning that not only explicit assignments are tracked in checking a confidentiality
policy, but also any value that depends on sensitive values. However, all approaches
need the programmer to augment their program with policy information or other formal
specifications which programmers are rarely willing or able to provide. Thus, formal
approaches are only applicable in cases where the security requirements justify the extra
work.
2.3. Language-Theoretic Security
In previous sections, we reviewed defenses to allow the safe execution of untrusted code
and attacks against either these defenses or attacks against the underlying system (e.g.,
buffer overflows). Yet, there are effective attacks that do not require the transfer of
untrusted code to the attacked party. The systems attacked are vulnerable, simply
because they receive a message of some kind from the attacker, which is essentially a
request to perform a computation on the untrusted input value (e.g., parsing). What
looks benign at first glance, turns out to be a severe security issue when inspected more
closely.
Sassaman et al. [SPBL13] argue that the increased use of composition in current
software development fosters the creation and use of communication protocols between
those components as more boundaries have to be crossed. But, as Fred Schneider puts
it: “Since (by definition) interfaces provide the only means for influencing and sensing
system execution, interfaces necessarily constitute the sole avenues for conducting at-
tacks against a system.” [Sch11]. Thus, if we increase the number of boundaries (i.e.,
interfaces) we increase the attack surface of the system.
Intrusion detection systems have been designed with this particular class of attacks in
mind. However, to be effective they have to mimic the behavior of the input recognizer
code they protect. They may also introduce vulnerabilities that were not there before,
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because the code of the detection system can be faulty. Despite much effort, these
systems do not fundamentally reduce the insecurity of the system they protect. Sassaman
et al. found that the underlying problem is the computational power of the input language
of the interface. If the input language itself is undecidable, there will be no feasible way
to produce a recognizer for this language which will fulfill safety (nothing bad happens),
liveness (something good will eventually happen) [Lam77, AS87], or termination (it will
eventually terminate) properties.
Therefore, it is impossible to show the equivalence of the encoding and the decoding
of the language between the components. As a simple example take the interface be-
tween the Java Class Library and its native counterpart for operating-system binding
(cf. Section 3.3 and Section 4.3). These two components frequently exchange memory
pointers. Since Java does not have an explicit type for pointers, the native code converts
it to an integer value and passes it to the Java side. As it is not explicitly typed on the
Java side, the integer value can be freely modified and then returned to the native code,
which converts it back to a pointer. However, this pointer may now target a different
possibly unrelated section of memory, which might lead to unexpected – if not harmful
– results when the native code is executed using this pointer value. The two parties did
not agree on a reliable protocol and, therefore, the Java component did not enforce the
policies on the pointer value. To make pointer handling explicit and enforceable, other
language, such as VB.NET or C#, feature specific pointer types (e.g., IntPtr).
Bratus et al. [BLP+11] use the term weird machines for the computational concept
behind these kind of attacks, because they demonstrate hidden, unexpected computa-
tional power in the existing code base. This hidden power can be harnessed by attackers
using crafted input values – the exploit code. In this exploit code, they argue, lies a
constructive proof that computations that are not intended by the original developer
can still be achieved. Thus, exploits provide evidence of incorrect assumptions on the
powerfulness of the program. In terms of formal language theory, they demonstrate a
computationally stronger automaton than the one intended.
Of course, languages of the inputs exchanged between components can be more com-
plex than this easy example. Sassaman et al. argue that all programs processing input
languages should be decidable. Input languages as they understand are file formats, wire
formats, encodings, scripting languages, finite-state concurrent systems such as network
protocols, and of course mobile code in low-level formats. A language in the class of
recursively-enumerable languages is a security risk, as its parser is not guaranteed to
terminate and could perform arbitrary computations on behalf of the attacker.
More complex examples are injection attacks such as SQL injections or buffer over-
flows. While in the former example, a parser fails to interpret an argument and provides a
new command to the SQL database, in the latter example, an attacker uses an unchecked
access to a bounded region of memory (e.g., an array or a buffer) to read or write beyond
the bounds of that region. Sassaman et al. show that even complex protocols, such as
PKCS#1, can be inspected in terms of language expressiveness and decidability.
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2.4. The Object-Capability Model
Many programming languages and their underlying security models allow for authority to
be transferred implicitly (e.g. Stack-Based Access Control, cf. Section 3.3). This enables
attack schemes such as the Confused Deputy (cf. Section 3.4). A model that enforces
explicit, and therefore traceable, authority transfer is the Object-Capability Model [MS03,
Mil06]. It provides fine-grained privilege separation based on the insight that in an
object-oriented system the only way to execute an operation on (or to retrieve data
from) an object is to have a reference to that object in order to send a message to it.
A capability, in this sense, embodies a transferable permission to perform operations on
an object, which puts a strong emphasis on a reference and implies some requirements.
The first and most important requirement states that references must be unforgeable.
That means that there is no way to obtain a reference to an object other than construct-
ing the object the reference points to or receiving it through a method (or constructor)
parameter. The Java language fulfills this requirement, but in C++ a programmer can
construct references to arbitrary objects on the heap by constructing memory pointers
to the objects position. When this requirement is not fulfilled, no assumptions on ac-
cessible objects can be made anymore, as any object can be reached at any point in the
program.
As a second requirement, an object system needs to ensure private state encapsu-
lation. Without this, a reference to an object always makes all references this object
holds accessible, therefore, breaking isolation. Also, no shared mutable state may be
used. Objects can collude and share references over such a channel and, hence, tracking
references becomes significantly harder. As a last requirement, devices like the network
socket or the filesystem must only be accessible through objects, otherwise they cannot
be protected.
In order to obtain authority only these four mechanisms may be used:
Initial Condition In the initial condition of the program inspected, an object A already
has a reference to object B. For example, the configuration of a program environment
using dependency injection (e.g., Spring) already sets this reference and the environment
initiates the program with that reference already in place.
Parenthood An object A creates a new object B and, thus, receives the only reference
to the new object B.
Endowment An object A creates a new object B and provides it a subset of its refer-
ences. Object A receives the only reference of the new object B. Object B now has the
set of references A has provided.
Introduction An object A already has a reference to object B and C. Object A can
now send a message to object B containing a reference to object C. After receiving this
message object B now has a reference to object C.
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When the requirements of the model are met and the four transfer rules are followed,
the reference graph of the objects on the heap is exactly the access graph of the program.
This allows to safely reason over the security of the system by means of this access graph.
The idea of capability-based security systems is indeed older. Dennis and van Horn
introduced the idea of capabilities [DVH66] for the design of computer systems. Their
notion of capability is a data structure that provides a guarded access to a computing
resource. A capability has a concept of ownership and can be granted and ungranted
by means of the programming language of the system. The idea has been adopted in
system design, although not into current mainstream operating systems. For instance,
the KeyKOS microkernel [Har85] implements the idea for IBM’s System/370 and UNIX.
Newer implementations are POSIX Capabilities [Bac02] and Capsicum [WALK10], both
based on the idea to split monolithic UNIX processes in smaller parts with limited
authority.
The first work transferring the idea from system design to language design was the
E programming language1 by Miller, Borstein, and others. It was designed for the
robust composition of distributed systems and implemented object capabilities. In their
J-Kernel system van Eicken et al. [vECC+99] apply the concept to Java and provide
capability-based protection domains. Interestingly, their work was developed in parallel
to the Version 1.2 redesign of Java’s security model, but allows a more fine-grained
separation.
Several language subsets have been proposed to derive capability-safe languages from
common programming languages. The following list is not nearly complete but repre-
sentative. Oz-E [SVR05] is a capability-safe variant of Oz [Smo95], a multi-paradigm
research language. Joe-E [MWC10, MW10] is a subset of Java. In Joe-E not only the
language was limited to conform to the Object-Capability Model, but also the class li-
brary was cut down to a capability-safe part. Miller et al. provide Caja [MSL+08], which
is a capability-safe subset of JavaScript with the clear focus on composed applications
in web browsers.
1http://erights.org/
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In this chapter, we present a security view on programming languages and runtime plat-
forms with a particular focus on Java. We discuss attacks that use specific vulnerabilities
of programs written in or compiled to low-level languages. We then take a step back
and review two fundamental security principles: The Principle of Least Privilege and
the Trusted Computing Base. These are the foundations that defensive mechanisms for
security are build upon. Current programming languages and runtime environments al-
ready have various of these mechanisms for the safety and security of programs in place.
We discuss them using the example of the Java platform.
3.1. Attacks on Programs: The Perils of Compiled Code
In memory, all things are created equal. Access to memory does not distinguish between
data or program, between executable or argument. This enables many features we take
for granted in modern computing, however, it also enables attackers to inject operations
into programs. Therefore, most current operating systems implement some form of
executable space protection, which marks parts of the memory as not writable or not
executable. In the most common implementations the heap and stack memory areas
of a program are protected by a not-executable (NX) flag. This hinders certain buffer-
overflow attacks from succeeding to inject and execute new instructions.
A buffer overflow can be used for an attack known as stack smashing [Lev96]. The
attacker uses a pointer to data on the stack to overwrite the return address of the function
currently on the stack. Attackers can then change the control flow of the program and
use the privileges of the program to gain access to a computer system. As an example,
take the code in Listing 3.1. The doStuff function uses the strcpy function in line 9.
This function, however, does not perform a bounds check on the arguments and allows to
write beyond the allocated memory of the character array c. When inspecting the stack
layout presented in Figure 3.1, we can see that crossing the allocation bounds of variable
c can overwrite the return address. An attacker can jump to any point in the memory
address space and execute instructions, if there is such an accessible return address.
Execution prevention techniques for memory effectively defend systems against con-
ventional stack buffer overflow attacks and protect the control-flow integrity policy
against jumps outside the program’s memory. However, the control flow inside the
program memory can still be hijacked by an attacker. In this category of attacks, called
Return-Oriented Programming (ROP), chosen machine-instruction sequences called gad-
gets are chained together through return-address manipulation. Leveraging a bug in the
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1 #include <string.h>
2
3 int main (int argc, char **argv) {
4 doStuff(argv[1]);
5 }
6
7 void doStuff(char *arg) {
8 char c[10];
9 strcpy(c, arg);
10 }
Listing 3.1: A
Program Vulnerable to a
Stack Buffer Overflow
Return address
main’s stack
Saved frame pointer
char	*arg
char	c[10]
M
em
or
y A
dd
re
ss
 S
pa
ce
Figure 3.1.: Example Layout of a Stack
for Function doStuff from
Listing 3.1
program (typically an unchecked buffer), the return address is overwritten with the ad-
dress of the next point in the control flow the attacker desires. If an attacker finds a
sufficient set of these gadgets (typically a read, a write, and a loop gadget), she can
execute arbitrary operations and, thus, take control of the program. Gadgets are usu-
ally found in shared library code (e.g., libc [Ner01]). As all such library code is located
inside the memory area of the program and can be executed eventually as part of normal
program flow, techniques for execution prevention do not limit the possibilities of ROP
attacks.
An effective defense integrated into modern operating systems is Address Space Layout
Randomization (ASLR). In this defensive mechanism, the address space positions of data
areas, libraries, the heap and the stack are randomized for each process. Therefore, it
is harder for an attacker to predict, where the gadgets necessary for a ROP attack are
located.
A more recent mitigation attempt was described by Vasilis Pappas [Pap12]. His
kBouncer technique was motivated by the fact that ASLR is often ineffective in prac-
tice, because of fixed parts of the address space, incompatible libraries, or computeable
base addresses of libraries. It leverages the Last Branch Record feature included in In-
tel processors to check for problematic return instructions and intervenes, if necessary.
However, Carlini and Wagner [CW14] as well as Schuster et al. [STP+14] have shown
how ROP attacks can be masked in such a way that the most popular defenses kBouncer,
ROPecker [CZY+14], and ROPGuard [Fra12] do not detect them.
Another strategy to prevent return-oriented programming is Control-Flow Integrity
(CFI) [ABEL05]. The idea is to compute a static control-flow graph for a program
and to have a runtime monitor prevent executions of any call or branch that is not
included in this graph. It has long been considered as a strong defense mechanism
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against ROP and other control-flow attacks. However, recently Carlini et al. [CBP+15]
have shown that even this defense can be circumvented with reasonable effort. Their
attack technique named Control-Flow Bending leverages valid jump targets allowed by
the CFI implementation (e.g. using a modified function pointer) to achieve the attack
goal. They show that this technique is effective even against fully-precise static CFI.
3.2. Guiding Security Principles for Secure Software
Engineering
Besides adding defensive mechanisms to operating systems or runtime engines, it is also
desirable to construct programs free of vulnerabilities. In the pursuit of developing
secure software, principles can help to guide efforts towards this goal. We present two
such principles, which are relevant for this thesis: The Principle of Least Privilege and
the Trusted Computing Base.
The Principle of Least Privilege [SS75] states that every program and every user
should operate using the least set of privileges necessary to complete the job. Also, if the
system is connected to other systems, the amount and volume of interactions between
these systems should also be limited to the necessary minimum. Following this principle
limits the damage a program can do, when privilege is misused by an attacker that
gained control. This has two consequences: (a) Privilege is less likely to be abused,
because it is more scarce and (b) in case of a privilege abuse, the number of programs
to review is reduced to those that need the privilege to function. Both consequences are
strong arguments to follow the principle as it makes exploitation less rewarding and it
guides resources for program review towards critical programs.
However, software development has changed considerably since the principle was de-
fined in 1975. Programs are not monolithic blocks of code anymore. Library reuse has
become a necessity in the efficient development of software [Boe99]. This entails that
programs are delivered with a significant amount of third-party code. To ensure that
this code conforms to the security requirements of the program, it is therefore necessary
to review the code of all third-party libraries before including them into the program.
This is required because this code is running in the same security context – the principal
– as the rest of the program and thus possesses all the privileges of the program.
The Principle of Least Privilege permits library reuse, as this third-party code is a
part of the delivered program and necessary for its functionality. Nevertheless, from
a security standpoint this is not a satisfactory solution: We have modularity in code,
such that different code providers can influence a final program, yet, we do not have
modularity or separation of principality. This observations leads us to a reformulation
of the Principle of Least Privilege.
Every program, every part of the program, and every user of the system
should operate using the least set of privileges necessary to complete the job.
This reformulation immediately leads to the need for mechanisms to determine and
limit the set of privileges available to parts (e.g., libraries, components) of a software
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systems. We will present such mechanisms in this thesis.
The notion of Trusted Computing Base (TCB) [Rus81] describes a set of compo-
nents of a system that are implicitly trusted. Usually, this is the hardware, firmware,
(parts of) the operating system, and a compiler. As these components are implicitly
trusted, a vulnerability in these components jeopardizes the security of the entire sys-
tem. However, components outside the TCB can be effectively monitored and isolated
by components in the TCB. As it is paramount for the overall security of the system,
designers of TCB components attempt to keep its size as small as possible. This is also
useful when formally verifying its security, as less code has to be checked, thus, making
the proof process easier.
In a Linux system, the TCB consists of the hardware (including firmware), parts
of the kernel, and the C compiler. The security of every program compiled with this
compiler directly depends on the compiler’s security. When we verify the kernel parts
and the compiler and trust the hardware, we can, therefore, conclude that the system’s
foundation is secure and programs running on this setup thus can be secure as well. If we
fail to show this, no program running on this setup can be considered secure, regardless
of the programs individual properties.
3.3. The Java Security Model
The Java platform originated in 1991 and had its first public release in 1995. The design
goals from the very beginning were to provide an easy programming language, operating-
system independence, safety guarantees, and a sophisticated access-control model. The
latter was motivated by the requirement to support so-called mobile code. This concept
describes the ability of a program to be installed on-the-fly over a network and its ability
to load components during runtime. From the beginning it was clear to the designers of
Java, that this feature of the platform raised the need for an access-control mechanism
to prevent abuse [Gon98, Gon11].
Java programs and libraries are not compiled to actual machine code immediately. The
Java compiler emits code in an intermediate language – Java Bytecode (cf. Listing 3.2).
Programs and libraries are delivered to the end user in this format. The Java Runtime
Environment (JRE) then performs a Just-In-Time (JIT) compilation step to run it on
the end user’s operating system and hardware.
The first layer of defense for mobile code is Bytecode verification [Ler01, Yel95, Gos95].
When loading a class, the Java runtime first checks the Bytecode for various properties.
The specific guarantees provided by these checks are:
• Type correctness, i.e., all arguments of an instruction are always of the types
expected by the instruction. Java is a strongly-typed language and the benefits of
this approach are preserved in Java Bytecode as well.
• Balanced stack operations, i.e., the stack can never be less than an empty stack
and never be larger than the maximal stack size. Instructions will not be executed,
if they violate this rule and, thus, cannot break into adjacent parts of the memory.
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1 public class Test {
2 public int multiply(int first, int second) {
3 int val = first * second;
4 return val;
5 }
6 }
7
8 public class Test {
9 public Test();
10 Code:
11 0: aload_0
12 1: invokespecial #1 // Method java/lang/Object."<init>":()V
13 4: return
14
15 public int multiply(int, int);
16 Code:
17 0: iload_1
18 1: iload_2
19 2: imul
20 3: istore_3
21 4: iload_3
22 5: ireturn
23 }
Listing 3.2: Example of Java Code and the Resulting Compiled Bytecode
• Code containment, i.e., program counters can only point to parts inside the same
method and only the starting part of an instruction. Branches can, therefore, never
jump to any other position than the start of the instruction they want to jump to.
• Register and object initialization, i.e., a load operation must always be pre-
ceded by at least one store operation. If an object is created, the initialization
methods must always be invoked before the instance can be used.
• Access control, i.e., all method invocations, field accesses, and class references
must honor the visibility modifiers of the respective construct.
Although all of these properties can be checked at runtime, these checks are performed
at load time to prevent a slow-down of the program. Bytecode that has been verified
once can be executed safely.
3.3.1. Type Correctness
The Bytecode verifier performs a type-level abstract interpretation [CC77] of the pro-
vided Bytecode. All instructions in Java Bytecode are typed already. Types processed
by the abstract interpretation include the primitive types (int, long, float, and double
– boolean, byte, short, and char are represented by int in Bytecode), object types
(identified by their names), array types, and null. There is an additional element to
describe uninitialized registers (local variables).
This is an important distinction of the Java Bytecode instruction set to other stack-
based instruction sets (e.g., x86), where the instructions are free to operate on whatever
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arguments are on top of the stack. In Java, this verification step ensures that the
operands on the stack and in local variables are of the correct type. This is also enforced
for branches that meet on the same point.
During the abstract interpretation all Bytecode instructions of each method are ex-
ecuted, but operate over types and not concrete values. For instance, the interpreter
executes an iadd operation only if two integer-typed values are on the top of the stack.
Method invocations are treated as if they were well-typed, given that if the opposite
was true, the verification of the called method would fail. Verification fails when the
interpreter gets stuck, i.e., fails to find a valid transition in the operational semantics
of the Bytecode language. This verification step guarantees the type correctness of the
Bytecode blocks and prevents stack over- and underflows.
3.3.2. Low-Level Access Control
Classes, methods, and fields in Java can be declared with the visibility modifiers public,
protected, and private. If this modifier is missing, a fourth visibility level (default)
is assumed. Elements with a private modifier can only be used in the scope of the
enclosing class. Elements without a modifier can only be used in the scope of the same
package as the enclosing class. Elements with a protected modifier can only be used in
the scope of the same package as the enclosing class or a subclass of this class. Elements
with the public modifier can be used from everywhere. The Bytecode verifier checks
whether these conditions are fulfilled and rejects Bytecode that does not conform to
them. In a previous step, the Java compiler also checks for these conditions and does
not compile Java programs if the check fails. However, as Bytecode might also be created
without the use of the Java compiler, the verification step is necessary to enforce access
control.
Java’s access control implements the idea of information hiding [Par72], which fosters
the limitation of critical data to the necessary scope and, therefore, implements the
Principle of Least Privilege at the language level. For instance, an object that contains
a piece of sensitive data effectively controls the access to this information by storing it
in a private field. Each method of the object now has the ability and the obligation to
check the permissions of a caller, before returning the data.
However, with reflection, access control can easily be circumvented. A principal with
the permission to access the reflection capabilities of Java can view, manipulate, and
delete the complete internal state of every object it has a reference to. This breaks any
assumption on the protection of sensitive data or operations the object owns. Reflection
can also be used in accordance to information hiding, so to distinguish the different uses
we call reflection that breaks information hiding Intrusive Reflection.
3.3.3. Memory Safety
In contrast to languages like C or C++, Java does not allow direct manipulations of
memory. The Java runtime is responsible for allocating and deallocating memory for the
program. Also, it guarantees the proper initialization of value-type and reference-type
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variables. This eliminates the security problems with direct pointer access described
earlier (cf. Section 3.1) and provides a safe environment to run code from sources of
questionable trust.
Arrays and strings in Java are always bounds-checked. A write beyond the allocated
memory is, therefore, impossible. As each variable is initialized by the runtime engine, a
read from uninitialized memory can never happen. Also, as Java uses garbage collection,
it is not possible to have a reference to an object that has already been deallocated from
memory.
However, even though the language forbids direct memory manipulations, they are
possible from Java code using the Java API, specifically with methods from sun.misc.-
Unsafe. As Mastrangelo et al. [MPM+15] have shown, the use of this API is rather
prevalent in current Java code. Of course, the use of these methods invalidates any
memory safety guarantees the platform can give. The particularly critical part here is
that the use of sun.misc.Unsafe often happens unbeknownst to the application devel-
oper as part of libraries. Therefore, it is of paramount importance to make this visible
to the application developer when including libraries to her application.
Direct memory operations from the Java side can have the same catastrophic conse-
quences as they have from C/C++ code. The virtual machine can be compromised or
crashed. The heap of a Java program cannot be trusted anymore, if such operations are
in use.
Technically, this is not only true for uses of sun.misc.Unsafe, but every native func-
tion that can be reached from the Java side. Any vulnerability in the native part of
the Java platform jeopardizes any guarantees given on higher layers. For instance, im-
age processing functions in the native part of the JCL were prone to buffer overflow
attacks triggered by prepared images passed from Java code (e.g., in CVE-2015-47601).
Therefore, any value passed to a native function in Java has to be treated as possibly
harmful.
3.3.4. High-Level Access Control
A verified program in Java Bytecode can be safely run on a Java Virtual Machine w.r.t.
the guarantees discussed before. However, these guarantees do not protect operating
system resources such as the filesystem of the machine. For this purpose Java uses a
sophisticated access control system. The platform is provided with a standard set of
policies suited for the protection from harmful mobile code (e.g., applets). Developers
can add policies and custom permissions to the access control system.
1 grant [SignedBy "signer_names"] [, CodeBase "URL"] {
2 permission permission_class_name ["target_name"] [, "action"] [, SignedBy "signer_names"];
3 permission ...
4 }
Listing 3.3: Syntax Example for a Java Policy File
Using a policy file (cf. Listing 3.3) specific parts of a Java program can be en-
trusted with a number of permissions. These parts are identified either by their origin
1https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2015-4760
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(CodeBase), or a digital signature (SignedBy), or both. Permissions can have arguments
to limit the permission. For instance, java.io.FilePermission has two arguments:
The first argument describes a file pattern for which the permission should be granted.
The second argument describes whether the permission is only granted for reading or
for reading and writing to files and directories matching this pattern.
Writing these policy files is a complicated task and they are hard to test. We performed
a search on Java projects hosted on GitHub and found that less than 0.02% that were
providing policy files at all. This implies the policy feature of Java is used very little in
practice. Koved et al. [KPK02] contributed a technique to automatically infer a least
privilege policy for Java components. They provide a data-flow analysis that tracks
the use of Permission instances in order to determine the smallest set of permissions
necessary to run a piece of code. However, as the components have to be maintained, so
do these policy files, which puts an additional task on the list for software developers.
This task cannot be fully automated as the analysis can only approximate a policy and
will, e.g., miss dynamically created permission requests.
The enforcement of these policies is a runtime technique called Stack-Based Access
Control. In this model, sensitive operations are protected with explicit calls to a check
procedure that inspects the permission set of each frame on the current call stack ac-
cording to some pre-defined policy. If at least one frame of the stack does not possess the
requested permission, the operation fails. This access control scheme is not specific to
Java. It is used in other platforms such as the .NET Framework (Code Access Security)
as well. Yet, throughout this chapter, we use the Java security model to illustrate the
concept.
Permissions in Java are expressed as subclasses of java.security.Permission. Sev-
eral permission representations are already provided in the standard class library and
specific representations can be added by subclassing. Permissions can be specialized
by providing values in their constructor arguments. For example, instances of java.-
security.FilePermission can be specialized with a path or file pattern and an action
(i.e. read, write, execute, delete, and readlink). Permission instances are used in policy
files and in permission requests.
Critical resources or procedures have to be actively protected by calls to a check func-
tion. As Java’s security model was changed significantly in version 1.2 of the platform,
multiple of such functions exist. However, the only pattern that is backward compatible
is presented in Listing 3.4. A call to System.getSecurityManager() retrieves the appli-
cation’s instance of the SecurityManager class, which is only set in a restricted security
environment. This is the case when executing an applet in a browser or when setting the
security manager instance directly upon starting the Java VM. In cases where there is
no policy enforcement configured, the return value of System.getSecurityManager()
is null.
When policy enforcement is enabled, a call to the checkPermission method starts the
evaluation process. Consider the following example: An instance of class MyUntrustedClass,
which as the name suggest is not trusted in this scenario, tries to read a file through
an instance of the FileReader class. For clarity of presentation, we skip technical
details in the description of this example, but present a full call stack in Figure 3.2.
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1 SecurityManager security = System.getSecurityManager();
2 if (security != null) {
3 FilePermission perm = new FilePermission("somepathtofile", "read");
4 security.checkPermission(perm);
5 }
Listing 3.4: Checking a Specific File Permission
AccessController.checkPermission(Permission)	line:	529	
SecurityManager.checkPermission(Permission)	line:	549	 	
SecurityManager.checkRead(String)	line:	888	 	 	
FileInputStream.<init>(File)	line:	131		 	 	
FileInputStream.<init>(String)	line:	97	 	 	 	
FileReader.<init>(String)	line:	58		 	 	
MyUntrustedClass.doFoo()	line:	13	 	 	 	
MyUntrustedClass.main(String[])	line:	8	 	 	 	
Figure 3.2.: Layout of a Call Stack for an Example File Operation
FileReader delegates this to an instance of the FileInputStream class, which starts
the permission evaluation process by calling checkPermission on the current instance
of SecurityManager. This method retrieves the current call stack of the application
and checks the policy of each stack frame against the permission requested, in this case
the FilePermission for this particular file. If this permission was granted to each stack
frame, the checkPermission method just returns to its caller and the operation is per-
formed. If one of the stack frames does not possess this permission, checkPermission
throws a SecurityException. This breaks the normal control flow and prevents the
critical operation (i.e., the file access).
When a Java applet calls a method to write a file to the client’s hard-drive, the check
procedure walks down on the stack, finds a stack frame from the applet’s code, and – ac-
cording to the default policy – denies the operation. Yet, there are cases where suppliers
of trusted code such as the JCL want to enable unprivileged clients to perform certain
privileged operations. For instance, an applet might be allowed to invoke operations
which need to read a specific configuration file from a client’s hard drive. Using the
model presented so far, the applet’s methods would be on the stack at the time of the
permission check and access to the file would be denied consequently.
The AccessController class offers a facility to perform such operations. Defined
actions can be performed using the doPrivileged method. This action will run with all
privileges of the caller (cf. Listing 3.5). Permission checks will end at the stack frame
containing the doPrivileged call and, therefore, only check stack frames that have
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1 doSomething() throws FileNotFoundException {
2 // code in normal privilege level
3
4 try {
5 FileInputStream specialFile = (FileInputStream) AccessController.doPrivileged(new
PrivilegedAction() {
6 public Object run() throws FileNotFoundException {
7 // code running in elevated privilege level
8 // example:
9 return new FileInputStream("someFile");
10 }
11 });
12 } catch (PrivilegedActionException e) {
13 // unwrap exception and rethrow
14 throw (FileNotFoundException) e.getException();
15 }
16
17 // code in normal privilege level
18 }
Listing 3.5: Elevating Privileges
been added with the privileged action. Callers of doPrivileged have the obligation
to carefully check the resources and operations they provide to unprivileged code, as
the sensitive function wrapped inside a doPrivileged call cannot check the full stack
anymore. Therefore, particular care has to be taken not to insert new vulnerabilities.
Alternatives to stack-based access control have been discussed extensively, because
of its limitation on information contained on the stack to express policies. Abadi et
al. [AF03] suggest to base access control on execution history rather than on the current
state of the stack. Their model does not only include method nesting as in stack-based
access control, but also includes any method call that has been executed prior to the
method that starts the check. Stack-based access control has no knowledge of these
methods and their changes to the global state of the application. If this global state
influences security-critical methods, stack-based access control will not prevent their
execution. Martinelli et al. [MM07] integrated history-based access control into Java
using IBM’s Jikes VM. However, history-based access control comes with a significant
overhead, as the method systematically needs to perform more costly checks.
An alternative called security-passing style was introduced by Wallach et al. [WAF00].
Here, security contexts are represented as pushdown automata, where calling a method
is represented by a push operation and returning is represented by a pop operation.
However, as these automata need to be weaved in with the program, their model requires
program rewriting.
Pistoia et al. [PBN07] introduce information-based access control, which is based on
stack-based and history-based access control. They argue that history-based access
control may prevent authorized code from executing because of less authorized code
executed previously, although it may not have influenced the security of the operation
that is about to be executed. In information-based access control every access-control
policy implies an information-flow policy. It augments stack inspections with the tracking
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Figure 3.3.: Untrusted Caller Loading a Class in Java 6
of information flow to sensitive operations. An extensive review on the relation of access
control and secure information flow is given by Banerjee and Naumann [BN05]. We
discuss work on information flow security in Section 2.2.
3.4. The Confused Deputy
Stack-based access control puts a large obligation on the developer providing security-
critical resources to correctly implement the necessary checks. For instance, if a filesys-
tem access would not be properly guarded by a call to SecurityManager.checkPermission
it would be open to every caller regardless of its actual permission. Moreover, using the
doPrivileged facility, programmers vouch that the operation they perform is permissi-
ble for every caller.
Attackers can exploit missing or faulty permission checks or elevate their privileges
with unprotected doPrivileged blocks. These accidental vulnerabilities of a system are
called Confused Deputies [Har88], because the vulnerable but trusted code is used to
execute operations on behalf of the unprivileged code. To the access-control facilities
everything seems to be in order, but unprivileged code can freely perform sensitive
actions, including deactivating access control altogether.
Multiple vulnerabilities2 like these have been exploited in the Java platform, especially
between late 2012 and early 2013. Most of these vulnerabilities exploit a flaw in the
implementation of access control in Java in so-called caller-sensitive methods [CGK15].
These methods implement shortcuts in the access-control check and usually only check
the permission of the immediate caller.3 Since Java 8, these methods are marked with
the @CallerSensitive annotation [RTC].
We illustrate this class of attacks with the exploit for CVE-2012-4681.4 Java offers
the ability to load classes at runtime and executing them using dynamic invocation with
information from reflective facilities in the platform. This feature of the platform can
2e.g., CVE-2012-4681, CVE-2013-0422, CVE-2013-2460
3Some methods check specific stack frames, but also do not perform full stack walks.
4https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2012-4681
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Figure 3.4.: Untrusted Caller Loading a Class in Java 7
be used to implement plug-in mechanisms or other forms of extensibility. Up to Java 6,
untrusted code could call the forName method of java.lang.Class to load the desired
class (cf. Figure 3.3). The forName method checks the authority of its caller to load the
class and either returns the Class instance or denies the operation.
Java 7 introduced a new class com.sun.beans.finder.ClassFinder (cf. Listing 3.6)
that is utilized to retrieve class instances. In order to retrieve the class by the name
given in the parameter className, it calls Class.forName using the class loader of the
current context. This performs the class loading operation in the security context of the
caller. However, when this operation fails and throws a SecurityException in case the
caller is not authorized to load this call, findClass calls Class.forName again using
its own class loader by not providing one explicitly. As ClassFinder is inside the trust
boundary of the JCL it is permitted to load any class. This implementation allowed
every caller to load any class. It has been secured by an additional check since Java 7
update 10.
Using the open class loader, the exploit was able to get a reference to a class called
sun.awt.SunToolkit that contained another vulnerability, which made it possible to
deactivate visibility access control for fields. This, in turn, allowed the exploit to deacti-
vate the SecurityManager altogether, allowing execution of arbitrary code in an applet
context. The exploit was actively used to deliver other malware ranging from botnet
nodes to remote control features.
However, it should have not been possible for the attacker to gain access to sun.awt.-
SunToolkit, as it resides inside a so-called restricted package. Classes inside restricted
packages cannot be used or loaded from a restricted security context such as an ap-
plet. The open class loader vulnerability inside ClassFinder enabled to load this class
using ClassFinder’s security context and is, therefore, considered a confused deputy.
The vulnerability of the unguarded call to Class.forName stems from the fact that
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1 public static Class<?> findClass(String className) {
2 try {
3 ClassLoader localClassLoader = Thread.currentThread().getContextClassLoader();
4 if (localClassLoader == null)
5 localClassLoader = ClassLoader.getSystemClassLoader();
6 if (localClassLoader != null)
7 return Class.forName(className, false, localClassLoader);
8 }
9 catch (ClassNotFoundException localClassNotFoundException) {}
10 catch (SecurityException localSecurityException) {}
11 return Class.forName(className);
12 }
Listing 3.6: Previous Implementation of ClassFinder.findClass (slightly
shortened)
it is a caller-sensitive method and, as such, requires the caller to check the necessary
permissions of the request, which ClassFinder failed to implement.
3.5. Open Issues Addressed in This Thesis
As seen in Section 3.1 attacks which alter the control flow of programs in favor of an
attacker’s goal are still common despite various operating-system-level defenses. While
there are solutions to detect and remove some of these vulnerabilities from program
code, developers still need to inspect the code manually for vulnerabilities these tools
cannot detect. Especially in larger codebases such as the Java Class Library with over
640k lines of C/C++ code or the Linux Kernel with over 15M lines of code, developers
need tools to guide them to critical areas where vulnerabilities are more likely to occur.
In case of Java, vulnerabilities in the native part can be triggered by code as part of
an application or Applet that is considered to be safe to be executed from a Java point
of view. This means that the guarantees of the Java platform such as access control and
memory safety cannot be upheld anymore after an attacker triggered a vulnerability in a
native function which can be reached from the Java side (cf. Section 3.3). In that sense
the native part of the Java Class Library is a weird machine that can be triggered with
crafted input values (cf. Section 2.3).
But, vulnerabilities might also be introduced upward the stack. Application developers
widely reuse library code in order to efficiently produce applications. However, library
code usually runs in the same security context as the application code. We consider this
a violation of the Principle of Least Privilege (cf. Section 3.2) as it is rarely necessary to
endow the library code with the complete permissions of the application code. Developers
require tools to detect and remove excessive privilege usage in parts of the library that
their application does not depend upon.
The Object-Capability Model (cf. Section 2.4) limits the means by which authority can
be transferred between parts of a program. Thus, authority can be tracked and analyzed
much easier than without these rules. The underlying assumption is that vulnerabilities
related to authority transfer (e.g., the Confused Deputy, cf. Section 3.4) can be averted
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using the rules of the model. This assumption has not yet been shown to be true.
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Monitoring
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A Slice of the Layer Cake
In the previous part, we identify many open challenges in software security. We present
the danger of uncontrolled memory access in low-level languages, which is still a large
problem in the wild despite various elaborate defense mechanisms. This does not only
affect programs written in languages such as C or C++, but also Java programs as we
have shown with the example of sun.misc.Unsafe. We describe the effect that reflective
facilities can have on encapsulation guarantees.
In this part of the thesis, we present three different program analysis approaches
that monitor the static representation of a program and derive a set of warnings if
problems are detected. All of them use the Java platform as their exemplifying case
study. However, the concepts presented are portable to other platforms with little or no
alteration. Also, all of the approaches have in common that they target the developer as
their primary user focus. The analyses, thus, form a set of monitoring tools for developers
to use in secure software development. They help to address the issues presented in the
previous part.
In general, the purpose of monitoring is the detection of possible policy violations.
The output of a monitoring system can then be used to guide ex-ante or ex-post isola-
tion. Traditionally, monitoring is perceived as being a run-time technique. However, an
analysis of the static representation of a program can also be considered as monitoring,
as it also observes a state (the static representation) and infers a rating on policy viola-
tion. In a static-analysis-based monitoring system the policy is encoded in the detection
criteria of the analysis.
In the construction of our monitoring defense mechanisms, we assume Baltopoulus
and Gordon’s Principle of Source-Based Reasoning [BG09]. It states that security prop-
erties of compiled code should follow from review of the source code and its source-level
semantics. In our case, this applies to LLVM IR and Java Bytecode as the ”source code”
of our analyses. Therefore, covert channel attacks and attacks that void this assumption
are out of scope for the guarantees we give.
When constructing monitoring schemes for the Java platform it is necessary to include
every layer of the platform in the design of the analysis. In order to produce any
observable effect, the Java Runtime Environment has to interact with the underlying
operating system. Two parts of the platform are responsible for this binding to the
operating system. There first is the Virtual Machine, the runtime engine for programs
that have been compiled to Java Bytecode. The second is a large part of the Java Class
Library that has been implemented in C or C++. This part can be (and has been) used
to break the higher-level security measures of Java.
Therefore, we designed and implemented an analysis that targets unsafe programming
practices in C and C++ code. We identified these unsafe programming practices by
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inspecting known categories of previous bugs in the native section of the JCL. We show
that we can effectively find possibly vulnerable parts in the native section of the JCL
using this technique.
The major purpose of the native implementations is to provide access to system ca-
pabilities such as network sockets or the filesystem. In order to limit the access to those
capabilities, the Java platform provides an access control system on the principle of stack-
based access control. However, when composing an application from third-party libraries
it is hard to control the permissions of these libraries in this model. We developed an
analysis to detect the capability usage of a library, so that effective counter-measures
can be taken in case a library exceeds its expected capability set.
The implementation of effective access control is a challenging task for developers
(cf. Section 3.3). Small programming mistakes may lead to either non-functional or
overly permissive code. These mistakes usually manifest themselves in infeasible code
paths as do many other classes of errors. We found that a large number of these errors
can be found with inspecting the causes of dead paths in the program. To find these
paths and their causes, we implemented a data-flow sensitive analysis based on abstract
interpretation.
To conclude this part of the thesis, we provide an overview over related work on
monitoring the static state of software systems.
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In contrast to languages like Java, which are considered safe languages, programming
languages such as C or C++ allow operations directly on the systems memory. Param-
eters to these operations have to be carefully checked in order to prevent vulnerabilities
in the program that can be exploited by attackers.
As Sergey Bratus et al. [BLP+11] present in their paper “Exploit Programming - From
Buffer Overflows to ’Weird Machines’ and Theory of Computation”, this is notoriously
hard for programmers and despite great care attackers still find parts of code to misuse for
exploits. They state that creating an exploit is programming with crafted data in order
to borrow code snippets that make up weird instructions, abstract instructions, which
can be multi-step and spread over the program. These form weird machines, that can
reach states in the state space of an automaton view of the program that were expected
to be unreachable when just inspecting the desired behavior. A security vulnerability
explodes the state space: the program can be forced to perform operation sequences,
which the initial design did not intend. Therefore, detecting possible weird instructions
in a codebase and removing them can actively prevent attackers from misusing it.
Literature in the security area knows these kind of attacks as Return-Oriented Pro-
gramming (ROP). The term was coined after the particularity that attackers seek those
borrowed code snippets which can return to any point the attacker wishes. Elias Levy’s
(aka Aleph One) classic paper “Smashing The Stack For Fun And Profit” [Lev96] from
1996, which is the most referenced memory-corruption paper of all times [Mee10], ex-
plained these attacks first. He illustrates how to overflow small buffers using environment
variables and gives hints on how to find buffer-overflow vulnerabilities in applications
and operating systems.
Several approaches to detect and prevent these kinds of attacks exist [CPM+98,
Pap12]. However, as soon as a new protection mechanism is invented, an attack to
counter it is also devised. Carlini and Wagner [CW14] show that ROP attacks are still
a problem.
In this chapter, we present an approach that can detect unsafe programming practices
and highlights functions which could be exploited by memory corruption attacks. It
can, thus, help enhance software security by lifting the task of finding vulnerable code
parts from specialized problem categories to a general detection of unsafe programming
practices. We apply this approach to the native part of the Java Class Library (JCL)
and find interesting correlations between unsafe programming practices and patterns of
exploitable bugs.
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4.1. The Case of Java’s Native Part
The Java platform is a widely used runtime environment installed on devices from mobile
and embedded devices over desktop computers to cloud environments. It is equipped
with a basic class library (JCL) to support efficient development of software applications
running on the platform. Java uses an abstract memory model to prevent programs
running on the platform from affecting system software and other applications. As Java
programs cannot read from or write to arbitrary addresses in the memory, it is considered
a safe language.
However, as Java programs need to interact with the underlying operating system
to achieve observable effects, such as user interaction, filesystem access, and network
operations, the JCL is shipped with a considerable amount of native code written in
C/C++: Its size is about 620k lines of code in OpenJDK 6 and 640k lines of code in
OpenJDK 7/81. This native code base is a large liability to the Java platform.
This code base has full access to the complete memory area of the virtual machine,
including the heap of Java programs. It can read or modify this heap freely without the
restrictions imposed by information hiding or the access control model of Java. Thus, by
exploiting vulnerabilities in the native part of the JCL through contrived input values,
attackers can gain access to system resources or disable Java’s security mechanisms.
These vulnerabilities possess a significant magnitude of threat when attackers choose
Java applets as their delivery mechanism. Applets may run undetected in a user’s
browser, allowing access to the client machine over networks. Using this technique,
attackers may gain full access to the process the Java Virtual Machine (JVM) runs in
and, therefore, the user’s full security context. When breaking the security mechanisms
of Java, attacking code is able to load new code from a distant host and execute it by
spawning another process. Depending on the user’s access permissions, the attacking
code is then able to make itself resident in the target system.
The powerful capabilities of JCL’s native part result in a significant potential attack
surface. This threat is real: JCL’s native part has been actively exploited and still is.
For instance, the exploit filed in the NVD2 under CVE-2015-47603 uses a vulnerability in
the native implementation of 2D font rendering in the JCL to achieve buffer overflows.
This allows for full access to the JVM instance from the applet used as the delivery
mechanism.
The above observations clearly motivate the need for carefully analyzing Java’s evolv-
ing native code base to discover potential vulnerabilities of any kind. One approach to
do so, would be to apply existing techniques and tools that specifically target particular
bug/vulnerability categories, e.g., buffer overflows. However, there are two problems
with this approach. First, as reported by Tan and Croft [TC08], there are vulnerability
patterns that are specific to JCL and, thus, not covered by tools for finding general
bugs/vulnerabilities, such as buffer overflows. Second, tools that specifically target par-
ticular bug categories are ineffective in analyzing potential security threats in JCL’s
1Measured using wc -l on *.c, *.cpp, and *.h files.
2National Vulnerability Database – https://nvd.nist.gov/
3https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2015-4760
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native code base, because new bug patterns arise with new exploits being published
constantly, continuously rendering the list of bug patterns to look for incomplete. In-
deed, since the publication of the JCL’s native-code-vulnerability categories by Tan and
Croft [TC08], various new vulnerability categories have been identified in JCL’s native
code base, e.g., Invalid Array Index vulnerabilities.
In this chapter, we propose a different approach to identify vulnerabilities by searching
for unsafe usages of certain programming-language features. We inspected the code of
the bugs found in Tan and Croft’s study [TC08] and identified four unsafe programming
practices as major causes for vulnerabilities in the native code of the JCL. These un-
safe programming practices are: Functional impurity, use of pointer arithmetic, use of
pointer-type casts, and dynamic memory management. Neither of these practices can
be omitted when writing code for JCL’s native part, however, all of them bear the risk
of being vulnerable if their use is not properly protected.
We developed four distinct static analyses using the LLVM framework [LA04] to scan
JCL’s native part for these four categories of unsafe practices in C/C++ code. We
compile the complete native source code of the JCL using LLVM and apply our static
analyses. We found that the majority of the functions in JCL’s native part are impure;
about 40% of the code uses pointer-type casts; pointer arithmetic or dynamic memory
management was detected each in about 20% of the native functions. By triangulating
the results of the individual analyses, vulnerable hot spots in the implementation are
highlighted for further inspection: We found 94 of the 1,414 public native functions
(approx. 7%) to be the most vulnerable hot spots.
We foresee several usage scenarios for our analysis infrastructure. It can help security
experts to: (a) characterize the vulnerability level of their code, (b) guide code reviews
towards more critical areas and efficiently skip over safe functionality, (c) point out where
additional checks for safety, e.g., penetration tests, are necessary, and (d) localize areas
that need special fortification, e.g., via confinement in sandboxes.
We evaluate our analysis infrastructure by performing studies to answer the following
research questions: (a) are the results of the analyses accurate, (b) are our four analyses
independent with regard to pinpointing problematic parts of code, (c) is there a (strong)
correlation between accumulations of unsafe practices and known vulnerabilities? We
argue that our analyses are precise by construction. We show that all four analyses are
notably independent from each other, i.e., they will find different issues and, hence, not
overlap in what they detect. A case study on vulnerability categories from Tan and
Croft’s study and current exploits reveals that our approach effectively points out three
out of the five vulnerability categories considered and provides at least helpful results
for the other two categories.
To summarize, we make the following contributions:
• The design and implementation4 of an analysis infrastructure that detects unsafe
programming practices based on the LLVM compiler infrastructure (presented in
4The source code and raw data is available here: http://www.st.informatik.tu-darmstadt.de/
artifacts/peaks-native/
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Section 4.3).
• A detailed evaluation of the approach, including (a) an analysis of its precision,
(b) an analysis of the independence of its four parts as a means of justifying the
mix of analyses supported by our infrastructure, and (c) a case study on known
vulnerabilities of the native part of the JCL (Section 4.5)
• A detailed study of the occurrences of problematic programming practices in the
native part of the JCL in OpenJDK 8 (Section 4.4).
We provide an introduction to Java Security w.r.t. the Java Native Interface (JNI)
and a precise threat model in Section 4.2. Section 4.6 concludes this chapter with a
summary of the benefits and limitations of the approach.
4.2. Problem Description
4.2.1. Java Security and the JNI
The Java platform has several protection mechanisms that prevent untrusted code from
executing sensitive operations [GE03]. The most significant feature is Java’s memory
safety, i.e., references to objects can only be created and passed through Java primitives;
direct access to the memory is prohibited. Thus, features like information hiding can ef-
fectively be enforced. In order to restrict the access to sensitive operations like file access,
Java makes use of stack-based access control enforced mainly via the SecurityManager
class.
The JNI is the only way for programs written in Java to interface with the operating
system and other native code written in C/C++. Native methods can be invoked like any
other Java method. The implementation of the methods can use any feature available
in C or C++. In addition, the JNI provides an interface to interact with the Java side.
Therefore, native implementations are also able to create and modify Java objects as well
as to handle and throw exceptions. However, it is possible to manipulate the memory of
the Java heap directly, ignoring information hiding. Besides, native code is not guarded
by Java’s security mechanisms.
4.2.2. Our Attacker Model
The Java platform allows for the execution of code from diverse – even untrusted –
locations. Besides the standard execution model of a Java application located on the
client machine, Java features two other models: (a) execution as an Applet in the client’s
browser, and (b) execution via Java Web Start, where applications from remote locations
are executed on the client machine, outside the browser. In both of these models the
default policy for Java forbids the loading of non-local native code for security reasons.
We assume that our attacker has no possibility of tampering with hardware and is,
therefore, strictly limited to the software side. Furthermore, we assume that the active
security policy disallows non-local native code, otherwise it would be easy for an attacker
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to introduce exploit code. Also, we do not consider the user’s browser or the Java part of
the JCL as an attack surface in this chapter, although both systems have been attacked
successfully in the past (e.g., CVE-2013-08095, CVE-2013-14916, CVE-2013-14937).
In this chapter, we target attacks that try to spot a vulnerability in the native part
of the JCL and then exploit these vulnerabilities by executing the affected methods
with malicious parameters. Outside of Java’s memory safety, attackers will thus mainly
try to cause accesses to parts of the memory they are not supposed to have access to.
Accordingly, our analyses focus on detection mechanisms that enable such violations.
4.3. Analysis Design
The analyses we created to inspect the JCL’s native methods are written in C++ and
based on the LLVM framework [LA04]. LLVM is a compiler infrastructure that aims
at providing analyses and optimizations at compile-, link-, and runtime for programs of
any programming language. It defines its own intermediate representation (IR) on which
the analyses are run, the so called LLVM IR. This IR is an assembly-like single-static-
assignment language that allows a uniform representation of code for all programming
languages. All our analyses have to run on a whole compilation unit, thus we imple-
mented them as ModulePasses in LLVM that allow interprocedural analyses by looking
at the whole IR module.
In pursuit of analyzing them, we compile the native part of the JCL for the Linux
version of OpenJDK 88 using LLVM and a build process modified by us. We, thus,
analyze the code in the share/native and solaris/native subfolders. However, the
procedure can be ported to Windows, which will allow to analyze the Windows version
as well. We then use opt to perform our analyses on the compiled bitcode in LLVM
IR. Every analysis implementation iterates over the IR module’s functions and looks for
native function definitions that are accessible from the Java side as a starting point for
the analysis. These function’s names start with Java by convention. Every analysis
can trace native function calls to internal native functions, but those visible to the Java
side serve as the entry points.
We designed and implemented four distinct analyses that we combine to achieve a
threat rating of native implementations in the JCL for every function. These analyses
look for functional purity, use of pointer arithmetic, pointer type casts, and dynamic
memory management. In the following, we explain all four analyses, give a motivation
for their respective usefulness, and describe their design and implementation.
4.3.1. Functional Impurity
In their paper Verifiable Functional Purity in Java [FMSW08], Finifter et al. define
pure functions as being deterministic, meaning that the function only depends on its
5https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2013-0809
6https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2013-1491
7https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2013-1493
8Build 132 - March 3rd, 2014
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Algorithm 1 Functional Purity Analysis
function isPureFunction(Function f)
if ¬f .onlyReadsMemory then return false
for all Instructions i in f do
if i.mayThrowException ∨ ¬i.mayReturn then return false
for all Operands o in i do
if o.isGlobalVariable then return false
if i.isJavaCall then return false
if i.isCall ∧ isPureFunction(i.calledFunction) = true then return false
return true
parameters and yields equal results for equal arguments. Also it has to be side-effects
free, i.e., the function has no visible effect other than generating a result. Finifter et al.
also outline a set of benefits of such functions w.r.t. to software security and safety. One
of these benefits is reproducibility, i.e., the fact that a pure function will deterministically
produce the same result no matter where and when it is called. Another benefit is that
the function’s inputs are clear and explicit in the arguments.
Furthermore, if untrusted code is functionally pure it allows us to hold a set of secu-
rity assumptions. First of all, due to the lack of side-effects, a pure function naturally
executes in a sandbox-like environment and cannot tamper with the rest of the pro-
gram. Secondly, if a pure function processes untrusted and potentially malicious data
it is sufficient to mistrust the function’s output, the execution itself cannot be harmful
(excluding denial of service-like attacks that aim at depleting resources or preventing
termination). It follows that pure functions have only limited capability to leak through
overt channels as the return value is the only one. Still the function can leak through
covert channels to impure functions via e.g. timing and resource usage.
There is no single universally-accepted formal definition of functional purity, but we
follow the definition by Finifter et al. as it is most appropriate to give us the security
assertions we are looking for.
Our analysis to detect impure functions (cf. Algorithm 1) first checks for functions
that have been annotated with the readonly attribute by LLVM. The LLVM Language
Reference Manual [Pro14] defines this flag as being attributed to functions that do
not write through any pointer arguments (including byval arguments) or otherwise
modify any state (e.g., memory or control registers) visible to caller functions. The
function, however, may dereference pointer arguments and read state that may be set
in the caller. A readonly function always returns the same value (or throws an identical
exception) when called with the same set of arguments and global state. It cannot throw
an exception by calling the C++ exception-throwing methods. We consider all functions
not having this attribute as impure, as they will cause write-related side effects.
We then process each operand in the function’s instruction sequence and check if a
global variable is used by either reading from it or writing to it. This is necessary, as
the readonly attribute tolerates global variable reads. We also check every instruction
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for additional side effects, specifically throwing an exception or lack of a defined return.
If either is the case, we consider the function as impure.
Finally, we need to check for calls to impure functions, which would naturally render
the caller impure as well. Therefore, we transitively apply our analysis to any called
function and if any of them is detected as impure, the calling function is also impure.
As calls might be recursive, we added a simple detection mechanism based on a set of
visited and currently-inspected functions.
4.3.2. Pointer Arithmetic
Pointer arithmetic is the process of manipulating a pointer with an arithmetic operation.
For instance, array access in C is implemented as pointer arithmetic, so that (arr[i]
is the same as *(arr + i) (Note that both operations implicitly take the size of arr’s
base type into account). Pointers and the ability to manipulate them are fundamental
to the C programming language’s performance (and insecurity as we will see).
A significant amount of research has been conducted on the security risk pointer
arithmetic can induce, however, for the sake of brevity of presentation, we will discussion
only two papers. Younan et al. [YPC+10] refer to the fact that buffer overflows enable
diverse attacks and – while languages like Java provide inherent protection – C and C++
lack such a mechanism (at the benefit of performance and brevity). These protection
mechanisms prevent attackers from abusing buffer overflow vulnerabilities by introducing
run-time bound checks whenever pointer arithmetic happens and justify the enduring
necessity of pointer-arithmetic related checks with a huge number of buffer overflow
vulnerabilities still existing.
Avots et al. [ADL+05] describe a number of assumptions, called ”common usage”.
Everything that falls outside of these assumptions can be seen as potentially dangerous
and thus illustrates why pointer arithmetic can be critical. Among these assumptions,
they mention that pointers to an object should only be derivable from a pointer to the
same object, that pointers are only retrievable with the correct type of the underlying
structure specified and that arithmetic is applied only to pointers pointing to an element
of an array to compute another element in the same array. As we have seen, pointer
arithmetic can be dangerous if used in an incorrect manner or if insufficient checks take
place.
LLVM uses an instruction called getelementptr (GEP) to get the address of a subele-
ment of an aggregate data structure, which can be an array or struct. This instruction
is the only one in LLVM IR that is used to perform pointer arithmetic. It will be au-
tomatically inserted for pointer arithmetic by LLVM’s clang front-end and can, thus,
reliably indicate pointer arithmetic in the original C/C++ code. The instruction’s first
argument is always a pointer or a vector of pointers that is used as a base for the address
calculation. The additional arguments index into the aggregate data, one argument for
each level of nesting.
So, in order to detect pointer arithmetic in a given function, the analysis (cf. Al-
gorithm 2) looks for GEP instructions. If all indices in the GEP instruction are zero,
it indicates that the instruction only retrieves a pointer and does not perform pointer
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Algorithm 2 Pointer Arithmetic Analysis
function usesPointerArithmetic(Function f)
for all Instructions i in f do
for all Operands o in i do
if o.isGEP ∧ ¬o.allIndicesZero ∧ ¬o.isStruct then return true
if i.isCall ∧ ¬i.isJavaCall ∧
usesPointerArithmetic(i.calledFunction) = true then return true
return false
1 /**
2 * Returns the ADLER-32 value of the uncompressed data.
3 * @return the ADLER-32 value of the uncompressed data
4 */
5 public int getAdler() {
6 synchronized (zsRef) {
7 ensureOpen();
8 return getAdler(zsRef.address());
9 }
10 }
Listing 4.1: The Java Implementation of the getAdler Method of the java.util.-
zip.Deflater Class
arithmetic, which is considered benign. The GEP instruction is used for both array and
structure access. We filter out the structure accesses, because we consider them as harm-
less for the following reason: An illegal index to an array access leads the pointer out of
bounds, yet structure elements are always accessed by name in C and, thus, cannot be
abused in the same manner. As there may be a cascade of pointers finally pointing to a
structure we recursively determine if a pointer eventually points to a structure.
If the GEP instruction is found to neither have all zero indices and to not operate on
a structure, the analysis flags the function as using pointer arithmetic. We also consider
a function as using pointer arithmetic when one of the functions called in this function
is flagged in that way.
4.3.3. Pointer Type Casts
Type casts between integers and pointers appear frequently in native functions that use
the JNI, because Java does not have an explicit type for pointers. If a C pointer needs
to be passed through the Java side, it is converted to an integer and back to a pointer
when it comes back to native code. An example of this can be found in the getAdler()
method of the Deflater class (cf. Listing 4.1) and its native implementation in Deflater.c
(cf. Listing 4.2).
Whenever a Java program instantiates an object from the Deflater class, its construc-
tor instantiates a private field with a new object of type ZStreamRef that encapsulates
the address of a C structure in a private long integer field.
If the Java program then calls the Deflater object’s getAdler() method, the method
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1 JNIEXPORT jint JNICALL
2 Java_java_util_zip_Deflater_getAdler(JNIEnv *env, jclass cls, jlong addr)
3 {
4 return ((z_stream *)jlong_to_ptr(addr))->adler;
5 }
Listing 4.2: The C Implementation of the getAdler Method of the java.util.zip.-
Deflater Class
invokes its native counterpart. The native method receives the pointer to the C structure
as a long integer in an argument. It takes the parameter and casts it to a pointer, before
accessing and returning the desired field of the structure. As the C pointer is treated as
an integer in the Java code, we call this code pattern pointer-as-integer. The safety of
pointer-as-integers is ensured by storing the integer values in private fields and declaring
all native methods private, to avoid their direct invocation. If this access control is intact
and enforced, it is a sufficient protection. An attacker can then only indirectly invoke
the native methods and never tampers with the critical pointer-as-integers.
However, if a Java program has access to the reflection API, it can change private fields
at runtime, including those containing pointer-as-integers, as Tan and Croft [TC08]
already pointed out. A native method, like getAdler(), can then be used to read
arbitrary memory locations by passing it the target address minus the offset of the field
it is supposed to return. Writing arbitrary memory works similarly with methods that
update data in a struct given through a pointer-as-integer. Even though the default
policy for untrusted Java code normally disallows reflection, enabling it can have more
severe consequences than a user might assume. While it is obvious that reflection allows
for a violation of access control, it does not allow arbitrary read and write operations in
pure Java programs, thus memory safety remains intact. Only when the aforementioned
problematic methods can be passed pointers-as-integers through the JNI, reflection will
enable arbitrary read and write operations.
As Java’s native code is steadily evolving, we argue that it is worth highlighting the
use of pointer-as-integers, even if they only appear dangerous once reflection is allowed.
An error in the consistent declaration of all native methods as private to a Java class
would render them exploitable. Furthermore, casting between pointers and integers
could be used to circumvent detection of pointer arithmetic, if first a pointer is cast to
an integer, then arithmetic operations are performed on it and it is finally cast back.
As no arithmetic operations on pointers took place, this case will not be flagged by our
pointer-arithmetic analysis, while a pointer has been effectively manipulated. This seems
to be uncommon behavior in non-malicious code like the JCL’s native code, nonetheless
it would be highlighted by our analysis, if it had been accidentally introduced.
Our analysis (cf. Algorithm 3) detects any cast between an integer and a pointer type.
It checks for every type cast in the instruction sequence of a given function, whether it
casts an integer type to a pointer type or vice versa. Specifically, the LLVM instruc-
tions detected are the inttoptr <type> <value> to <type2> and ptrtoint <type>
<value> to <type2> instructions. If such a type cast is detected, the function is marked
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Algorithm 3 Pointer Type Cast Analysis
function usesPointerTypeCasts(Function f)
for all Instructions i in f do
if i.isCast ∧ (i.isIntToPtrCast ∨ i.isPtrToIntCast) then return true
if i.isCall ∧ ¬i.isJavaCall ∧
usesPointerTypeCasts(i.calledFunction) = true then return true
return false
1 #define jlong_to_ptr(a) ((void*)(a))
2
3 #ifdef _LP64 /* 64-bit Solaris */
4 typedef long jlong;
5 #else
6 typedef long long jlong;
7 #endif
Listing 4.3: Definitions Taken from src/solaris/native/common/jlong md.h and
src/solaris/javavm/export/jni md.h
as containing pointer type casts.
Thereby, we detect a complete class of casts that looks much less uniform in C code
than in IR code. For example the getAdler() method in the Deflater class (discussed
earlier) casts a jlong to a pointer via the jlong to ptr() function. Its definition and
the definition of a jlong are shown in Listing 4.3. Example code and compiled LLVM
IR bitcode is presented in Listing 4.4 and Listing 4.5.
The jlong to ptr() function performs a cast to a void pointer, which is what we
find represented in the LLVM IR by a inttoptr instruction.
We perform this analysis transitively for any called function. In detecting any kind of
pointer type casts in a function, we assume that all of them are critical w.r.t. security,
regardless of whether they are applied to input values or local variables.
4.3.4. Dynamic Memory Management
C and C++ both allow a program to dynamically manage an application’s memory. The
functions malloc, calloc, realloc, and free of the C standard library manage memory
dynamically at runtime. C++ adds object orientation and, thus, new, new[], delete,
and delete[] reserve and release memory for new objects / object arrays. Memory, once
1 #include "jni_md.h"
2
3 void* f(jlong x) {
4 return jlong_to_ptr(x);
5 }
Listing 4.4: Example Usage Code for jlong to ptr
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1 define i8* @f(i64 %x) #0 {
2 %1 = inttoptr i64 %x to i8*
3 ret i8* %1
4 }
Listing 4.5: Compiled LLVM IR for jlong to ptr
allocated, has to be freed by the program eventually to avoid running out of memory.
This process of manual memory management is error prone.
Akritidis [Akr10] motivates why dangling pointers are potentially insecure. Dangling
pointer are pointers that point to objects that have been freed already. The author
outlines that attackers may use appropriately crafted inputs to manipulate programs
containing use-after-free vulnerabilities into accessing memory through dangling point-
ers. When accessing memory through a dangling pointer, the compromised program
assumes it operates on an object of the type formerly occupying the memory, but will
actually operate on whatever data happens to be occupying the memory at that time.
The author states that dangling pointers would likely abound in programs using manual
memory management as its consistent implementation across large programs is notori-
ously error prone.
Attackers can exploit use-after-free vulnerabilities, if they are able to place attack
code or a reference to it in the free memory where the dangling pointer is still pointing
to. This is rather difficult, but techniques like heap spraying [DWW+10] enable an
attacker to assume the necessary control over the heap layout to reliably exploit such
vulnerabilities.
As we analyze the JCL’s native code, it is important to notice that there is a number
of JNI function calls that resemble C’s dynamic memory management and can lead to
memory leaks and dangling pointers. For instance, the JNI allows native methods to
manage Java heap memory by communicating with the Java garbage collector. Access to
a Java integer array requires that a native method first invokes GetIntArrayElements()
to get a pointer to the integer array. When the method finishes working on the array, it
is supposed to invoke ReleaseIntArrayElements() to release the pointer. If it fails to
do so, a memory leak occurs, as the Java garbage collector still considers the array as
”in use” and does not free it. If the C pointer is used after it is released, this is similar
to a dangling pointer. The array it points to may have already been moved. This can be
as difficult to detect as lacking free calls to the C memory manager or dangling pointers
caused by a use-after-free.
While the list of functions used by C and C++ to manage memory dynamically is clear,
we have to manually scrutinize every function in the JNI API to check if it falls into the
category of dealing with Java’s dynamic memory management. Table 4.1 shows a table
of the functions we consider critical, grouped as related pairs. We compiled this list based
on the JNI’s documentation [Ora14b]. The most critical are the functions of the families
Get<PrimitiveType>ArrayElements() and Release<PrimitiveType>ArrayElements(),
where <PrimitiveType> stands for any of the eight primitive types. They allow access
to a Java array by pinning it down in memory, thus, preventing the garbage collector
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Function name(s)
Get<PrimitiveType>ArrayElements(),
Release<PrimitiveType>ArrayElements()
GetPrimitiveArrayCritical(),
ReleasePrimitiveArrayCritical()
GetStringChars(), ReleaseStringChars()
GetStringUTFChars(), ReleaseStringUTFChars()
GetStringCritical(), ReleaseStringCritical()
NewGlobalRef(), DeleteGlobalRef()
NewLocalRef(), DeleteLocalRef()
NewWeakGlobalRef(), DeleteWeakGlobalRef()
PushLocalFrame(), PopLocalFrame()
Table 4.1.: Memory-Managing JNI Functions
Algorithm 4 Dynamic Memory Management Analysis
function usesDynamicMemoryManagement(Function f)
for all Instructions i in f do
for all Operands o in i do
if o.isGEP ∧ o.isJNIDynMemFunction then return true
if i.isCall ∧ i.isDynamicMemoryCall then return true
if i.isCall ∧ ¬i.isJavaCall ∧
usesDynamicMemoryManagement(i.calledFunction) = true then
return true
return false
from removing it. All the other functions in the table have less impact, but all of them
can cause memory leaks and/or dangling pointers to some extent.
To find calls to these functions, our analysis (cf. Algorithm 4) inspects all getelementptr
instructions in the function’s instruction sequence and determines if they return a pointer
to one of the JNI functions listed in Table 4.1. It also detects calls to malloc, calloc,
realloc and free and C++’s new, new[], delete and delete[]. If either is found, the
function is marked as containing operations for dynamic memory management.
The analysis is invoked transitively on every called function and assumes that called
Java functions are uncritical since they cannot contain manual dynamic memory man-
agement.
4.4. Unsafe Coding Practices in the JCL
The results of the analyses are displayed in Table 4.2. The first two columns indicate
the packages functions belong to, the third column shows the number of functions in
that package; the remaining columns show for how many of them the respective analysis
detected unsafe behavior. The fraction of unsafe functions to total functions is presented
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Package #Func. Impurity Ptr. Arith. Type Casts Dyn. Mem.
com sun 105 103 (98%) 47 (45%) 57 (54%) 33 (31%)
java awt 66 27 (41%) 2 (3%) 7 (11%) 3 (5%)
io 49 48 (98%) 9 (18%) 0 (0%) 5 (10%)
lang 102 98 (96%) 8 (8%) 5 (5%) 11 (11%)
net 58 58 (100%) 15 (26%) 0 (0%) 20 (34%)
nio 9 9 (100%) 7 (78%) 9 (100%) 7 (78%)
security 6 6 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
util 46 36 (78%) 21 (46%) 34 (74%) 13 (28%)
sun awt 281 269 (96%) 43 (15%) 179 (64%) 40 (14%)
font 45 42 (93%) 19 (42%) 32 (71%) 26 (58%)
instrument 10 10 (100%) 0 (0%) 10 (100%) 0 (0%)
java2d 174 135 (78%) 52 (30%) 89 (51%) 60 (34%)
management 92 92 (100%) 5 (5%) 3 (3%) 4 (4%)
misc 15 15 (100%) 3 (20%) 2 (13%) 1 (7%)
net 8 7 (88%) 2 (25%) 0 (0%) 1 (13%)
nio 192 180 (94%) 20 (10%) 64 (33%) 11 (6%)
print 12 12 (100%) 2 (17%) 0 (0%) 6 (50%)
reflect 19 19 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
security 109 108 (99%) 18 (17%) 40 (37%) 66 (61%)
tools 10 10 (100%) 2 (20%) 0 (0%) 3 (30%)
tracing 5 5 (100%) 1 (20%) 0 (0%) 2 (40%)
util 1 1 (100%) 1 (100%) 0 (0%) 1 (100%)
Total 1,414 1,290 (91%) 277 (20%) 531 (38%) 313 (22%)
Table 4.2.: Results in OpenJDK 8 b132 grouped by the first two packages. Fraction of
total functions is given in parenthesis.
in parenthesis after the values.
While nearly all packages consist mainly of impure functions, our analysis does not
classify half of java.awt’s functions as such. All other kinds of unsafe behavior are
detected very rarely as well in this package. Looking at the source code, we noticed that
it contains a lot of * initIDs() methods with an empty function body. Accordingly,
none of our analyses detected dangerous behavior. Obviously, empty functions can be
safely ignored.
For java.nio, our analyses show the highest detection rates of unsafe behavior among
all of the packages. Besides its purpose of providing I/O functionality, the package pro-
vides methods for copying between arrays. Therefore, it makes excessive use of JNI func-
tions (rendering methods impure), array manipulations (involving pointer arithmetic),
casts from integers to pointers to access external data, and the JNI’s array pinning
methods.
The java.security package stands out in that all six methods are impure, but no
other analysis detects unsafe behavior. They all reside in the same source file and simply
return the result of a call to the Java Virtual Machine. What happens in the JVM is
out of scope and, thus, functional purity cannot be asserted. Nevertheless, we can
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# Analyses # Func.
4 94
3 172
2 479
1 561
0 108
Total 1414
(a) with functional impurity
# Analyses # Func.
3 94
2 172
1 495
0 653
Total 1414
(b) without functional impurity
Table 4.3.: Number of Functions in OpenJDK8 b132 Ranked by the Number of Analyses
Reporting Them
assume that no dangerous pointer arithmetic, pointer type casts, or insecure dynamic
memory management happens on the Java side. We made a similar observation for the
sun.reflect package, which contains 19 functions, all of them impure, because they
just return the result of a call to the JVM.
A look at the total detection numbers reveals that about twice as many functions use
casts between pointers and integers than pointer arithmetic. Considering that the latter
is involved in every array access and the former is normally unusual behavior for most
other code, a clear particularity of the JDK’s native code shows.
Table 4.3 shows how many functions are detected by how many analyses at once. The
left table (a) shows the full distribution with functional impurity. As the functional
impurity analysis is flagging more than 90% of the functions in total, we also show the
distribution without this analysis in the right table (b). Regardless of this, the top-
rated 94 functions in both tables are the same. Reviewers can now concentrate on these
top-rated functions and work their way towards the lower-rated functions, guiding their
efforts efficiently toward the most critical parts. Moreover, 108 functions (more than 7%)
are classified as functionally pure and not containing any of the other unsafe practices
and, thus, can be considered safe and will not need to be reviewed further.
4.5. Evaluation
In our evaluation we inspect three research questions in detail:
RQ1 Are the analyses precise in finding unsafe practices?
RQ2 Are the analyses notably independent from each other, in that sense that they
detect different vulnerabilities?
RQ3 Are the analyses able to point out the causes of known vulnerabilities?
4.5.1. Setup
Each analysis in this section is run on the Openjdk-8-src-b132-03 mar 2014 version of
OpenJDK 8, unless otherwise noted. In order to run analyses on the native libraries in
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the OpenJDK, we modified the JDK’s makefiles, such that when the native C and C++
files are compiled during the build process, LLVM IR for each source file is emitted in
parallel. The resulting bitcode files are then linked library-wise using LLVM’s llvm-link,
such that interprocedural analyses are possible.
The analysis implementations are integrated into the LLVM framework’s source code
and compiled with it. This enables us to use them via a parameter with the opt tool
(LLVM’s optimizer) that performs analyses and transformations on the Bitcode. Our
combined analysis outputs its results as a true/false value for each function and each
analysis into a file in the CSV format.
We detected 1,414 functions that are accessible from the Java side. Running all four
analyses on them yields 5,656 boolean values. Running the complete analysis on the
codebase takes around 15 seconds of user time, measured on an Ubuntu 14.04 LTS
64-Bit Linux operating system with an Intel Core i5-4200U CPU and 4 GB of RAM.
4.5.2. RQ1: Precision of the Analyses
Static analyses are usually evaluated in terms of soundness and precision. As we im-
plemented our analyses specifically to capture unsafe programming practices that are
the direct result of using specific language features, our analyses are by design sound
and precise as we will argue in the following. However, as we apply all of the analyses
interprocedurally to determine if a called functions is flagged by the respective analysis,
we are directly depending on the precision of the used call-graph algorithm. This means
that any technique that makes call-graph algorithms more precise can be used to receive
more accurate results from our analysis. For the remainder of this section, we will, thus,
discuss the precision of the intraprocedural analyses.
Our functional-purity analysis is conservative. We use the readonly attribute, which is
applied automatically to functions without writes to pointer arguments and global state.
We add an extended check for global state read access, a behavior that the readonly
attribute does not exclude. Thus, we classify functions as impure, if they either use
writes to pointer arguments or access/change global state. As this is our definition of
impurity, we have no false positives and no false negatives.
We build our analysis on LLVM IR bitcode and, therefore, all kinds of pointer op-
erations are already represented by the getelementptr instruction. We safely detect
and filter out instructions working on structures and simple pointer reads or writes.
Thus, we are left only with those instructions using pointer arithmentic and have no
false negatives. This includes array accesses as it can be seen in CVE-2015-47609 that
unchecked array access operations can also lead to serious vulnerabilities. However, as
we cannot statically determine the complete memory layout, we cannot actually tell if
pointer arithmetic or array-access operations are benign or hostile. But, as we want to
report all occurrences of unsafe practices in code, we do not consider benign operations
as false positives.
For pointer type casts, analysing compiled code pays off as well. A source code analysis
9https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2015-4760
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Agreement Impurity Ptr. Arith. Type Casts Dyn. Mem.
Impurity 1
Ptr. Arith. 0.2836 1
Type Casts 0.4406 0.6252 1
Dyn. Mem. 0.3091 0.8190 0.6124 1
Table 4.4.: The Agreement Among the Analyses
has to consider all macros and typedefs, as they may contain new integer types and
conversions (cf. Listing 4.3). In LLVM IR, all casts between integer types and pointers
are represented by exactly two instructions (inttoptr and ptrtoint). As we want to
find all type casts of this kind and all of them are represented by these two instructions,
there cannot be any false positives or false negatives.
When detecting memory management it is important to have a complete list of all
functions allowing programmers to access this feature. In our analysis these are the
functions from the standard library and those provided by the JNI. To our knowledge
both lists are complete and thus the analysis cannot produce false negatives. The only
reasons where our analysis would produce false positives, is when functions in this list
would not be offering access to dynamic memory management.
Therefore, we conclude that our analyses are indeed precise w.r.t. their detection
purpose.
4.5.3. RQ2: Independence of Analyses
In order to answer the second research question, we measure the agreement between the
four analyses, i.e., in how many cases two separate analyses report the same function.
Table 4.4 shows the amount of the pairwise agreement for the four analyses.
Impurity shows the lowest agreement rates with the other analyses. We see a high
agreement between the analyses for pointer arithmetic and for dynamic memory manage-
ment. Yet, a high agreement does not imply a high correlation. Any two analyses that
both mark many functions as either critical or non-critical will have a high agreement,
simply because the latter is likely to occur, even if the cause is just random coincidence.
A measure to take that into account is the Pearson product-moment correlation coef-
ficient that is defined as the covariance between two samples divided by the product of
their standard deviations. The coefficient ranges on the interval [−1, 1], with −1 being
total negative correlation, 0 being no correlation and 1 being total positive correlation.
The coefficients for our analysis are presented in Table 4.5.
As we can see, there is a slightly positive correlation between all the analyses, likely
because all of them naturally agree on negative detection for empty function bodies. It
stands out, though, that pointer arithmetic and dynamic memory management correlate
more than expected. Looking at the functions that use both pointer arithmetic and
dynamic memory management, we notice a certain pattern: A function uses one of
the array-pinning methods, works with the array, and releases it. An example is easily
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Correlation Impurity Ptr. Arith. Type Casts Dyn. Mem.
Impurity 1
Ptr. Arith. 0.1530 1
Type Casts 0.1578 0.1287 1
Dyn. Mem. 0.1653 0.4536 0.1071 1
Table 4.5.: The Pearson Product-moment Correlation Coefficient for Each Pair of Anal-
yses
1 JNIEXPORT jint JNICALL
2 Java_java_util_zip_Adler32_updateBytes(JNIEnv *env, jclass cls, jint adler, jarray b, jint
off, jint len)
3 {
4 Bytef *buf = (*env)->GetPrimitiveArrayCritical(env, b, 0);
5 if (buf) {
6 adler = adler32(adler, buf + off, len);
7 (*env)->ReleasePrimitiveArrayCritical(env, b, buf, 0);
8 }
9 return adler;
10 }
Listing 4.6: A Native Method from src/share/native/java/util/zip/Adler32.c
found in the JNI’s zlib glue code and is displayed in Listing 4.6. The function pins down
the Java array b (influencing Java’s dynamic memory management) and assigns it to
buf, a pointer to the array. After ensuring that the operation was successful, the zlib
method is called with, among others, the array pointer plus an offset (performing pointer
arithmetic). Then, the array is released (again influencing Java’s dynamic memory
management). This pattern is found frequently and explains the correlation between
the two analyses.
The overall low correlation between the pairs of analyses indicates that they detect
different unsafe coding practices, implying an overall good separation. This leads us
to conclude that our analyses are indeed independent, so that they point out different
vulnerabilities.
4.5.4. RQ3: Effectiveness on Known Vulnerabilities
In order to answer our third research question, we applied our analyses to five different
vulnerability categories. We choose four out of the six bug patterns from Tan and Croft’s
study. We omitted the C pointers as Java integers pattern, as we build a specialized
analysis for this that completely covers this issue, and the Insufficient Error Checking
pattern, because it is the only one not based on unsafe programming practices and,
therefore, not in our focus. We added the Invalid Array Index pattern, since it is
regularly found in actual exploits of the native part of the JCL.
As our approach only points out unsafe practices, we do not spot the actual cause
of the vulnerability, but only highlight accumulations of such unsafe practices to guide
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Vulnerability Category
Invalid Array Index Detected
Exception Mishandling Detected
Race conditions Not detected
Buffer Overflows Not detected
Memory Leak Detected
Table 4.6.: Effectiveness on Known Vulnerabilities
code reviews. Our evaluation metric for this research question is, therefore, as follows:
We deem our analysis to be effective in this case study, if it points towards the native
functions involved in the vulnerability.
For every set of native functions, we outline if and by which analyses their current
versions are detected. While these vulnerabilities do not exist anymore in these current
versions, the potentially dangerous basic patterns are likely to persist throughout in-
creasing versions. For example, a function using dynamic memory management without
sufficient checks, thus vulnerable to a buffer overflow, will likely be fixed in a higher
version by introducing the necessary checks. Nonetheless, it still uses dynamic memory
management and the pattern persists, as it should, because even the improved checks
might contain errors.
Invalid Array Index CVE-2013-246310 and CVE-2013-246511 both exploit an invalid
array indexing vulnerability in the storeImageArray() function. This internal native
function is used by the three Java accessible native functions convolveBI(), transformBI(),
and lookupByteBI() in the class sun.awt.image.ImagingLib.
These three methods are used by the Java method filter() in the same class. This
method works on objects of class BufferedImage and returns an object of that very
class. An exploit, like the one described in [Jax13], can trigger the vulnerability through
a Java applet which creates and transforms images that were initialized with contrived
parameter values, causing a call to the filter() method somewhere down the applet’s
call chain. The special parameter values cause a buffer overflow in the vulnerable native
method and this allows an attacker to gain additional privileges, deactivate the security
manager and subsequently spawn a shell, thus, gaining full access to the system.
The three vulnerable methods are all detected by most of our analyses: convolveBI()
and transformBI() are classified as impure, using pointer arithmetic, and performing
dynamic memory management, lookupByteBI() is detected by all of our analyses. Com-
paring this to the overall results of the sun.awt package, we observe that detection by
three or even by all four analyses is unusually high. Our analyses only points out exactly
these three methods as particularly unsafe.
10https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2013-2463
11https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2013-2465
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1 static void* xmalloc(JNIEnv *env, size_t size) {
2 void *p = malloc(size);
3 if (p == NULL)
4 JNU_ThrowOutOfMemoryError(env, NULL);
5 return p;
6 }
7
8 #define NEW(type, n) ((type *) xmalloc(env, (n) * sizeof(type)))
9
10 static const char * const * splitPath(JNIEnv *env, const char *path){
11 [...]
12 pathv = NEW(char*, count+1);
13 pathv[count] = NULL; [...]
14 }
Listing 4.7: An Excerpt of src/solaris/native/java/lang/zip/UNIXProcess md.c
(Java version 6 update 2)
Exception Mishandling One of the vulnerabilities found by Tan and Croft [TC08] is
a dynamic memory allocation (presented in Listing 4.7), which is succeeded by a non-
null check. In case the allocation fails, an error is thrown. In contrast to Java code,
exceptions thrown in the native code do not disrupt the control flow.
When xmalloc() throws an error, the control flow is returned to the callee and not
to the Java Virtual Machine. This means that if the malloc() fails, an exception
will be thrown, but the pathv[count] = NULL; instruction will be executed anyway,
dereferencing unallocated memory and crashing the JVM. The current versions of the
JCL transfered this critical code part to the effectivePathv() function. This function
now explicitly returns NULL to the JVM upon allocation failure.
Our analysis classifies this function as impure, performing both pointer arithmetic and
dynamic memory management. Again, being detected by three of our four analyses, the
function stands out in the package java.lang.
Race Conditions Tan and Croft [TC08] describe another class of vulnerabilities. The
native function Java java io UnixFileSystem setPermission() performs calls to the
external stat and chmod functions to get information about a file and modify permis-
sions. If an attacker manages to manipulate the file reference in between the calls to
stat and chmod, a file may get permissions only another file was allowed to get.
Java java io UnixFileSystem setPermission() is only detected as impure, none
of the other analyses match. This is very common for the java.io package, and low
overall. In this case, our analyses do not point out the vulnerable function. As none of
the analyses seek race conditions, this is expected.
Buffer Overflows Another vulnerability discussed by Tan and Croft [TC08] is one that
can lead to a buffer overflow. It lies in the internal native method initLocalIfs().
Older versions of the native code would call fscanf() with a format specifier that
did not specify the input’s length. Listing 4.8 shows the problematic part. The last
format specifier %s will let the ifname array overflow, if the last entry on any line of
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1 char ifname [32]; [...]
2 if ((f = fopen("/proc/net/if_inet6", "r")) == NULL) { return ; }
3 while (fscanf (f, "%2x%2x%2x%2x%2x%2x%2x%2x%2x%2x%2x%2x%2x%2x%2x%2x "
4 "%d %x %x %x %s",&u0,&u1,&u2,&u3,&u4,&u5,&u6,&u7,
5 &u8,&u9,&ua,&ub,&uc,&ud,&ue,&uf,
6 &index, &x1, &x2, &x3, ifname) == 21) { [...] }
Listing 4.8: An Excerpt of src/solaris/native/java/net/net util md.c (Java version 6
update 2)
1 JNIEXPORT jobject JNICALL Java_java_net_NetworkInterface_getByName0
2 (JNIEnv *env, jclass cls, jstring name) {[...]
3 const char* name_utf = (*env)->GetStringUTFChars(env, name, &isCopy);
4 [...]
5 ifs = enumInterfaces(env);
6 if (ifs == NULL) {
7 return NULL;
8 } [...]
9 (*env)->ReleaseStringUTFChars(env, name, name_utf);
10 [...] }
Listing 4.9: An Excerpt from src/solaris/native/java/net/NetworkInterface.c (Java
version 6 update 2)
the /proc/net/if inet6 file is greater than 32 bytes. This is a network interface name,
which can indeed be chosen to exceed 32 bytes. Newer versions of the code increase
ifname’s size to 33 bytes and modify the format specifier to be %32s, which solves the
issue. initLocalIfs() is used by 13 Java-accessible functions.
All these functions are impure according to our analysis, Java sun nio ch sctp -
SctpChannelImpl send0() performs pointer arithmetic and pointer-type casts, Java -
sun nio ch DatagramChannelImpl send0() only does the latter, Java java net
PlainDatagramSocketImpl send() and Java sun nio ch sctp SctpNet bindx() use
dynamic memory management. These values are not particularly high, neither for the
respective packages nor overall. None of our analyses specifically detects the format-
specifier buffer-overflow pattern. An additional analysis that classifies format specifiers
without size annotation in combination with a scanning function as unsafe could have
caught this unsafe practice. Since this pattern rarely occurred in the inspected version
of the JDK and the issue has an easy fix, we refrained from seeking such niche cases in
favor of more concise overall results.
Memory Leak Tan and Croft [TC08] found a memory leak, where function Java -
java net NetworkInterface getByName0() uses GetStringUTFChars() to pin down a
string but does not release it in certain control flows. Listing 4.9 shows the code. As
we can see, if enumInterfaces() returns NULL, the function will return without calling
ReleaseStringUTFChars(), thus causing a memory leak. Current Java versions simply
put the GetStringUTFChars() call behind the conditional block and avoid potentially
returning before releasing.
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Our analysis marks the function as impure and as using dynamic memory manage-
ment, just as expected, pushing it into the more critical half of its package’s functions.
4.5.5. Limitations
We have seen that our analyses only find occurrences of unsafe programming practices
and do not check if these practices actually lead to vulnerabilities of the program. There-
fore, a valid next step would be to combine our analyses with a data-flow analysis that
determines valid and given ranges for the operands of the unsafe operations. This would
include a detection for guard clause and sanitizer functions. In combination with an
additional analysis like this our analyses would then only report issues that are vulner-
able. If we further combine this with a guided dynamic analysis and exploit generation,
we could detect only those vulnerabilities that are actually exploitable. The four anal-
yses presented here are the foundation for such an analysis stack and necessary for the
efficient guidance of the downstream analyses.
Our four analyses presented in this chapter have some technical limitations. First, we
can only inspect the body of functions that are defined in source code that has been
compiled to Bitcode, which excludes functions from the standard library. Whenever such
a function is used, it is declared on-the-fly in the LLVM bitcode and gets appropriate
annotations with function flags based on standard implementations. For instance, if the
standard implementation of such a library function is read-only, LLVM will declare it
with a readonly flag. As these annotations are well tested and in ubiquitous use, we do
not consider this as a problem. Also, because we analyze Bitcode emitted by the clang
compiler, the Bitcode is naturally platform-dependent. As we use the Linux operating
system to conduct our experiments, only the shared native code and the native code for
Linux systems will be compiled, thus, excluding native code for other operating systems
from the study. However, the native code for different operating systems is very similar
in its functionality and mainly adapts to specific data formats and system calls.
4.6. Conclusion
In this chapter we presented four static analyses that find unsafe coding practices in
C/C++ code. These practices are functional impurity, use of pointer arithmetic, pointer-
type casts and dynamic memory management. Our four analyses accurately discover
diverse potentially insecure behaviors. The analyses complement each other in that
what one analysis misses another one may detect, and they can indeed point to bugs
for most of the inspected bug categories. However, our analyses will also detect all kind
of pointer arithmetic, which will include harmless array modifications. These benign
operations have to be filtered out in a downstream analysis for guards and sanitizers.
We used these analyses to inspect the native part of the JCL in order to find accu-
mulations of those practices that point toward possible vulnerabilities. In our study, we
pointed out that a large number of the functions available in the JCL in fact use these
unsafe practices. By inspecting five common vulnerability categories, we showed that
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the analyses are indeed helpful to detect vulnerabilities and in the majority of cases give
strong hints to their causes.
This case study shows the strengths and weaknesses of our analyses with regard to
pinpointing exploitable vulnerabilities (cf. Table 4.6). We saw that our analysis reli-
ably hints toward critical functions, when it comes to bugs related to dynamic memory
management, indexing, and memory leakage. Pointer-type casts have not appeared as
explicitly exploitable yet. Race conditions and overflows caused by scanning functions
like fscanf are not directly hinted to by the analysis except for marking the respective
functions impure. Unfortunately, the available data set used for the experiment is too
small to make more decisive statements. We found it hard to evaluate against vulner-
abilities that reside in Java’s native code in a large scale since none of the available
online databases mark native vulnerabilities explicitly. Nevertheless, the results of our
analyses are useful to characterize the level of vulnerability of native code, to guide code
reviews effectively, to provide useful subsets for more expensive analyses (e.g. dynamic
analysis), and, finally, to identify areas where intensive code review or strong isolation
is needed.
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1
The efficiency of software development largely depends on an ecosystem of reuse [Boe99,
Gri93, SE13, HDG+11]. Numerous software libraries are available that solve various
problems ranging from numerical computations to user interface creation. The safe
use of these libraries is an exigence for the development of software that meets critical
time-to-market constraints.
However, when including software libraries into their products software developers
entrust the code in these libraries with the same security context as the application
itself regardless of the need for this excessive endorsement. For instance, a system that
makes use of a library of numerical functions also enables the library to use the filesystem
or make network connections although the library does not need these capabilities. If
the library contains malicious code it could make use of them.
In commonly used languages like Java no effective mechanism to limit or isolate soft-
ware libraries from the application code exists. So developers face a dilemma: Either
trust the component and finish the project in time or be secure, review the library’s
source code and possibly miss deadlines.
We propose to consider this excessive assignment of authority as a violation of the
Principle of Least Privilege [SS75]. The principle states that every program should
operate under the least set of privileges necessary to complete its job. In order to
alleviate the described dilemma, we introduce an effective mechanism to detect the
actual permission need of software libraries written in Java.
Drawing inspiration from Android, we construct a capability model for Java. It in-
cludes basic, coarse-grained capabilities such as the authority to access the filesystem or
to open a network socket. As Java programs by themselves cannot communicate with the
operating system directly, any interaction with those capabilities has to happen through
the use of the Java Native Interface (JNI). By tracking the calls backwards through the
call graph, we produce a capability set for every method of the Java Class Library (JCL)
and by the same mechanism towards methods of a library. We can thus effectively infer
the necessary capabilities of a library using our approach. We can also infer the subset of
these capabilities used by an application, as it may not use every functionality supplied
by the library.
As the precision of our approach is directly depending on the precision of the algorithm
used to compute the call graph of the library, we took several measures to compute a
reasonably precise call graph while not compromising the scalability of the algorithm
too severely.
1 This chapter is based on and contains verbatim content of work previously published at Foundations
of Software Engineering 2015 [HREM15].
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We evaluated our approach by comparing our results against expectations derived from
API documentation. We found that for 70 projects from the Qualitas Corpus [TAD+10],
that we evaluated against, actual results exceeded expectations and produce a far more
accurate footprint of the projects capability usage. Thereby, our approach helps devel-
opers to quickly make informed decisions on library reuse without the need for manual
inspection of source code or documentation.
In our pursuit to mitigate the software developer’s dilemma w.r.t. library reuse, we
thus contribute the following:
• an algorithm to propagate capability labels backwards through a call graph (pre-
sented in Section 5.2.3),
• a labeling of native methods with their capabilities necessary to bootstrap the
process (in Section 5.2.2),
• a collection of efficient analysis steps to aid the precision of common call-graph
algorithms (explained in Section 5.2.3),
• an evaluation of the approach (Section 5.3) against extracted capability expecta-
tions from documentation.
We furthermore motivate our work in more detail in Section 5.1. Section 5.4 provides
concluding remarks and discusses interesting challenges.
5.1. Motivation
One of the major drivers of efficient software development is the ability to reuse parts of
software systems in the development of other systems in the form of software libraries.
Software developers can thus concentrate on the key requirements of their programs and
reuse functionality that is common to many software systems. Developing software this
way leaves more time for the creation of new functionality, mitigates rewriting already
existing functionality and also makes errors less likely as functionality in form of libraries
gets used more often than their individual counterparts. It has been observed that
programming with library reuse can speed up software development by over 50% [Boe99].
Therefore, library reuse is an important part of an efficient software engineering process.
The concept of library reuse has been adopted by many different programming en-
vironments from C and C++ over Java which ships with the Java Class Library to
academic languages like Racket or even embedded languages. Library reuse is part of
software development processes from the smallest wearable devices to the largest cloud-
based solutions. For instance, the Java Runtime Environment is shipped with multiple
libraries that are not part of the runtime but can be used by Java programs. Their func-
tionality includes graphical user interfaces, cryptography and many more. By providing
the functionality in form of libraries the Java platform gives developers the ability to use
the functionality without implementing it first or leaving them out of the program if not
needed. The C standard library is probably the most used software library worldwide.
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It is loaded in basically any system, although in different versions, from mobile devices,
desktop or laptop computers to cloud computing environments.
However, in order to be efficient developers rely on the described and observed behavior
of the libraries. The source code of the libraries hardly ever gets reviewed. Even in open
source projects the rigor of code reviews is quite lax [Bla14]. Examples of this can
be seen in the quite prominent Heartbleed incident [DKA+14], where the server-side
implementation of OpenSSL had a major programming error that allowed clients to
read the server’s complete memory in 64kb blocks exposing inner state that can be
and was used against the server. Although being a de-facto standard with a large user
base the error was not discovered through a code review but through an exploit. What
makes this exploit particularly interesting is that the error was in code not necessary for
the pure functionality of SSL connections but for a convenience heartbeat functionality.
Developers using server-side OpenSSL never opted in to such functionality.
As library code runs in the same security context as application code a developer
automatically entrusts the library code with the same privileges the end user has provided
to the application. She implicitly transfers the users trust towards her to the developers
of the library. Thus, any capability the complete application may use is available to
library code as well.
Moreover, consider a scenario where a central point for library delivery like Maven
Central gets compromised. Many applications may be shipped with malicious versions
of libraries and be delivered to end users without noticing.
Considering all the aforementioned problems it is rather surprising that developers
still blindly trust libraries. Besides code reviews that may not be possible for a closed
source component, very little tool support for developers in need to make the right
choice of library is available. Developers can use tools like FindBugs [HP04] to check for
well-known patterns of bad behavior in a library, but will only find instances of known
problems not a full footprint of the library’s critical resource usage.
As library reuse is an essential and widely adopted practice for software development
it is crucial that developers have access to trustworthy software libraries. Trust in those
libraries can be gained by inspecting them manually – which is often tiresome – or with
bug detection tools – which is often not helpful. Hence library code runs within the
same security context as the application code and it is seldom under the scrutiny of
a code review, it may pose a significant risk when rolling out libraries as part of an
application. Thus, new methods to determine the actual usage of system capabilities of
software libraries are needed.
Therefore, in this chapter, we present an approach to capability inference for software
libraries written in Java. In the following sections we present our approach and the
bootstrapping necessary for it in detail.
5.2. Capability Inference
We use the OPAL framework [EH14], an extendable framework for static analysis of
Java Bytecode based on abstract interpretation, to perform all static analyses relevant
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for our inference algorithm. After giving an overview of our approach, we will discuss it
in detail.
5.2.1. The Approach in a Nutshell
The purpose of the analysis presented in this chapter is to uncover the capability foot-
prints of software libraries written in Java. Making them aware of these footprints helps
developers to make informed decisions as whether to integrate a library into their ap-
plication based on how it uses system resources. For instance, consider a library for the
decoding and display of images. An application developer considering to use this library
expects the library to use functionality for reading from the filesystem and for displaying
images on the graphical user interface. However, it is unlikely that this library needs to
perform operations to play sounds or to open network sockets. If the library does use
these capabilities, a developer might want to invest more time into the inspection of the
library.
In order to access system functionalities a library written in Java will have to make
use of the Java Native Interface (JNI) either directly or through the Java Class Library
(JCL) (cf. Figure 5.1). Our analysis uncovers the use of system capabilities through the
JCL. It consists of three main steps.
We first manually inspected all native functions of the core part of the JCL. According
to their name, implementation and documentation we assigned them capability markers
manually.
These sets of capability markers are then propagated backwards through a call graph
of the JCL and the library under test. Through refinement and filtering steps on the
call graph we ensure a precise but practical result. In the example presented above the
native functions using the capabilities for the filesystem and the graphical user interface
are traced backward to library functionality (cf. Figure 5.2).
In a last step, the results of the analysis are consolidated to receive either a complete
footprint of the library or a partial footprint depending on the use of library functionality,
because only parts of the library may have been used in the application. In our example
from Figure 5.2, the union set of all used capabilities in the library consists of the
capabilities for the filesystem and the graphical user interface as expected, but it does
not include capabilities for playing sound and using network sockets. Developers can
thus save the time for an inspection of the library’s source code.
5.2.2. Bootstrapping
In Java, the capabilities considered in our case, are created outside of the Java Virtual
Machine and are reached only via a call through the JNI (cf. Figure 5.1). As any system
resource like the filesystem, network sockets or the graphical user interface is a matter
of the underlying operating system – when viewed from the Java side – this assumption
naturally holds. As libraries seldom bring their own native code, they rely on the native
functions and their wrapping functions inside the JCL. Therefore, to compute meaningful
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Figure 5.1.: Architectural Layers for Java Libraries
results for arbitrary Java libraries it is necessary to first infer capability usage for the
JCL.
We identified 14 distinct capabilities presented in Table 5.1, whose usage we want to
track. They represent different critical resources that are accessible through the native
part of the JCL. The CLASSLOADING, DEBUG, REFLECTION, and SECURITY capabilities refer
to internal resources of the JVM used to achieve dynamic code loading, instrumentation,
introspection, or securing code, respectively. Even though these capabilities are not sys-
tem resources, we decided to include them as they represent authority to circumvent
other mechanisms like information hiding, memory safety, or the security model. For
instance, using reflection it may be possible for a library to call into filesystem function-
ality although our analysis does not recognize it, because the call graph we use to extract
the information does not contain a respective call edge. We also decided to include a
marker capability (NATIVE) for all native calls that do not access system resources (e.g.
java.lang.StrictMath.cos()). Although these functions do not provide access to a
capability, they still are native functions with the possibility to read and write arbitrary
memory locations in the JVM heap. All other capability names have been chosen w.r.t.
the system resource they represent.
To retrieve a list of all native method stubs of the JCL, we use the OPAL framework.
The core part of the JCL is included in the rt.jar file shipped with the Java Runtime
Environment. Therefore, we limited our bootstrapping analysis to this file. All libraries
that ship with the JCL are based on the rt.jar and those that also have native code are
mainly concerned with graphical user interface display (e.g. JavaFX). We implemented a
simple analysis that collects all methods with the ACC NATIVE marker in the method info
structure [LYBB14]. This corresponds to native methods in Java source code. On the
64-bit version for Windows of the OpenJDK version 7 update 60 this analysis returned
1, 795 methods.
We manually assigned each of these methods the set of its capabilities. To assign the
correct capabilities, we reviewed the source code of the native implementation of the
method. We also took the naming and the documentation of the function into account,
as they provide insight into its purpose. Column #m in Table 5.1 presents the number
of methods for each capability in the result set of the bootstrapping process. As some
methods are annotated with more than one capability, the sum of these figures is higher
than the number of methods in the result set.
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capability # of methods description
CLASSLOADING 24 Definition and loading
of classes
CLIPBOARD 9 Access to the system
clipboard
DEBUG 5 Debugging instrumen-
tation
FS 377 Access to the filesystem
GUI 449 Graphical user interface
INPUT 10 Retrieve values from in-
put devices
NATIVE 419 No specific facility, but
calls into native code
NET 274 Network socket access
PRINT 54 Print on physical print-
ers
REFLECTION 78 Introspective access to
objects
SECURITY 14 Influence the security
mechanisms of Java
SOUND 36 Play or record sound
SYSTEM 126 Operating system facili-
ties
UNSAFE 85 Direct memory manipu-
lation
Table 5.1.: Capabilities Identified in the JCL
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Figure 5.2.: Call Graph with Annotated Capabilities
5.2.3. Building Capability Footprints
Our analysis propagates capabilities backwards from JCL methods to the library’s API
(cf. Figure 5.2). The propagation consists of the following three major steps which are
detailed afterwards:
1. The call graph that includes the JCL and the analyzed library is build.
2. The capabilities identified in the bootstrapping phase are propagated backwards
through the graph. As part of the propagation, call edges in the call graph are
filtered that will result in excessively overapproximated capability sets.
3. In the last step, either the complete footprint of the library (e.g. {FS,GUI} in
Figure 5.2) or a footprint based on the usage context of the library is build.
Call-Graph Construction Step We build the call graph using a variant of the VTA algo-
rithm that we implemented in OPAL. Compared to the original VTA algorithm [SHR+00],
the algorithm only propagates precise type information intra-procedurally and does not
first calculate a whole-program type propagation graph. However, intra-procedurally the
analysis is more precise as it uses the underlying abstract interpretation framework and
is therefore flow- and path-sensitive. This way we are able to construct an equally pre-
cise call graph, but be more efficient at the same time. To further increase precision,
we added two steps. First, we added a shallow object-insensitive analysis of all final
or private fields to OPAL to determine a more precise type of the values stored in the
respective fields than the field’s declared type. Second, we added a basic data-flow anal-
ysis of all methods that return a value to determine a more precise return type than the
declared one if available. Both information is used during the call graph construction.
Overall, the number of call edges of the resulting call graphs are comparable, but our
VTA algorithm is more efficient than the original one.
For the call graph’s entry points we use all non-private methods and constructors,
all static initializers and those private methods that are related to serialization. The
latter are added to capture the implicit calls performed by the JVM when serializing or
deserializing objects.
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Propagation Step In the bootstrapping phase, we manually assigned each native method
of the JCL the set of its capabilities. To determine a library method’s capabilities, we
propagate the capabilities through the call graph by traversing the call graph backwards,
starting with the native methods of the JCL. While traversing the graph, we propagate
the initial sets of capabilities to compute the set of capabilities attached to each method
of the JCL and the library. At the end, each method of the library is annotated with a
set of its capabilities based on the transitive native calls it performs.
Unfortunately, this na¨ıve propagation of the capabilities results in a hugely overapprox-
imated capability distribution as basically every method of the JCL would be annotated
with all capabilities. This is due to the fact that often no precise type information for
the receiver of a method call is available, so all possible receivers have to be taken into
account by the analysis although these receivers are never called.
For instance, if the toString() method is called by some method and the runtime
type of the receiver is unknown and, hence, the upper type bound java.lang.Object
needs to be assumed, the call graph will contain 1, 304 edges2 for this call.
These edges will propagate capabilities to methods that will in practice never be
reached. Hence, we filter these problematic edges during the capability propagation
step. For instance in the above example, it is rather unlikely that each of these 1, 304
alternative implementations will be called in practice from this call site. However, as all
of these implementations are annotated with their respective capability sets the method
including the call site will be annotated with the union set of all these sets. We decided
for filtering although it gives up soundness of the analysis by replacing the overapprox-
imation with an underapproximation. We ignore calls to unlikely implementations and
thus get a much stricter capability propagation that is closer to runtime reality. Al-
ternatively, a points-to analysis could have been used to determine more exact receiver
types, but as our approach needs to scale up to the JCL such a costly analysis is not
permissible. We implemented two filters in our approach.
The first filter removes edges for method calls whose receiver type is java.lang.-
Object. Listing 5.1 shows an example where this filter effectively removes problematic
call edges. The method currentContent() calls toString() on the field o whose re-
ceiver type is Object. Although the field is initialized with the concrete type MyInt, the
call cannot be resolved to the implementation in this type, because the field is public
and may be overwritten with an object of any other type. This results in call-graph
edges to all implementations of toString() of subclasses of java.lang.Object. Our
filter removes these edges from the capability propagation.
1 public class A {
2 public Object o;
3
4 public A() { o = new MyInt(42); }
5
6 public String currentContent(){ return o.toString(); }
7 }
Listing 5.1: Example for Inconclusive Type Information
2The toString method is implemented by 1, 304 JCL classes.
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filter type call edges reachable methods
Without filter 2.068.946 102.896
Object filter 1.221.293 102.411
Abstract filter 1.974.261 101.656
Interface filter 1.322.949 98.728
Subtype filter 1.194.172 91.813
all filters 368.231 91.135
Table 5.2.: Effect of Filter Application in OpenJDK
The second filter handles a similar problem that occurs with the use of interface types
and abstract classes. Like receivers, whose type cannot be refined more precisely than
java.lang.Object, receivers of interface and abstract types also have a large number of
subtype alternatives within the JCL. Again, the call-graph algorithm does not have any
other choice than to include edges to all these alternatives, resulting in a over-propagation
of capabilities.
However, in this subtype filtering process we perform a prefix match on the package
name of callee and caller. We only propagate capabilities for alternative edges that point
to a callee located in the same package as the caller, as we assume that the most relevant
implementations often reside in the same package. For example, consider a call to the
compare method of the java.util.Comparator<T> interface in some method of a class
C. Further assume that the implementation of compare to which the call dispatches is
inside an anonymous class located inside C and is thus implicitly in the same package as
C. When detecting a call to the compare method our filter only accepts implementations
in the same package, which in this case is only the one in the anonymous class.
Without filtering, the call graph of the OpenJDK version 7 update 60 (Windows,
64bit) includes roughly 2M edges and over 100k methods that transitively call into
native methods. The exact figures are presented in Table 5.2. Applying the first filter
regarding receivers of type java.lang.Object will drop approximately 847k methods
(∼ 40%). When using abstract receiver types for the second filter, the considered edges
for capability propagation drop only to 1.9M , but when we apply the filter to interface
type receivers, the number drops to 1.3M edges. If we combine interface and abstract
receiver types (named Subtype filter in Table 5.2), we have only about 1.2M edges.
Finally, when combining both kinds of filters, we only consider about 370k edges. This
reduces the processed edges by 82% and the number of methods in the inverse transitive
hull by 13%.
As discussed before, overapproximation in the analysis produces overly populated
results in our approach. Due to that we choose to filter, which has the subsequent effect
that we find a capability set of a given library that is closer to the runtime situation.
For instance, a simple call of the read method and InputStream as receiver type would
imply the capabilities CLASSLOADING, SOUND, NET, UNSAFE, FS, SYSTEM, SECURITY and
GUI which are eight out of the 13 capabilities in our model. In case of the more concrete
type FileInputStream, the call of read would only yield the FS capability. Hence,
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we are underapproximating to that end that instead of assuming that all call edges
are possible, we only consider edges where caller and callee are in the same package.
Furthermore, we decided to apply our filter mechanism only for callees within the JCL
as we did not find large sets of alternative call edges inside libraries.
Result usage and reporting The last step in the analysis is the construction of a
report of the results. Depending on the developer’s needs we can construct two different
reports. First, by building the union set over all methods of a library we can construct
the complete capability footprint of a library. Second, when taking the usage context of
a library into account, we can report on the actual used capabilities as developers might
not always use a library to its full extent and thus may not use capabilities included in
the complete footprint.
Beyond our motivating usage scenario, where this information is displayed to the
application developer to decide on libraries to use, it may also be interesting in other
situations. Considering the example in our motivation regarding the Heartbleed incident,
we could also display the difference between the complete footprint of a library and the
used part. This can hint to features of a library that are unused by the application, just
as the heartbeat feature was not used in the OpenSSL scenario. Also this information
could be used to slice the library down to the used part in order to prevent unintended
or malicious use. We explore this idea in Chapter 8.
The information we infer can also be interesting for library developers. We already
compute a list of methods and the assigned capabilities which can be used to support code
inspections for libraries. Because through this list developers have assistance to identify
and find critical methods with ease, our approach can help to guide code inspections
and make them more efficient.
By analyzing and collecting the information from open source libraries in a database,
we could also build a recommendation system that, based on metrics like the delta from
expectation or the number of used capabilities, could assist developers to find a suitable
library.
5.3. Evaluation
In this section, we present the measures taken to evaluate the capability inference in our
approach. We are guided by these research questions:
RQ1 Does the capability inference algorithm effectively find capability sets equal to
developer’s expectations of library capability usage?
RQ2 Does the capability inference algorithm exceed these expected sets by more true
positive values?
Setup Developers make educated guesses on the capabilities used in a library when
integrating it into their application. A math library, for example, should not use the
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network or the filesystem. To check such an assumption developers can leverage the
documentation of the library. However, to save time developers might perform only
a key phrase scan to search for the presence (or absence) of certain terms. In our
evaluation, we mimic this process and use techniques from Information Retrieval to scan
documentation for key phrases.
We use a subset of the Qualitas Corpus [TAD+10] incorporating 70 Java libraries.
They were selected based on two criteria. First, the documentation for the library
must be accessible. Second, we choose libraries with a low number of dependencies on
other libraries, so that capabilities used by dependents will not influence the outcome
of the experiments. That is because we assume that capabilities used by dependencies
will only be documented in the original documentation of that library and not in the
documentation of the library depending on it.
The selected libraries have different sizes and capture various domains. Ranging from
ANTLR, which is a parser generator, to Weka, a collection of machine-learning algo-
rithms, or Pooka, a mail client with user interaction, multiple domains are captured in
the selection. Therefore, the capability expectations for these libraries vary as different
domains require different capabilities. For instance, a developer will expect pooka to use
the GUI capability, because it should display information for the user, while she would
not expect it from ANTLR.
As all libraries need the Java Class Library to work, we set the baseline for all our
experiments to the 64-bit build of the OpenJDK version 7 update 60 running under
Windows.
We constructed a list of key phrases for each capability (cf. Table 5.3). For this,
we used terms in the English language that can be assigned to the capabilities without
ambiguity between capabilities. We derived these key phrases from the documentation
of the JCL functions we annotated manually in the bootstrapping phase. As the NATIVE
capability is just used as a marker, we do not assign any keyword to this capability.
In order to search in API documentation for key phrases, we first obtain the docu-
mentation either by downloading the complete set of documentation or by requesting
it directly from the projects webserver. We then traverse the complete documentation
starting at allclasses-noframe.html, which contains a complete list of all available
classes, abstract classes and interfaces in the project. For each of the listed classes we
extract the documentation given for each method of that class. This text as well as the
method signature for reference is passed to Apache Lucene.
Lucene creates an inverted index using all tokens found inside the provided text. We
then use this index to search for the key phrases in the key phrase list. Depending on
whether we search for a word, e.g., ”classloader”, or a phrase e.g., ”load a class”, we use
either a TermQuery or a PhraseQuery. While term queries have support for stemming,
phrase queries do not. Stemming is a process where a term is reduced to its root, the
stem. For example, the term ”paint” would match ”painting” as well as ”painted”. The
use of stemming results in a more complete set of hits for this term.
For each project we record the capabilities whenever the respective key phrases are
found in the documentation. The result of this process is a union set over the complete
project and hence is expected to be the complete footprint of the library.
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Results The results of the evaluation are presented in Figure 5.3. For each project a
line in the diagram shows the expected and found capabilities. It uses the abbreviations
already introduced in Table 5.3. A green square with an equality symbol (=) denotes that
the capability was expected from the documentation and also found with the capability
inference algorithm. A red square with a minus symbol (-) means that the capability was
expected from the documentation, but not found. A blue square with a plus symbol (+)
represents a capability that was found by the inference algorithm, but was not expected
from the documentation. Empty squares represent capabilities that where neither found
in documentation nor inferred.
For example, for the ANTLR project, the FS, GUI, REFLECTION, and UNSAFE capa-
bilities were expected from key phrases in the documentation and also found through
capability inference. The documentation also suggested the DEBUG capability, but no
evidence for this was found in the call graph. Moreover, the CLASSLOADING, NET, PRINT,
SECURITY, and SYSTEM capabilities were found, but not expected from documentation.
We measured the agreement of our capability inference with the results obtained from
the key phrase search. For the agreement we consider every capability the analysis and
the key phrase search agree upon – both positively and negatively. For example, for the
ANTLR project the agreement is 87.50%. The mean agreement3 in the inspected project
set was 86.81% while the algorithm missed only 3.90% of the capabilities detected from
documentation.
When looking closer to individual capabilities, we see a similar result (cf. Table 5.4).
The only outlier here is the DEBUG capability. Moreover, the capability inference al-
gorithm was able to find 14.1% more capabilities than documented in mean over all
projects. It found evidence for undocumented use for all capabilities except DEBUG,
REFLECTION, and SOUND. The UNSAFE capability was found in 1.8 times more projects
than it was documented.
Figure 5.4 shows the capability distribution of each capability over all projects. For the
SYSTEM and UNSAFE capability it can be seen that every documented capability use was
successfully detected and for most other capabilities the figures are very close. However,
in contrast to Table 5.4 we present the true positives and not the agreement here, so
true negatives are not represented in the figure.
Discussion First and foremost, we are interested in meeting the developers expectations
(RQ1) of the capability usage of libraries. As our approach has a mean agreement of
86.81% over the inspected projects, we clearly reach this goal. The capability inference
only misses a mean of 3.90% in our experiments.
What is even more interesting is that the capability inference systematically discov-
ers usage of capabilities that are not to be expected by the developers when they use
documentation as a source of information (RQ2). While a mean of 14.1% more capa-
bilities over all inspected projects were found only shows this as a tendency, when look-
ing at technical capabilities like CLASSLOADING (66.67%), SECURITY (133.33%), SYSTEM
3As the values per project are already normalized, we use the geometric mean. Zero values are set to
0.001.
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Figure 5.4.: Capability Distribution over Projects
(133.33%), and UNSAFE (180.00%), it is apparent that the use of these capabilities by a
library is often not documented.
These technical capabilities may give hints towards whether a library might be vul-
nerable to exploits. For instance, as it may not be surprising that JUnit is using the
CLASSLOADING capability, developers might not expect this from jFin DateMath, which
is a library for financial date arithmetic. However, in our evaluation results both li-
braries use the CLASSLOADING capability although not suggested by the project docu-
mentation. A quick inspection of jFin DateMath revealed that two methods both named
newInstance4 use the forName method of java.lang.Class. According to Oracle’s Se-
cure Coding Guideline (Guideline 9-9)[ora14a], however, this method performs its task
using the immediate caller’s class loader. As both implementations of the newInstance
method do not perform further checks on the provided class name and simply pass it to
the forName method, attackers in an untrusted security context could use this so-called
Confused Deputy [Har88] in order to execute code in the library’s context given that it
is more privileged than the context of the caller.
Results show that our capability inference algorithm works well for most of the ca-
pabilities. The capability with the least convincing results regarding its agreement is
the DEBUG capability. Our approach misses every occurrence found through key phrase
scanning. While we choose a rather narrow set of methods for this capability during the
bootstrapping phase, the key phrases assigned to the capability occur in comparatively
many method documentations. For instance, the phrase “Method that is most useful
for debugging or testing; . . . ” occurred in the documentation of Jackson-core. While
4In org.jfin.date.daycount.DaycountCalculatorFactory and org.jfin.date.holiday.-
HolidayCalendarFactory.
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this phrase clearly does not imply any kind of JVM debugging on the methods part, it
still is included in the results for the term query for the ”debug” key phrase included
in the key phrase list for the DEBUG capability. However, when we apply our algorithm
to the jvm monitoring tool jconsole, we are indeed seeing the DEBUG capability included
in the results. In general, this observation also applies to the SOUND and to the INPUT
capability. This is what leads us to the conclusion that documentation might not be
precise enough in these cases.
However, we receive rather good results for CLIPBOARD, FS, NET, PRINT and REFLECTION
where we find most of the capabilities and even undocumented ones. This indicates that
our capability inference algorithm is a helpful approximation. Moreover, the excellent
results for the capabilities CLASSLOADING, SECURITY, SYSTEM and UNSAFE, where the in-
ference significantly exceeds the expectations, are a very interesting outcome. It may
indicate that API documentation is not a reliable source of information to build capa-
bility expectations in a security aware context.
Most projects in our evaluation set make good use of capabilities; one project is
an exception. The Javax-inject project shows no capability usage w.r.t. our inference,
but also no expectations can be extracted from the documentation. This is because
the project consists entirely out of interfaces, which by definition cannot have concrete
methods up to Java 7. We deliberately included the project in the evaluation set to
inspect whether the documentation of this project may raise expectations. As it did not
raise any and also by its contents could not use any capabilities, it is a good example
for true negatives.
As the evaluation answers both research questions positively, we conclude that our
approach is effective in helping to mitigate the developer’s dilemma when making library
choices for applications.
Threats to validity We only used API documentation for the extraction of developer
expectations. However, there are alternatives, which we did not consider. In an open
source setting, for instance, one could inspect the source code. Another alternative would
be to statically analyze the code for the presence or absence of specific, interesting calls,
as e.g., static bug checkers do. Manuals or other documents could also be a source of
information to developers. However, we think that capability information should be
denoted clearly in the public API documentation of a project.
We constructed the key phrase list manually from the observations we made while
inspecting the source code and the documentation of the annotated native methods in the
bootstrapping phase. It is possible that we missed key phrases that denote capabilities in
API documentation. Moreover, it is possible that we included key phrases that are not
suitable to detect capabilities and introduce many false expectations. Finally, the API
documentation of the projects could be outdated [FL02], incomplete, or even wrong. In
order to mitigate this threat, we reviewed the key phrase list and the results of search
queries to remove questionable key phrases.
There are also threats to validity with regard to our inference approach. First, we
are aware that we might introduce false negatives through our filtering phase. However,
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we use these filters to reduce false positives by removing call graph edges introduced
by incomplete receiver type information. If we get rid of the filters while keeping our
coarse-grained capability model, we would receive a result, where almost every time
the complete set of possible capabilities would be found in every library. In order to
mitigate the risk of introducing false negatives, we limit the filter to be only applied for
receiver types inside the JDK. Second, the analysis we use is unaware of everything that
is beyond the scope of the used call graph algorithm, so that we do not detect calls made
through reflection and direct manipulation of the heap through native code.
The largest manual step in our approach is the bootstrapping of native methods of
the JCL. As we inspected the implementation and documentation of these methods
manually, we may have documented too less, too much, or incorrect capabilities for
methods, even though we reviewed the dataset multiple times. In future work, we would
like to exchange this process with an automated analysis of the syscalls made in the
implementation. Beyond the process being more efficient, it is also repeatable for new
versions of the JCL and applicable to native code shipped with libraries. It might also
be more reliable in terms of precision.
5.4. Conclusion and Future Work
In this chapter, we presented a novel approach towards a capability inference for Java.
It is based on a manually created dataset of native methods and their capabilities in the
JCL. An automated process propagates these capabilities along a call graph through the
JCL and a library in order to find the capability footprint of the library. To produce
helpful results, we added a refinement step to the used call-graph algorithm and also ap-
ply filtering for alternative edges during capability propagation. Although filtering may
impede the soundness of the approach, the produced results are closer to expectation.
Being able to produce a capability footprint for a library helps developers in their
task of selecting libraries for their projects. With our analysis, a developer can get
answers towards capability usage in a few seconds instead of inspecting the source code
or the documentation manually. We show that the approach is able to find capabilities
expected from documentation with an agreement of 86.82%. Moreover, we show that the
approach exceeds these expectations by finding 14.1% more capabilities than expected
from the documentation and produces a more accurate footprint of a library’s actual
capability usage.
We plan to study the accuracy of the approach regarding developer expectation more
closely with the help of a user study. Developer experts will be asked to document their
expectations regarding multiple software libraries. By this, we will be able to further
determine the utility of the approach for secure software development.
Furthermore, we plan to infer the capabilities for native methods by an automated
process rather than the manual process presented in this chapter. A static analysis on
the native implementations of the methods can extract and trace system calls in order
to achieve a reproducible result for new versions of the JCL. Furthermore, it is useful to
include native library code into the process.
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capability key phrases
CLASSLOADING (CL) classloader, load a class,
classloading, jar
CLIPBOARD (CB) clipboard, paste
DEBUG (DB) jvm, debug, instrumenta-
tion, debugging
FS (FS) filesystem, file, folder, di-
rectory, path
GUI (GU) textfield, menubar, user in-
terface, canvas, paint, edi-
tor, color, rendering, ren-
der
INPUT (IN) press key, mouse, key-
board, trackball, pen
NATIVE (N)
NET (NT) network, socket, port, tcp,
udp, ip, host, hostname,
protocol, connection, http,
imap, pop3, smtp, ssl,
mail, transport, mime
PRINT (PR) printer, paper
REFLECTION (RF) reflection, class, field,
method, attribute, anno-
tation
SECURITY (SC) security, security provider,
policy, privilege, authority
SOUND (SD) sound, midi, wave, aiff,
mp3, media
SYSTEM (SY) system, command line, ex-
ecute, process, thread, en-
vironment, runtime, hard-
ware
UNSAFE (UN) pointer, memory address,
memory access, unsafe
Table 5.3.: Expected Key Phrases for Capabilities
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capability agreement miss excess
CLASSLOADING 97.62% 2.38% 66.67%
CLIPBOARD 98.53% 1.47% 2.94%
DEBUG 42.86% 57.14% 0.00%
FS 94.83% 5.17% 20.69%
GUI 79.10% 20.90% 4.48%
INPUT 91.30% 8.70% 1.45%
NET 82.46% 17.54% 22.81%
PRINT 90.77% 9.23% 7.69%
REFLECTION 90.00% 10.00% 0.00%
SECURITY 96.67% 3.33% 133.33%
SOUND 94.29% 5.71% 0.00%
SYSTEM 100.00% 0.00% 133.33%
UNSAFE 100.00% 0.00% 180.00%
Table 5.4.: Results by Capability
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1
Programming errors can have severe consequences on the secure of the program. When
a programmer makes a mistake in the implementation of a security checks the complete
security model might be affected, because it can be deactivated when exploiting the
mistake. Thus, the development of secure software also entails the use of static bug
finding tools.
Since the 1970s many approaches have been developed that use static analyses to
identify a multitude of different types of issues in source code [CHH+06, AB01, GYF06,
CCF+09]. These approaches use very different techniques that range from pattern
matching [CHH+06] to using formal methods [CCF+09] and have very different proper-
ties w.r.t. their precision and scalability. But, they all have in common that they are
each targeting a very specific kind of issues. Those tools (e.g., FindBugs [CHH+06])
which can identify issues across a wide range of issues are typically suites of relatively
independent analyses. This limits the number of issues that can be found to those that
are identified as relevant by the respective researchers and developers.
In this chapter, we present a generic approach that can detect a whole set of control-
and data-flow dependent issues in Java Bytecode without actually targeting any specific
kind of issue per se. The approach applies abstract interpretation to analyze the code
as precisely as possible and while doing so records the paths that are taken. Afterwards,
the analysis compares the recorded paths with the set of all paths that could be taken
according to a na¨ıve control-flow analysis that does not consider any data-flows. The
paths computed by the latter analysis but not taken by the former analysis are then
reported along with a justification why they were not taken.
For example, when implementing a security check as a condition to perform a critical
operation, a mistake in the implementation may manifest as an infeasible path either
containing the critical operation or the case where the operation is denied. In the
first case, the security critical operation is never performed. While this does not pose a
security risk, it is still undesirable as the functionality is also not available for authorized
clients. In the second case, the operation is performed regardless of client authorization,
which makes the code vulnerable.
The rationale underlying this approach is as follows. Many issues such as null derefer-
ences, array index out of bounds accesses or failing class casts result in exceptions that
leave infeasible paths behind. Hence, the hypothesis underlying the approach is three-
fold. First, in well-written code every path between an instruction and all it’s direct
successors is eventually taken, and, second, a path that will never be taken indicates an
1 This chapter is based on and contains verbatim content of work previously published at Foundations
of Software Engineering 2015 [EHMG15].
93
6. Hidden Truths in Dead Software Paths
issue. Third, a large class of relevant issues manifests itself sooner or later in infeasible
paths.
To validate the hypotheses we conducted a case study analyzing the Java Development
Kit (JDK 1.8.0 25). Additionally, we did a brief evaluation of the approach using the
Qualitas Corpus [TAD+10] to validate the conclusion drawn from the case study. The
issues that we found range from seemingly benign issues to serious bugs that will lead
to exceptions at runtime or to dead features. However, even at first sight benign issues,
such as unnecessary checks that test what is already guaranteed, can have a significant
impact. Manual code reviews are a common practice and the biggest issue in code
reviews is comprehending the code [BB13]. A condition that always evaluates to the
same value typically violates a reviewer’s expectation and hence impedes comprehension
causing real costs.
The analysis was explicitly designed to avoid false positives. And, yet it identified a
large number of dead paths (≈ 50% of all identified dead paths), which do not relate
to issues in the source code. This is because the analysis operates on Bytecode and is
as such sensitive to compilation techniques and a few other intricacies of the language.
To make the tool usable [JSMHB13, BBC+10], we implemented and evaluated three
heuristics to filter irrelevant issues.
Though we opted for analyzing the code as precisely as possible, we deliberately limited
the scope of the analysis by starting with each method of a project then performing a
context-sensitive analysis with a very small maximum call chain size. This makes the
analysis unsound – i.e. we may miss certain issues – but it enables us to use it for large
industrial sized libraries and applications such as the JDK. As the evaluation shows, the
approach is effective and can identify a wide range of different issues while suppressing
over 99% of all irrelevant findings.2
To summarize, we make the following contributions:
• We put forward the idea that infeasible paths in software are a good indication
for issues in code and show that a large class of relevant issues does manifest itself
sooner or later in infeasible paths.
• We present a new static analysis technique that exploits abstract interpretation
to detect infeasible paths. The analysis is parametrized over abstract domains
and the depth of call chains to follow inter-procedurally. These two features en-
able us to make informed reasonable trade-offs between scalability and soundness.
Furthermore, the analysis has an extremely low rate of false positives.
• We validate the claims about the proposal in a case study of industrial size soft-
ware; the issues revealed during the case study constitute themselves a valuable
contribution of the paper.
This chapter is structured as follows. In Section 6.1 we discuss a selection of issues
that we were able to find. After that, we discuss the approach in Section 6.2 along with
2The tool and the data set are available for download at www.opal-project.de/tools/bugpicker.
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its implementation. The evaluation is then presented in Section 6.3. The chapter ends
with a conclusion in Section 6.4.
6.1. Classification of Issues
In this section, we discuss the kind of issues that we found by applying our analysis to
the JDK 1.8.0 253. Given that the approach is not targeted towards finding any specific
category of issues, it is very likely that further categories emerge from investigating
the results of applying the analysis to other projects. Yet, the following list already
demonstrates the breadth of the applicability of the proposed approach.
Obviously Useless Code In some cases, we were surprised to find code that is obviously
useless in such a mature library as JDK. For illustration consider the code in Listing 6.1.
In the method isInitValue, the developer checks whether an int variable contains a
value that is smaller/larger than the smallest/largest possible value, which is obviously
false and does not need to be checked for. Such useless code has two problems. First,
it wastes resources. More importantly, it negatively impacts reasoning from the per-
spective of code that uses isInitValue. A developer has to understand that a call to
isInitValue always returns true. This is most likely not obvious in the context of the
calling method, as isInitValue suggest something different.
252 boolean isInitValueValid(int v) {
253 if ((v < Integer.MIN_VALUE) || (v > Integer.MAX_VALUE)) {
254 return false;
255 }
256 return true;
257 }
Listing 6.1: Obviously Useless Code in
com.sun.jmx.snmp.SnmpInt.isInitValueValid
Confused Conjunctions The binary conjunction operators in Java (|| and &&) are a
steady source of logic confusion not only for novices but also for experienced developers.
Mixing them up will either lead to an expression that is overly permissive or one that is
overly restrictive compared to the original intent.
1842 if (maxBits > 4 || maxBits < 8) {
1843 maxBits = 8;
1844 }
1845 if (maxBits > 8)
1846 maxBits = 16;
1847 }
Listing 6.2: Confused Conjunction in
com.sun.imageio.plugins.png.PNGMetadata.mergeStandardTree
3Some of the code samples shown in the following are abbreviated to better present the underlying
issue.
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In the example in Listing 6.2, a variable maxBits is checked if it is greater than 4 or
(operator ||) less than 8. This is always true as the partial expressions overlap. As a
result, the maxBits variable is always set to 8 rendering the following check (Line 1845)
useless. In this example, the developer probably wanted to use the && operator instead.
337 if (ix<0 && ix>=glyphs.length/*length of an array >= 0*/) {
338 throw new IndexOutOfBoundsException("" + ix);
339 }
Listing 6.3: Confused Conjunction in
sun.font.StandardGlyphVector.getGlyphCharIndex
In Listing 6.3 we have the dual situation. Here, the developer probably wanted to
use —— instead of &&. Currently, the condition – as a whole – will always evaluate
to false; an integer variable (ix) can never contain a value that is at the same time less
than zero and also larger or equal to zero. Currently the precondition check is useless
and ix could exceed the array’s length or even be negative. In general, such useless pre-
condition/post-condition checks may lead to deferred bugs at runtime which are hard to
track down. For example, imagine that ix is just stored in a field for later usage and at
runtime some other method uses it and fails with an exception. At that point-in-time
the method that caused ix to contain an invalid value may no longer be on the stack
and is therefore typically hard to identify.
In general confused conjunctions can render pre- or post-condition checks ineffective
or mask paths that are necessary for correct behavior.
Confused Language Semantics The semantics of Java’s instanceof check is in bor-
derline cases sometimes not well understood. For example, the instanceof operator
will return false, if the value is null.
381 public boolean containsValue(Attribute attribute) {
382 return
383 attribute != null &&
384 attribute instanceof Attribute &&
385 attribute.equals(...(Attribute)attribute...));
386 }
Listing 6.4: Instanceof and null Confusion in javax.print.attribute.-
HashAttributeSet.containsValue
In the example in Listing 6.4, the developer first checks the parameter attribute for
being not null. After that she checks if it is an instance of Attribute. However, the
instanceof operator also checks if the object is not null, so the first check is redundant.
But, given that the declared type of the parameter is Attribute, the respective value
will always be either an instance of Attribute or null, hence the not-null check would
be sufficient.
A second issue in this category is shown in Listing 6.5. In this case the developer checks
if a newly created object is indeed created successfully. This is, however, guaranteed by
Java’s language semantics. In this case the developer most likely had a background in
programming using the C family of languages where it is necessary to check that the
allocation of memory was successful.
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288 doc = new CachedDocument(uri);
289 if (doc==null) return null; // better error handling needed
Listing 6.5: New Objects are Never null in com.sun.org.apache.xalan.-
internal.xsltc.dom.DocumentCache
Instances of this category usually lead to redundant code that is detrimental to com-
prehensibility of the program.
Dead Extensibility Programmers may deliberately introduce temporary infeasible paths
into code when programming for features that are expected to be used in the future.
However, in some cases the implementation of a feature is aborted but no clean-up is
done; leaving behind dead code. For example, a method that was defined by an interface
with a single implementation and where the implementation of that method returns a
constant value is an instance of dead extensibility.
We classify issues as belonging to dead extensibility only if (a) the package is closed
for extension (e.g, everything in the com.sun.* or sun.* packages), (b) the development
of the respective code is known to have ended (e.g., javax.swing.*) or (c) we find an
explicit hint in the code.
189 // For now we set owner to null. In the future, it may be
190 // passed as an argument.
191 Window owner = null;
198 if (owner instanceof Frame) { ... }
Listing 6.6: Infeasible Paths from Unused Extensibility (taken from javax.print.-
ServiceUI.printDialog)
For example, in Listing 6.6 the variable owner is set to null but later on checked for
being of type Frame. This will always fail as discussed previously. Here, the comment
in the code however identifies this issue as a case of programming for the (now defunct)
future.
Another instance of this issue can be found in java.util.concurrent.ConcurrentHashMap.-
tryPresize. In that case our analysis identified that a variable (called sc) always has
the value 0 which leads to a decent amount of complex dead code. Given the complexity
of the code we directly contacted one of the developers and he responded:
“Right. This code block deserves a comment: It was not always unreachable,
and may someday be enabled ...”.
In general dead extensibility primarily hinders comprehension; sometimes to a highly
significant level as in the last case. Additionally, it may lead to wasted efforts if the code
is maintained even though it is dead [EJJ+12].
Forgotten Constant In case the declaration of a local variable and its first use are
very distant, developers might have already forgotten about its purpose and value and
assume that its value can change even though it is (unexpectedly) constant.
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For example, in javax.swing.SwingUtilities in method layoutCompoundLabelImpl
a variable called rub is set to zero and never touched over more than 140 lines of code.
Then the variable is used in an expression where it is checked for being larger than zero
and, if so, is further accessed. But, that code is never executed.
Issues in this category are often a hint to methods that need to be refactored because
they are very long and hard to comprehend. Overall these issues are also causing main-
tainability problems, because they are hindering comprehension and the resulting dead
code still needs to be maintained.
Null Confusion The most prevailing category of issues that our analysis discovered in
the JDK is related to checking reference values for being (non)-null. The issues in this
category can further be classified into two sub-categories: (a) unnecessary checks, which
do not cause any immediate harm, and (b) checks that reveal significant issues in the
code. We don’t consider this distinction in the following sections because both categories
are very relevant to developers [AP10].
An example of an issue of the first sub-category is a non-null check of a value stored in
a (private and/or final) field that is known to only contain non-null values. Another
instance is shown in Listing 6.7 - the variable atts is checked for being non-null and an
exception is thrown if the check fails. Later in the code (Line 227 - not shown here) the
variable is, however, checked again for being non-null, resulting in an infeasible else
path.
211 if (atts != null)
212 types.add(att);
213 else
214 throw new IOException(paramOutsideWarning);
Listing 6.7: Ensuring Non-nullness in javax.management.loading.MLetParser.-
parse)
Issues of the second sub-category are those where a non-null check is done after the
reference was already (tried to be) dereferenced. An example of the latter category is
shown in Listing 6.8. In this case, either the check is redundant or the code may throw
NullPointerExceptions at runtime.
372 int bands = bandOffsets.length;
373 ... // [bandOffsets is not used by the next 6 lines of code]
374 if (bandOffsets == null)
375 throw new ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException("...");
Listing 6.8: Late Null Check (taken from
java.awt.image.Raster.createBandedRaster)
Range Double Checks We classify issues as range double checks if the range of a value
is checked multiple times in a row such that subsequent checks are either just useless
or will always fail. As in case of Null Confusion issues, such issues are benign if they
are related to code that is just checking what is already known. However in other cases
(more) significant issues may be revealed.
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331 byte jcVersion = jc.javaSerializationVersion();
332 if (jcVersion >= Message.JAVA_ENC_VERSION) {
333 return Message.JAVA_ENC_VERSION;
334 } else if (jcVersion > Message.CDR_ENC_VERSION) {
335 return jc.javaSerializationVersion();
336 } ...
Listing 6.10: Contradicting Range Checks in com.sun.corba.se.impl.orbutil.-
ORBUtility
An issue of the first category is shown in Listing 6.9. Here, the variable extendableSpaces
is first checked for being zero or less (Line 1095) and if so the method is aborted. Later
on the dual check (Line 1097) is unnecessarily repeated.
1095 if (extendableSpaces <= 0) return;
1096 int adjustment = (targetSpan - currentSpan);
1097 int spaceAddon = (extendableSpaces > 0) ?
1098 adjustment / extendableSpaces : 0;
Listing 6.9: Useless Range Check in javax.swing.text.ParagraphView$Row.-
layoutMajorAxis
An issue of the second category is shown in Listing 6.10. Here, the value of the variable
jcVersion is first checked for being equal or larger than the constant JAVA ENC VERSION,
which has the value 1. After that, the variable is checked again for being larger than the
constant CDR ENC VERSION, which is 0. Hence, both checks are equivalent, but the code
that is executed in both case clearly differs which makes it likely that it is incorrect.
Type Confusion Names of methods often explicitly or implicitly suggest that the han-
dled or returned values have a specific type and that specific type casts are therefore
safe. This, however, can be misleading and lead to runtime exceptions.
For example, the method createTransformedShape shown in Listing 6.11 suggests
that a transformed version of the Shape object is returned that has been passed to it.
However, the method always returns an instance of Path2D.Double. Now the method
getBlackBoxBounds which is defined in java.awt.font.TextLayout calls createTranformedShape
passing an instance of GeneralPath and casts the result to the very same type. This
will always result in an exception as GeneralPath is not a subtype of Path2D.Double.
3825 public Shape createTransformedShape(Shape pSrc) {
3826 if (pSrc == null) { return null; }
3827 return new Path2D.Double(pSrc, this);
3828 }
Listing 6.11: Confusing Implicit Contract Leading to a Type Confusion in java.-
awt.geom.AffineTransform.createTransformedShape
Unsupported Operation Usage If a method is called that always just throws an ex-
ception and that exception causes the calling method to also behave abnormally then we
considered the related issues as Unsupported Operation Usage. Consider for example the
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code shown in Listing 6.12. Here, the extract method calls the read method, which
always throws an exception. This results in two issues: First, both methods cannot
be called without triggering an exception that disrupts the control flow. Second, the
extract method calls the create input stream method returning an InputStream,
which is afterwards not further used and – in particular – not closed.
29 static CodecFactory extract (org.omg.CORBA.Any a) {
30 return read (a.create_input_stream ());
31 }
32 static CodecFactory read (InputStream istream){
33 throw new org.omg.CORBA.MARSHAL ();
34 }
Listing 6.12: A Method Always Throwing an Exception in org.omg.IOP.-
CodecFactoryHelper
In such cases the code often seems to be in a state of flux where it is unclear what has
happened or will happen.
Unexpected Return Value We found some cases where the name of a method suggests
a specific range of return values – in particular if the name starts with is. In this case,
Java developers generally expect that the set of return values is {true, false} and write
corresponding code. This will, however, directly lead to dead code if the called method
always returns the same value. A concrete example is shown in Listing 6.13. Here,
the developer calls a function isUnnecessaryTransform and, if the result evaluates to
true sets the used transformer to null. However, this code is dead because the called
method, which is shown in Listing 6.14, always returns false.
746 if (isUnnecessaryTransform(...)) {
747 conn.getDestination().setTransform(null);
748 }
Listing 6.13: Dead Code Due to a Bug in the Called Method; found in com.sun.-
media.sound.SoftPerformer
761 static boolean isUnnecessaryTransform(... transform){
762 if(transform == null) return false;
763 ... // [the next four tests also just return false]
764 return false;
765 }
Listing 6.14: The result is always false in com.sun.media.sound.SoftPerformer.
As demonstrated by the code in Listing 6.13, these issues are typically related to
significant problems in the respective code. The example also indicates that an inter-
procedural analysis is required to discover such issues.
6.2. The Approach
As described in the introduction, we are able to identify the issues presented in the
previous section using a generic approach that relies on the detection of dead paths.
The approach’s three main building blocks: the generic detection of dead paths, the
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underlying analysis and the post-processing of issues to filter irrelevant ones. We present
these building blocks in the following sections.
6.2.1. Identifying Infeasible Paths
To identify infeasible paths in code, we first construct a control-flow graph (CFG) for
each method. The CFG contains all possible control flow edges that may occur during
the execution if we do not consider any data flows. In a second step, we perform an
abstract interpretation (AI) of the code, during which a second flow graph is implicitly
generated and which consists of the edges taken during the AI. We denote this flow graph
AIFG in the following. The AIFG is potentially more precise than the CFG because
the underlying analysis is context- and data-flow sensitive. Hence, if the AIFG contains
fewer edges than the CFG then some paths in the CFG are not possible. Consider for
illustration a conditional branch expression (e.g., if, switch). The CFG of such an
expression contains an edge to the first instruction of each branch. On the contrary, the
AIFG will not contain edges from the condition instruction to those branches, whose
guarding condition cannot be the result of evaluating the condition, according to the AI.
Given a method’s AIFG and CFG, we remove the edges of the former from the latter.
The source instruction of the first edge of every remaining path in the intersection graph
is reported to the developer, as it is directly responsible for an infeasible path. This
instruction is the last executed one and is called the guard instruction. More precisely,
the algorithm to detect infeasible paths is shown in Listing 6.15. Given a method (Line 1)
and the result of its AI (Line 2), the algorithm iterates over each instruction, instr,
of method (Line 4) testing whether it was evaluated (Line 5). If instr was executed,
we iterate over all possible successors and check whether each expected path was taken
(Line 7); if not, instr is a guard instruction and a report is generated which describes
which path is never taken and why. If instr was not executed, it cannot be a guard
instruction and the iteration continues with the next instruction.
1 val method : Method { val instructions : Array[Instruction] }
2 val result : AIResult { val evaluated : Set[Instruction] }
3 for {
4 instr <- method.instructions
5 if result.wasEvaluated(instr)
6 staticSuccInstr <- instr.successors // static CFG
7 if !result.successorsOf(instr).contains(staticSuccInstr)
8 } yield { /* rank and create error report w.r.t. instr */ }
Listing 6.15: Detecting Infeasible Edges
Consider for further illustration the graph shown in Figure 6.1. Each node in the graph
represents an instruction in some piece of code, its edges represent the set of control-
flows in the CFG. Now, let us assume that – by performing an abstract interpretation
of the respective code – we can determine that the instructions 4, 5 and 6 are never
executed and, hence, that the control-flow paths [2→4→6], [2→4→5→6], [3→4→6] and
[3→4→5→6] are infeasible. In this case, the analysis will create one report for the guard
instruction 2 and one for guard instruction 3.
To illustrate how the technique reveals issues presented in the previous section, we
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1
2
3
4
5
6
Exit
Guards 
Figure 6.1.: A CFG vs. an AIFG.
1: public static X doX(SomeType[] array){
2:     if (array != null || array.length > 0) {(a) }
5:     // … (b)
6: }// (ex)
ifnonnull array arraylength array ifgt (>0)
(a)
(b) (ex)
(B) Corresponding CFG
true true false
false
(A) Java Source Code.
ifnonnull array arraylength array ifgt (>0)
(a)
(b) (ex)
(C) Computed AIFG
true true false
false
relevant missing edge
a missing edge
Java Bytecode 
Java Bytecode 
:- array is null
:- array not null
Figure 6.2.: The Approach Exemplified
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apply it to a concrete example. The issue under consideration that we found multiple
times in the JDK is the use of the wrong logical operator (e.g., ||) in combination with
a null check. The code in Figure 6.2(A) (Line 2) exemplifies this issue. The method
doX will always fail with a NullPointerException, if the given array is null, because
length is not defined on null values. Given the check of array against null that
precedes the field access array.length, we assume that the developer actually intended
to use the logical AND operator (&&) instead of || to avoid the runtime exception. This
issue is identified by our analysis because the AI determines the nullness property of
reference values. When the analysis of the null check is performed, a constraint is
created (cf. Figure 6.2(C)) that states that array is null if the test ifnonnull fails
and vice versa. Now, the AI will – when it evaluates the arraylength instruction –
always only follow the exception path and will never evaluate the ifgt instruction and
the instructions dominated by it. The generated report will state that the predecessor
instruction of ifgt, the arraylength instruction, is the root cause of the issue, as it
always throws a NullPointerException.
6.2.2. The Abstract Interpretation Analysis
The analysis that performs the abstract interpretation is built on top of OPAL [EH14] -
an abstract interpretation framework for Java Bytecode implemented in Scala. Central
to our idea is that the abstract interpretation does not pursue any specific goal – it
simply tries to collect as much information as possible; the identification of infeasible
paths is a side effect of doing so. Furthermore, unlike most abstract interpretation based
analyses approaches, our analysis is not a whole program analysis. Instead, the analysis
treats each method as a potential entry point and makes no special assumptions about
the overall state or input parameters. For example, when analyzing a method m(Object
o,int i), no assumptions are made about the parameters o and i (o could, e.g., be null,
an alias for this, or reference an independent object). For each method, we perform an
inter-procedural, path-, flow-, object- and context-sensitive analysis, however, only up
to a pre-configured – typically very small – call chain length.
The rationale for the above design decisions is twofold: (a) to make the approach
usable for analyzing libraries, and (b) to make it scalable to industrial sized applications.
Libraries do not have a designated main method - any public method can be an entry
point to the library. Hence, our decision to handle each method in isolation. Our
understanding of a very large codebase is, e.g., the entire JDK 8, which consists of more
than 190,000 concrete methods with more than 9,000,000 Bytecode instructions. An
approach that does not restrict the length of call chains to be followed may find more
issues, but does not scale for such codebases as the effort roughly scales exponentially.
So, we deliberately trade off the number of issues that we find for scalability. This is a
common design decision taken by static analysis tools [CHH+06, BBC+10].
The analysis is designed as a product line, currently customizable with respect to: (a)
abstract domains used to represent and perform computations on values, and (b) the
maximum call chain length that the analysis follows.
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Customizing the Abstract Domains Concerning (a), the current implementation is
configured with the following abstract domains.
(i) For computations on integer values we use a standard interval domain based on
the description found in [NNH99]. Our domain implements all arithmetical operations
supported by the JVM and facilitates path-sensitive analyses. It is further parameterized
over the maximum size of the intervals for which we try to compute the result before the
respective variable is assumed to take any value (the top value in the abstract domain’s
lattice). The parameterization over abstract domains enables us to adapt the precision of
the analysis and to make it scalable to large code bases. For example, for the method in
Listing 6.16 the analysis would compute that the return value is in the range [200, 1000]
if the configured maximum cardinality is larger than 800. If the maximum is, e.g., 32
the result would be AnyInt (the top value).
1 int m1(boolean test){
2 int i = 100;
3 if (test) i *= 10;
4 else i *= 2;
5 return i; // i is a value in the range [200,1000] or "Any Int"
6 }
Listing 6.16: Test Code for Integer Ranges
We could as well use a domain that represents integer values as sets. In the example
above, such a domain could precisely capture the information that the return value is
either 200 or 1000. However, in a pre-study, we found that a domain based on ranges is
superior in terms of its efficiency and hence better suited for our setting.
(ii) For the other primitive data types supported by the Java Virtual Machine (float,
long, double), the current implementation performs all computations at the type level;
hence, currently we cannot identify bugs related to these values. This limitation, how-
ever, is only a matter of putting more engineering effort, which is currently ongoing.
(iii) The domain for reference values is object-sensitive and distinguishes objects based
on their allocation site. Hence, for objects created within an analyzed method, we can
derive precise type information. The domain also supports alias and path-sensitive
analyses. Currently, this domain cannot be configured any further.
Customizing the Maximum Call Chain Length Let us now consider the second cus-
tomization dimension (b); adapting the maximum call chain length. At each call site,
the analysis uses the configured maximal call chain length to determine whether to make
the call. If the length of the current call chain is smaller than the configured maximum,
the analysis invokes the called method using the current context - however, only if the
information about the receiver type is precise, i.e., the call site is monomorphic. If we
only have an upper type bound for the receiver object it could happen that a developer
overwrites the respective method later on and would render the analysis unsound.
To illustrate the effect of configuring the call chain length, consider the code in List-
ing 6.17 and assume that the maximum call chain length is 2 and the analysis tries to find
issues in method m1. In this case, the method m2 will also be analyzed with the current
context (i <= 0) to find out that m2 will always throw an exception. However, since
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1 void m1(int i){
2 if(i <= 0 && m2(i) > 1) System.out.println("success");
3 else System.out.println("failure");
4 }
5 int m2(int i){
6 if(i > 0) sqrt(i);
7 else throw new IllegalArgumentException();
8 }
Listing 6.17: Example for the Effects of Call Chain Length
the max call chain length is 2 the constructor call in m2 (Line 7) will not be analyzed.
Hence, the analysis draws no conclusion about the precise exception that is thrown4.
We complement the abstract interpretation analysis described so far with two simple
pre-analyses. Their goal is to determine precise types for values stored in private variables
respectively of values returned by private methods. In Java (and other object-oriented)
libraries it is common to use interface types for fields and method return values, even if
these values are actually instances of specific classes. The pre-analyses that we perform
are able to determine the concrete types of private fields and of return values of private
methods in 40% of the inspected cases5.
We limit the application of these analyzes to private methods and fields only to make
them usable for libraries. Extending the scope of the analyses beyond private method-
s/fields may lead to wrong results. A developer, using the library, may create a new
subtype which stores other values of different kinds in the field or overrides the method
returning a different kind of object. This cannot happen with private fields/methods,
both are not accessible in subclasses and, hence, cannot be changed.
Both pre-analyses are very efficient as they only analyze one class at a time and perform
abstract interpretations of a class methods using domains that perform all computations
at the type level. However, they still contribute significantly to the overall power of the
analysis w.r.t. identifying issues in particular if the maximum call chain length is small.
If the call chain length is 1 then 10% of the issues are found based on the pre-analysis.
6.2.3. Post-processing Analysis Results
Obviously, it is desirable to minimize the number of false reports produced by the anal-
ysis. However, completely avoiding them is due to the complexities associated with
statics analyses generally not possible. In our setting, we distinguish between two kinds
of false reports. First, there are infeasible paths that are correctly identified as such by
the analysis, but which do not hint at issues in the software. They are rather due to (i)
code generated by the compiler, (ii) intricacies of Java and (iii) common best practices.
We call reports related to such issues irrelevant reports to indicate that they are not
real false reports in the sense of being wrong. Nevertheless, they would be perceived as
such by developers as they would not help in fixing any source code level issues. Second,
4The constructor of llegalArgumentException may throw some other exception.
5When analyzing the JDK 1.8.0 Update 25.
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there are paths that are wrongly identified as infeasible. Such paths are due to the im-
precision of the analysis w.r.t. code that uses reflection or reflection-like mechanisms. In
the following, we discuss each source of false reports and the heuristics used to identify
and suppress them.
Compiler Generated Dead Code The primary case that we identified, where Java
compilers implicitly generate dead code, is due to the compilation strategy for finally
blocks. The latter are typically included twice in the Bytecode, for both cases when an
exception occurred respectively did not occur. This strategy often results in code that
is provably dead, but where there is nothing to fix at the source code level.
1 void conditionInFinally(java.io.File f) {
2 boolean completed = false;
3 try {
4 f.canExecute();
5 completed = true;
6 } finally {
7 if (completed) doSomething();
8 }
9 }
Listing 6.18: Implicit Dead Code in Finally
For illustration, consider the code in Listing 6.18. The if statement (Line 7) gets
included twice in the compiled code. If an exception is thrown by the canExecute call
(Line 4), completed will always be false. Therefore, the call to doSomething would
be dead code. However, if no exception is thrown, completed will be true and, hence,
the branch, where completed is false is never taken. Now, to identify that there are
no issues at the source code level, it is necessary to correlate both Bytecode segments
to determine that both branches are taken. In other words, we have to recreate a view
that resembles the original source code to determine that there is nothing to fix at the
source code level.
To suppress such false warnings, we use the following simple heuristics. We search in
the Bytecode for a second if instruction that accesses the same local variable and which
is in no predecessor/successor relation with the currently considered guard instruction,
i.e., both instructions are on independent paths. After that, we check that one of the two
if instructions strictly belongs to a finally block, i.e., we check that the if instruction
is dominated by the first instruction of a finally handler, which the other one is not.
The Intricacies of Java In Java, every method must end each of its paths with either
a return instruction or by throwing an exception. Now, if a method is called, whose
sole purpose is to create and throw an exception (e.g., doFail in Listing 6.19), thus
intentionally aborts the execution of the calling method (compute in Listing 6.19), the
calling method still needs to have a return or throw statement. These statements will
obviously never be executed and would be reported without special treatment.
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1 Throwable doFail() { throw new Exception(/* message*/); }
2
3 Object compute(Object o) {
4 if(o == null) [ return doFail(); OR throw doFail(); ]
5 else return o;
6 }
Listing 6.19: doFail() Always Throws an Exception
Such infeasible paths, however, are not related to a fixable issue in code and should
hence be suppressed. We do not generate a report if (a) the first instruction of an
infeasible path is a return or throw instruction and (b) the guard instruction is a call
to a method that always throws an exception.
Established Idioms A source of several irrelevant reports in our study of the JDK is the
common best practice in Java programs to throw an exception if an unexpected value is
encountered in case of a switch statement. The implementations in these cases always
contain a default branch that throws an error or exception stating that the respective
value is unexpected. A prototypical example is shown in Listing 6.20.
1 switch (i) {
2 case 1 : break;
3 // complete enumeration of all cases that should ever occur
4 default : throw new UnknownError();// should not happen
5 }
Listing 6.20: Infeasible Default Branch
In the JDK we found multiple instances of such code, which vary significantly. In
particular, the exceptions that are thrown vary widely ranging from UnknownError over
Exception and RuntimeException, to custom exceptions. Furthermore, in several cases
the code is even more complex. In these cases a more meaningful message, which captures
the object’s state, is first created by calling a helper method that creates it. In some
cases that helper method even immediately throws the exception. To handle all cases
in a uniform way, we perform a local data- and control-flow analysis that starts with
the first instruction of the default branch to determine whether the default branch will
always end by throwing the same exception.
Assertions Another source of irrelevant reports related to correctly identified infeasi-
ble edges is code related to assertions. We found several cases, where we were able
to prove that an assert statement will always hold or where an AssertionError
was explicitly thrown on an infeasible path. In the latter case, the Java code was
following the pattern if( /* condition was proven to be false */ ) throw new
AssertionError( /*optional message*/ )) and is directly comparable to the code
that is generated by a Java compiler for assert statements. As in the previous case, re-
ports related to such edges are perceived as irrelevant by developers. We suppress related
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reports by checking whether an infeasible path immediately starts with the creation of
an AssertionError.
Reflection and Reflection-like Mechanisms Though we tried to reduce the number
of false positives to zero, we found some instances of false positives for which the effort
of programmatically identifying them would by far outweigh the benefits. In these cases,
the respective false positives are due to the usage of Java Reflection and/or the usage of
sun.misc.Unsafe. Using both approaches it is possible to indirectly set a field’s value
such that the analysis is not aware of it. For example java.lang.Thread uses Unsafe
to indirectly set the value of the field runner using a memory address stored in a long
variable. Our analysis in this case cannot identify that the respective field is actually set
to a value that is different from null and hence, creates an issue related to every test
of the respective variable against null. As the evaluation will show, the absolute and
relative numbers of false positives are so low that the heuristics can still be considered
effective.
6.3. Evaluation
We evaluated our analysis by using the approach on the JDK to (i) get a good under-
standing of the issue categories that our analysis can identify and the effectiveness of the
techniques for suppressing false warnings, and (ii) to derive a good understanding of how
the maximum call chain length and the maximum cardinality of integer ranges effects
the identification of issues as well as the runtime. After that, we applied the approach
to the Qualitas Corpus [TAD+10] to test its applicability to a diverse set of applications
and to validate our findings.
6.3.1. JDK 1.8.0 Update 25
Issue Categories
The issue categories that we identified were discussed in Section 6.1. The distribution
of the issues across different categories is shown in Table 6.1. We manually evaluated all
reported issues in the packages that constitute the JDK’s public API: java*, org.omg*,
org.w3c* and org.xml*. The analysis was executed using a maximum call chain length
of 3 and setting the maximum cardinality of integer ranges to 32; no upper bound was
specified for the analysis time per method.
Overall 556 reports were related to the public API; including the reports that were
automatically identified as irrelevant because they are expected to belong to compiler
generated dead code, to assertions or to common programming idioms. All 556 reports
were manually inspected to check for false positives, to classify the reports and to assess
the filtering mechanism. In the results of the analysis we found 19 reports that were
related to code for which we did not find the source code and, thus, dropped them from
the study.
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Category Percentage
Obviously Useless Code 1%
Confused Conjunctions 2%
Confused Language Semantics 3%
Dead Extensibility 9%
Forgotten Constant 4%
Null Confusion 54%
Range Double Checks 11%
Type Confusion 3%
Unexpected Return Value 5%
Unsupported Operation Usage 7%
False Positives 1%
Table 6.1.: Issues per Category
From the 537 remaining reports 279 (≈ 52%) were automatically classified as irrele-
vant. A further analysis revealed that 81% of the 279 irrelevant reports are related to
compiler generated/forced dead code - a finding that clearly demonstrates the need to
suppress warnings for compiler generated dead code. Another 12% are due to assertions
or common programming idioms. The remaining 7% were false negatives, i.e. the fil-
tering was too aggressive and suppressed warnings for true issues. All these cases were
related to a method read6 that just throws an exception and which was called at the end
of the calling methods. Hence, they were automatically classified in the Intricacies of
Java category. Given that the filter otherwise proved very helpful, we decided to accept
these false negatives.
The vast majority of the reported issues – i.e., the issues that were deemed relevant by
the analysis – is related to null values. A closer investigation revealed that developers
are often literally flooding the code with null checks that only check what is already
guaranteed. However, as already discussed in the introduction we also found numerous
cases where field and method accesses were done on null values. The second top most
category of issues is related to checking that an integer value is in a specific range. As
in the previous case this is sometimes useless, but in many cases it identifies situations
where it is obvious that the code does not behave as intended.
For each of the other categories we found so few issues that the development of a spe-
cially targeted analysis would probably not be worthwhile for other approaches. How-
ever, taken together, these categories make up 34% of all issues and given that we identify
them for free, these findings are significant.
Finally, we found two false positives (< 1% of all issues) as discussed in the previous
section.
6Presented in Listing 6.12.
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Varying the Analysis Parameters
To determine the sensitivity of the analysis on changed analysis parameters, we ran
several instances of the analysis with maximum call chain lengths of 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5
and with a maximum cardinality settings for integer ranges of 2, 4, 8, 16 and 32. If
the analysis time of a single method exceeded 10 seconds, the respective analysis was
aborted. This time limit was chosen because it enables the vast majority of methods to
complete within the timeframe, but it still avoids that the entire analysis is completely
dominated by a few methods with extraordinary complexity7. The analysis was executed
on a 8-Core Mac Pro with 32GB of main memory. Overall, we ran the analysis 25 times.
As expected, increasing the max call chain length or the maximum cardinality also
increases the number of identified issues. However, the effectiveness of the analysis in
terms of number of issues per unit of time decreases sharply. As shown in Table 6.2,
the number of additional relevant issues that are found if the call chain length increases
from 1 to 2 is remarkable (≈ 50%). However, the number of additional issues that are
found if the maximum call chain length is increased from 4 to 5 is much less impressive
(depending on the maximum cardinality of integer ranges between 1 and 2 additional
issues).
Hence, increasing the maximum cardinality of ranges of integer values is initially much
less effective than increasing the maximum call chain length. If the maximum call chain
length is 1 then increasing the cardinality from 2 to 32 increases the necessary effort
more significantly than increasing the call chain length by one, though the latter will
lead to the detection of more issues. Nevertheless, certain issues can only be found if
we increase the maximum cardinality and at some point increasing the cardinality is the
only feasible way to detect further issues. For example, increasing the call chain length
from 4 to 5 does not reveal significantly new issues. However, the analysis still revealed
new issues when we increased the range’s cardinality. Furthermore, if we specify an
upper bound of 10 seconds for the analysis of a single method – which includes the time
needed to analyze called methods – the number of aborted methods rises significantly
and we therefore even miss some issues.
In summary, from an efficiency point-of-view, a maximum call chain length of 2 or 3
and a maximum cardinality of 4 or 8 seems to be the sweet spot for the analysis of the
JDK.
We also examined some of the issues (using random sampling) that only show up if
we increase the call chain length from one to two to get an initial understanding of
such issues. This preliminary analysis reveals that most additional issues were related
to a defensive coding style, which can also be seen in the Null confusion, Range Double
Checks or Confused Language Semantics categories.
A prototypical example is shown in Listing 6.21. The check of tmpFile against null
(Line 2) is useless as the method createTempFile will never return null.
1 tmpFile = File.createTempFile("tmp","jmx");
7A particularly complex method can be found in jdk.internal.org.objectweb.asm.ClassReader.
The method readCode is more than 500 lines long and contains several loops that each call multiple
methods.
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Max
Call
Chain
Length
Max
Integer
Ranges
Cardi-
nality
Issues
Rele-
vant
Issues
Filtered
Issues
Total
Time [s]
Aborted
Methods
1 2 690 1157 1847 10 0
1 4 699 1172 1871 11 0
1 8 701 1180 1881 13 0
1 16 702 1182 1884 21 0
1 32 702 1182 1884 27 0
2 2 1078 1248 2326 25 0
2 4 1090 1269 2359 31 0
2 8 1093 1277 2370 43 0
2 16 1094 1279 2373 73 0
2 32 1094 1279 2373 149 1
3 2 1189 1252 2441 60 0
3 4 1201 1273 2474 78 0
3 8 1204 1281 2485 139 0
3 16 1205 1283 2488 289 1
3 32 1205 1283 2488 894 10
4 2 1224 1252 2476 156 0
4 4 1236 1273 2509 205 1
4 8 1237 1281 2518 438 7
4 16 1237 1283 2520 1259 27
4 32 1233 1283 2516 6117 63
5 2 1225 1252 2477 457 4
5 4 1235 1273 2508 990 7
5 8 1239 1281 2520 1566 20
5 16 1234 1283 2517 5482 80
5 32 1233 1283 2516 39274 143
Table 6.2.: Evaluation of the Analysis Parameters Sensitivity
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2 if (tmpFile == null) return null; (* return null is dead *)
3
4 File createTempFile(String pre, String suf) throws ... {
5 return createTempFile(pre, suf, null); }
6 File createTempFile(String pre, String suf, File dir) throws ... {
7 ... File f; ...
8 if (!fs.createFileExclusively(f.getPath())) throw ...
9 return f; (* The only return statement. *) }
Listing 6.21: Defensive Coding in javax.management.loading.MLet.getTmpDir
6.3.2. Qualitas Corpus
We ran the analysis twice on all 109 projects of the Qualitas Corpus [TAD+10]8. The
corpus is well suited to evaluate general purpose tools such as the proposed one as it is
a curated collection of projects across all major usage areas of Java (Desktop-/Server-
side Applications and Libraries). The evaluation is done once using a maximum call
chain length of 1 and once using a maximum length of 2. Overall, this study supports
our previous findings. As in case of the JDK study, increasing the maximum call chain
length from 1 to 2 led to the identification of a significantly higher number of issues.
Sometimes even more than twice as many issues are found (e.g., Eclipse, JRuby or
Findbugs), which further stresses the importance of context-sensitivity for bug finding
tools. Overall, we found more than 11, 000 issues across all projects. Interestingly, we
did not find any issues in the projects jUnit, jFin, jGraphT, Trove, sablecc and fit. A
close investigation of these projects revealed that they are small, maintained by a small
number of developers, and possess good test suites.
6.4. Conclusion
In this chapter, we have presented a generic approach for the detection of a range of
different issues that relies on abstract interpretation. The approach makes it possible
to adapt the executed analysis to a library’s or application’s needs and can easily be
extended in a generic fashion. As the evaluation has shown, the presented approach
is able to find a large number of issues across many categories in mature large Java
applications. We have furthermore motivated and discussed the filtering of false positive
that are technical artifacts as well as those related to common programming idioms.
The presented techniques reduce the number of (perceived) irrelevant reports to nearly
none.
8Version 20130901.
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In this chapter we present related work that targets monitoring the static or dynamic
state of a program. We start with looking at approaches for bug finding in C or C++
code. Going up the stack, we present techniques to find excessive privilege assignment or
usage in Java code. We follow this with a presentation of work in the field of taint-flow
analysis, which allows to find complex data-flow dependent issues. We conclude this
chapter with a review of techniques to find dead paths in programs.
7.1. Bug Finding in Native Code
Techniques for bug finding emerged right after the first programs were written. We will
concentrate on methods for bug finding that can be used for C or C++ code
In an empirical study [TC08], Tan and Croft discovered 59 previously unknown bugs
in the JDK’s native code. For this purpose, they leveraged existing tools and constructed
new ones. To scan for common C bug patterns they use Splint [EL02], ITS4 [VBKM00]
and Flawfinder (static analysis tools that highlight probable bug patterns). For JNI spe-
cific bugs they provide grep-based scripts and scanners implemented in CIL [NMRW02].
The results were manually inspected as all of the analyses provided high false positive
rates (97.5-99.8% for the off-the-shelf tools).
In their paper, the authors identified six vulnerability categories from their found bugs.
We designed our analyses (cf. Chapter 4) to target unsafe programming practices rather
than particular vulnerability patterns, as they can be exhaustively covered, whereas new
vulnerability categories are detected frequently. Indeed, since publication of the study
by Tan and Croft, various new vulnerability categories have been identified, e.g., Invalid
Array Index.
Their analyses produce a high number of false positives of over 97%. As a result, a
considerable amount of manual effort is needed to detect the actual bugs. In comparison,
we present a ranked list of functions by their detected use of unsafe practices. Also, our
analysis produces a considerably smaller amount of warnings in the process, even though
Tan and Croft only process a subset of the native part of the JCL1, as their tools did
not scale for the complete codebase. While Tan and Croft produce 0.124 warnings per
inspected line of code in this subset, we show only 0.002 warnings per inspected line
of code for the complete code base. Therefore, fewer cases have to be considered for
manual inspection. As we present them in a ranked list the most vulnerable cases can
be reviewed first, making the process more efficient.
1They only considered approximately 6% of JCL’s native code.
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Furr and Foster [FF06] directed research on Foreign Function Interfaces (FFI) towards
the JNI and introduce a type-inference system for checking the type safety of programs
that use the JNI. As class names, field names and method signatures are represented by
strings in the JNI, they track the flow of string constants through the program. This
allows them to assign type signatures to the JNI functions and to infer them for most
user-defined functions. They discovered 155 errors coming from incorrect type usage in
a set of programs using the JNI. Kondoh and Onodera [KO08] leverage static typestate
analysis to find four distinct error patterns: missing statements for explicit JNI exception
handling, mistakes in resource management due to erroneous manual allocation, local
references that are not converted to global references when living across multiple method
invocations and calls to disallowed JNI functions in critical regions. Lee et al. [LWH+10]
demonstrate how dynamic analyses can be synthesized from state machines to detect FFI
violations w.r.t. the JNI. They identified three big classes of rules that enforce safety for
the JNI: JVM state constraints, type constraints and resource constraints that each can
be represented by a type of state machine.
One thing pointed out in Tan and Croft’s study are the vulnerabilities that stem from
an incorrect use of exceptions in native code. Therefore, Li and Tan developed several
static analyses that can detect incorrect exception throwing and handling [LT09, LT11,
LT14].
Furthermore, Tan and Morrisett proposed a framework [TM07] that models C code
on an abstract level to help Java analyses understand its behavior and make inter-
language analysis more precise. They introduce an extension of the Java Virtual Machine
Language to model C code and present an automatic specification extractor for C code.
Gang Tan introduced JNI Light (JNIL) [Tan10] which is a formalization of a common
model of (a part of) Java and its native side. The Java-side language is a subset of the
JVM Language, the native-side language is a RISC-style assembly language augmented
with JNI functions. JNIL models a shared heap, but as Java takes a high-level view on
the heap as a map from labels to objects, while native code takes a low-level view as a
map from addresses to primitive values, a compromise is needed. To show JNIL’s utility,
the author formalized a static checking system in JNIL which inspects native code for
violations of Java type safety and presented a soundness theorem.
In contrast to our approach from Chapter 4, the bug finding techniques presented here
detect rather specific patterns of vulnerabilities. We detect more fundamental unsafe
practices, thus gaining a broader spectrum of possible vulnerabilities that we are able
to find. Our point of view of classifying JNI functions according to their potential
threat, thus, makes novel contributions to this area of research. Existing approaches
are focused on their particular bug pattern and cannot find issues not falling into this
particular category. Our classification not only gives an overview of where and how
many potentially security threatening patterns occur, but can hint a software developer
towards packages and methods which, when used directly or through a library, pose a
greater security risk than others and thus require more thorough input sanitization and
control. The list of functions to be inspected can even be narrowed down further when
taking the usage context or the particular capabilities provided into account, as we have
shown in Chapter 5.
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7.2. Excessive Privileges
When inspecting Java code for security flaws, other issue categories than in C or C++
are important. Because the Java platform already provides guarantees such as mem-
ory safety (cf. Section 3.3), issues like buffer overflows do not affect Java code. Issues
regarding excessive privilege assignment or usage are more important in this context.
As Java was designed with the idea of loading code dynamically, it is also equipped
with an elaborate security mechanism to protect clients from malicious code [Gon11].
It is based on runtime, stack-based access control checks w.r.t. policies provided by
the platform, code owners or users. However, writing these policy files has proven to
be challenging for developers and thus Koved et al. [KPK02] derived a method (and
improved it in [GPT+09]) to infer these access rights so that the resulting policies honor
the Principle of Least Privilege [SS75]. Their algorithm traces calls to methods for
permission checks in the Java security architecture just as we trace back actual native
calls. Hereby, they can effectively create a set of necessary permissions. Nevertheless,
they rely on the assumption that every critical resource is indeed effectively protected
with a runtime check, as they trace the check and not the resource itself.
The Android platform provides a permission-model for the authorization of apps.
When installing an app on an Android-based device, the system explicitly asks the
user to confirm a list of permissions granted to the app. Similar to our approach, a
coarse-grained permission model is used to represent system resources. Developers have
to supply a manifest with their app listing every used permission in form of a list of
strings. For example, the string android.permission.READ CONTACTS represents the
permission to read the contacts on the device from the app. If the app then calls a
platform function related to a permission the Android runtime checks if the permission
has indeed been granted to the app.
Similarly to Java policies, it is also hard for developers to write manifests that only
include necessary permissions. Accordingly, Bartel et al. [BKLTM12] follow a similar
approach to the one provided by Koved et al. With their COPES tool they were able to
discover a significant number of apps that suffer from a gap between declared and used
permissions.
Intrusion detection works in a similar way to our approach as there system calls are
analyzed, which correspond to native calls in our approach. There it has been well
established as a useful indicator. Maggi et al. [MMZ08], for instance, use sequence
and arguments of system calls with a behavioral Markov model to detect anomalies.
Whereas, we want to understand critical resource usage, they go beyond and want to
detect abnormal usage patterns.
Of course, developers can use tools like FindBugs [HP04] to determine a footprint of
a library, but will only find issues for patterns that have already been included in the
bug checker. Other tools like HAVOC-LITE [VL13] or ESC/Java [FLL+02] are able to
determine the resource usage of a library, but first have to be configured with the entire
set of resources and the methods to reach them.
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Figure 7.1.: Modeling Data Flow with the IFDS Framework
7.3. Taint-Flow Analysis
Security vulnerabilities can also stem from complex data-flow problems. A comprehen-
sive, yet complex example are confused-deputy problems (cf. Section 3.4). They consist
of an integrity problem, i.e. the security of the operation is jeopardized by a value con-
trolled by an attacker and an optional confidentiality problem, when the vulnerable
function returns sensitive information.
To be able to detect such complex problems, analyses must be context- and flow-
sensitive, meaning they find data flows over method and field boundaries. An algorithmic
framework to formulate such problems is the IFDS framework by Reps et al. [RHS95].
It addresses data-flow problems with distributive functions over finite domains. This
implies that the amount of tracked variables in a problem formulation must be finite.
So-called flow functions model the generation, propagation and deletion of taint facts as
transitions over programming instructions. For instance, an instruction that does not
modify the inspected taint facts is depicted in Figure 7.1a. Thus, the currently known
facts a and b are propagated to the new state of the program after the instruction. In
Figure 7.1b fact a becomes tainted. This is the case, for instance, when the value of a
taint source (e.g., user input) is assigned to a local variable a. The taint is generated
from the 0 fact, which the tautology fact in the system. In Figure 7.1c, fact a holds before
the instruction, but gets deleted, however, the same instruction generates a new taint
for fact b. The algorithm evaluates the flow functions over the complete interprocedural
control-flow graph (ICFG) of the program and constructs an exploded super graph. A
flow between a source and a sink is then expressed as a graph reachability problem from
the source fact to the sink node.
Lerch et al. [LHBM14] use the IFDS framework to find confused-deputy vulnerabil-
ities in the Java Class Library (JCL). As confused-deputy problems contain both an
integrity and a confidentiality problem, they formulate their analysis as in inside-out
analysis starting from calls to caller-sensitive functions. They extended and modified
the optimized version of the algorithm [NLR10] to make the algorithm scale to the JCL.
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Furthermore, they made adaptations to allow for the coordination of the integrity and
confidentiality analysis and for more helpful error reporting.
Arzt et al. [ARF+14] explicitly model the Android lifecycle and use the IFDS algorithm
to find leaks of sensitive information like unique identifiers (e.g., IMEI, MAC-addresses),
contact data, location or SMS messages. They use a forward and a backward analysis
to track different problems and extend it with an on-demand alias analysis. Their
FlowDroid tool accurately and efficiently finds flaws with a very low false positive rate.
7.4. Dead Code Detection
Besides the term dead code or dead path, which we are using in Chapter 6, other closely
related terms are also frequently used in related work. For example, Chou et al. [CCK11]
use the term unreachable code. In their case a fragment of code is unreachable if there
is no flow of control into the fragment and is thus never on any path of execution of
the program. Their focus is, however, on generating good explanations that facilitate
reasoning why the code is dead.
Kasikci et al. [KBC+14] use the term cold code to refer to code that is rarely or never
executed at runtime. They propose to use a dynamic analysis based on sampling the
execution frequencies of instructions to detect such code. As in our case, code that
is identified as dead is seen as a threat to software maintenance. In a similar context
Eder et al. [EJJ+12] use the term unused code and they also point out that unused
code constitutes a major threat to the maintainability of the software. As it is common,
approaches using dynamic analyses as proposed by Kasikci et al. and our approach which
uses static analysis complement each other.
Approaches based on formal methods that rely on SMT solvers are also used to identify
variants of dead code. The approach described in [ALS13, AS12, BSS12] for example also
determines code that is never executed. They use the term infeasible code to describe
code that is contained in an infeasible control-flow path. Scha¨f et al. [SSNW13] take
an even wider look at the topic by looking for Inconsistent Code, i.e. code that always
fails and code that makes conflicting assumptions about the program state. Compared
to our approach from Chapter 6 these approaches are trying to prove that the software
is free of respective issues. However, they are interested in dead paths of a specific kind
while we are interested in dead paths as such and find dead paths related to a variety
of issues.
Abstract interpretation [CC77] was already used in the past to detect dead code [CCF+09,
PS11]. But, compared to our approach the respective tools try to prove that the code
is free of such issues by performing whole-program analyses. The result is that those
tools favor precision over scalability and are often not targeting the analysis of libraries.
Payet et al. [PS11] for example use the Julia static analyzer to identify – among others
– dead code in Android programs.
Though detecting and eliminating code that is dead has been the subject of a lot of
research related to compiler techniques [DEMDS00, KRS94], our case study has shown
that it is still a prevalent issue in compiled code. Nevertheless, standard techniques
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that rely on live variable analysis or other data-flow analyses are now an integral part
of many modern integrated development environments such as Eclipse or IntelliJ. They
help developers to detect some related issues. Compared to these approaches we perform
an inter-procedural, context-sensitive analysis based on abstract interpretation which is
well beyond the scope of compilers and – as demonstrated – is able to find many more
issues.
Other approaches which also try to identify a broader range of issues, such as Find-
Bugs [CHH+06] or JLint [AB01], implement one issue detector for each kind of issue.
This limits these approaches to only detect those issues the developer explicitly had in
mind which is not the case in our approach. Compared to the presented analysis they
can also find issues that are not related to the control-/data-flow.
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Isolation
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Attack Surface Reduction and Sound
Privilege Separation
In the previous part of this thesis, we present our contributions regarding monitoring the
static state of a program, i.e. its program code. The three analyses we provide consider
the full stack of Java programs down to the operating system binding and target very
different issues. Developers can use the output of each analysis to harden their system
and remove possible vulnerabilities before delivering the software to the end user.
In this part of the thesis, we will extend this work and present concepts for isolation.
All of these concepts are directed toward vulnerability remedies and, by this, form iso-
lation mechanisms. Furthermore, all of the concepts follow the language-based security
approach as they use program analysis and transformation in order to derive a system
that is more secure than the previous.
Isolation for security can be understood in two ways in our case. First, the attack
surface of a system can be reduced by removing unnecessary code. The assumption of
this method is that by reducing the code base, the number of interfaces to the system
is also reduced. As shown before, unnecessary (library) code has been exploited in
the past many times. It is, therefore, a direct implication from the Principle of Least
Privilege that attack surface reduction should be practiced in any software project prior
to delivery.
In Chapter 8, we put forward the idea to reduce third-party code in applications to the
necessary minimum. This can either be achieved by inspecting the usage context in the
application or the desired capability footprint. We show that usage-context-based slicing
can reduce the file size of libraries as well as their capability footprint significantly.
The second way isolation can be understood is by means of privilege separation. In
order to follow the Principle of Least Privilege down to the object level, it is necessary
to minimize the authority of an object as much as possible. However, it becomes hard to
determine the actual authority of an object, when reflection or native calls are used. As
we discuss before, a strict adherence of the Object-Capability Model is a clear necessity
for a sound inspection of the effectiveness of authority isolation in a program written in
an object-oriented language.
In Chapter 9, we take a first step towards full and effective capability safety in Java
and present an idea for future work. We start with finding the fundamental violations
of the Object-Capability Model of the Java language by systematically inspecting its
language specification. We then design a study to find correlations between these viola-
tions and recorded or measured vulnerabilities. We find interesting correlations in the
first experiments and present ideas for further research on this topic.
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8. Library Slicing for Attack Surface
Reduction
In this chapter, we explore the idea to reduce the attack surface of applications by slicing
the libraries they depend on down to the part that the application actually needs. The
reduction can be executed in two different ways – either by leveraging usage information
from the application context, or by leveraging a set of target capabilities the application
developer deems appropriate for the library.
We begin with a motivation of the addressed problem (Section 8.1) and follow it with
a high-level summary of the proposed transformation design in Section 8.2. We present
the underlying concept of separation inference in Section 8.3. The technical details of
Bytecode emission are discussed in Section 8.4. In Section 8.5 we present the tasks for
application developers which are required by our approach. We evaluate the approach in
Section 8.6 and show that it can reduce library code by an average of 47% in file size. In
this Section we also closely investigate the limitations of the approach w.r.t. reflection.
We complete the chapter with a summary of the presented approach in Section 8.7.
8.1. Motivation
As discussed before, library reuse is an integral part of current software engineering.
However, the decision to include a library into an application can have a number of
consequences unknown to the developer. Most important, the inclusion of library code
to the application package can introduce new vulnerabilities to the application. As an
example take the vulnerability found in jFin DateMath (cf. Section 5.3). When using
this library in a security critical context, the open class loaders introduced by this library
might not be acceptable. The plugin infrastructure in this library that introduced the
vulnerability might not be needed in the application’s context, however, there is no way
to use the library without this infrastructure. The decision to use the library is binary
– the developer either includes the library or not.
The library’s code is as accessible as any other code in the application and is endowed
with the same privileges. Because more functionality is available to an attacker using
reflection (or similar mechanisms), the attack surface of the application is expanded with
every new library included in the application. In the previous example an attacker could
use the open class loader to load arbitrary new code into the current application process.
Libraries can also pose a significant confidentiality risk. As another example take the
popular log4j logging library, which provides a wide variety of logging targets ranging
from storing log messages in a file, using a syslog server over a network, sending log
messages via email, or logging to specific operating system logging facilities. In practice,
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Figure 8.1.: Library Slicing from Application Context
however, most applications use only one of these targets. The other targets still remain
reachable by configuration, meaning security-critical data can be sent over the network
to unauthorized systems using just a simple configuration change.
Besides the security of the application, the size of the delivered application package
is also influenced by used libraries. If the libraries contain unused functionality, code is
delivered to the end user which is never used and serves no purpose in this context. As
current applications rely heavily on libraries, the amount of library code in applications
usually exceeds the amount of application code. For example, the binary JAR file of
log4j version 1.2.17 uses approximately 478KB. Current research on Java software [SE13,
HDG+11] reveals that most applications are smaller than their combined library code.
Furthermore, as libraries may depend on libraries themselves, a reduction techniques
must be applicable recursively.
8.2. Concept in a Nutshell
The idea presented in this chapter is to slice the binary version of a library to the parts
desired in the application context. The extant slice should contain all code necessary to
perform the library’s tasks in the application. Moreover, it should contain only the code
necessary for its task in the application context.
We specifically target library users with our approach. Although the technique is
also available to library developers, it might not be applicable in their context, as it
is hard for them to anticipate all possible usage patterns that emerge in practice. Ap-
plication developers, on the other hand, have the knowledge on library usage right in
the application code and are able to break libraries down to the desired slice using our
method.
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Figure 8.2.: Library Slicing from Capability Context
The first step in creating the new library slice is separation inference which gathers
separation information to use in a later slicing step. Information for valid slicing can
be obtained using two different sources: (a) The usage context of the library in the
application, or (b) a set of desired (or undesired) capabilities for the target slice derived
from an analysis as presented in Chapter 5.
In the first scenario the resulting slice only contains the necessary part for the current
version of the application (cf. Figure 8.1). First, a call graph of the application and the
library is computed. Calls into the library are recognized and followed. Any method not
touched by this traversal is not called in the application context and can thus be safely
removed. In this scenario, the slice only contains the library code that is necessary to
run the application. This also includes methods that use capabilities that might not be
allowed in the application’s security context.
In the second scenario the resulting slice contains only parts of the library matching
a capability set provided by the applications policy (cf. Figure 8.2). The capability
footprint of the library is computed with the algorithm presented in Chapter 5. Only
those methods of the library are included in the slice, which match the capability set
requested from the application. In this scenario, the slice may contain more code than
necessary to run the application, however, it might also lack methods that are needed for
the application. If this is the case, an application might encounter runtime errors and
cannot be compiled against the library slice anymore. The developer has to take action.
This is an intented behavior as the usage of some parts of the library in the application
is violating the capability policy for the library.
If library size and the capability context are relevant to the application developer, the
new library slice can also be built from the intersection of both scenarios. This removes
any excess method, but also honors the capability policy of the application.
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The final step in the procedure is to emit the Bytecode of the extant library part to
a new library file. This library only contains methods (and their enclosing classes), that
are included in the separation information computed before. The application is only
shipped with code which will eventually be used or which is allowed in the capability
policy.
8.3. Separation Inference
The first step in producing a viable library slice is to gather information on the desired
subset. In contrast to regular slicing approaches, we are slicing at the method level and
leave code inside methods intact. We plan to inspect in future work, whether slicing
method blocks would benefit the approach significantly, however, we assume that most
Java libraries are decomposed sufficiently at the method level already. Here, we suggest
two different approaches to method-level slicing: Using the application context or using
a capability policy describing allowed capabilities for the library.
In both cases the challenge is to compute a most precise call graph for the application
and the library. Imprecision stemming from incomplete receiver type information may
lead to separation information that includes code in the extant library part that is never
used during runtime. Any unsoundness in the separation inference will, in contrast, lead
to a library slice that is not sufficient to run the application because functionality used
at runtime is missing.
8.3.1. Separation by Application Context
Library reuse works in two ways: (1) Black-box reuse, where applications use classes
and methods defined in the library, or (2) white-box reuse, where applications extend
types from the library. Both methods of library usage have to be taken into account
when producing the separation information for the slicing step.
First, a call graph of the application and all of its dependencies is constructed. Any
method or class defined in the library that is included in the application-specific subgraph
is then added to the set of preserved entities. Constants and field definitions are preserved
for each class where at least one method is preserved. Also any used annotation class
from the library is preserved. This step ensures the inclusion of any dependencies for
black-box reuse.
In white-box reuse application developers inherit from types in the library in order to
use their implementations instead of the default ones shipped with the library. Therefore,
any supertype of any class added in the previous step or of any class in the application is
added, if it is defined in the library. This step ensures the inclusion of any dependencies
for white-box reuse.
The precision of this step is depending on the precision of the used call-graph algo-
rithm. Its key element is the resolution of receiver type information for method calls.
Therefore, we apply the same pre-analysis steps described in Section 5.2.3 to compute
more precise field- and method-return-types.
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The output of this step is a set of entities that should be preserved in the extant slice
of the library, which captures the usage context of the library in the application. It is a
conservative overapproximation of the actually needed part of the library. This ensures
the proper execution of the application with the sliced library.
8.3.2. Separation by Capability Policy
In some cases the isolation from unnecessary code in libraries might not be enough.
Libraries may still exceed the authority the application developer intends to endow
them with and use system capabilities that the developer might not agree with. For
instance, a library that performs mathematical operations might store the results of
these calculations in the filesystem. In the particular context of some application this
might not be permissable. At least, the developer would not expect such a behavior.
So two sources of capability policy emerge: (1) The security context of the application,
or (2) the expectations towards a library that an application developer has. When these
policies are expressed, they can be used to guide library slicing.
As in the previous case, the call graph of the application and the library is computed
first. Furthermore, we compute the capability footprint of the library with the algo-
rithm presented in Chapter 5. We only include those classes and methods in the slicing
information, which conform to the defined capability policy.
However, this will result in a slice that might not include everything the application
currently depends upon. Runtime binding will fail and the slice will be unusable to
compile the application. This behavior is intended, as the removed classes or methods
violate the defined capability policy.
The new slice will also include library code, which is not used in the application, but
fulfills the capability policy. In order to receive a slice, that represents the usage context
and the capability policy, the sets of preserved entities of both approaches just have to
be intersected. The slice from this intersected separation information will only include
the parts of the library that have been used in the application, but the slice might also be
insufficient to run the application, if parts of the library are used, which do not conform
to the defined capability policy.
8.4. Bytecode Emission
The final step in the slicing process is the construction of the extant library containing
only the Bytecode described in the set of preserved entities. For this step, a new JAR
file is composed of all unmodified class files from the library that are included in the
separation information. All classes where methods were removed are modified in-memory
and then emitted as a new class file. As these transformation happen on the Bytecode
level, no recompilation is necessary. A new META-INF directory is created including a
new manifest with a reference to the ancestry of the slice. The new slice is then packaged
as a JAR-file and handed to the application developer.
As the modification of the original JAR-file voids any digital signature it might possess,
the original signature must be removed from the JAR-file or in case of a GPG signature
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the signature file itself. We suggest to resign the new JAR with a new key and to include
verifiable information on the ancestry of the library slice. While technically we could
preserve the SHA-256 digests of the unmodified classes in the classic jarsigner model,
we rather move them to the ancestry manifest and create a new signature to make the
distinction clear. Using this new signature and the ancestry information, the identity of
the library can be verified by end users in order to establish trust.
Another sensitive subject when slicing libraries is the matter of licensing. Third-
party libraries might be licensed very diversely. In contrast to commercial licences,
that generally forbid the modification of the library, some ”free” licences permit the
application developer to alter the library code. While licence models such as Apache
License, BSD License, GNU GPL and GNU LGPL allow the free modification and
distribution of library code, the Eclipse Public License requires the source code of the
modification to be public. Whether the inclusion of ancestry information in the modified
binary library fulfills this requirements remains open and a matter of further discussion.
However, the careful review of the licence of the library remains an obligation of the
application developer.
8.5. Implications for Application Developers
Using our approach, application developers can reduce the amount of unused third-party
code. This can either happen at the time, library dependencies are included into the
application or at build time. The former case is only applicable in the presence of a
capability policy, because the library is not yet used in the application. In this case, our
approach becomes a powerful tool for system architects to enforce policies for libraries in
a project. The latter case supports both inference sources. It is especially useful if there
is no general capability policy or no expectation towards the library yet. However, the
application developer can be sure, that she only ships the necessary part of the library
she uses.
In order to assess, if the resulting library slices still fulfill the applications requirements,
an application needs to provide an effective test suite with a representative coverage.
Even though an automated test suite is generally considered a best practice in software
development, not every application will fulfill this requirement. We assume that such a
test suite exists and encourage developers to create them.
8.6. Evaluation
The goal of our approach is to reduce the amount of unused library code in order to
prevent attacks using this code. Therefore, we pose the following research questions:
RQ1 (Soundness) Do the libraries sliced with our application-context approach lead to
faulty runtime behavior in the applications?
RQ2 (Precision) How much library code can be removed from libraries in a common
application context?
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(a) in kilobytes
(b) in number of methods
(c) in number of classes
RQ3 (Precision) How many capabilities are removed from the library with the unused
methods?
In order to answer these research questions we have built a set of benchmark appli-
cation for 60 of the projects used in the evaluation of Chapter 5. The remaining 10
project were either used as platforms or runtime engines (e.g., aspectj) or were mainly
designed as applications (e.g., jedit, pooka, and sandmark). We constructed the bench-
mark applications from the publicly available examples given for the library. If more
than one example was provided, we randomly chose one of them. Each application can
be successfully executed against the untreated version of the library it depends upon.
Furthermore, each example is simple enough to validate a successful execution manually.
Using these applications as the reference, we applied our context-based slicing ap-
proach to all 60 libraries and re-ran the applications against the extant slices. Further-
more, we measured the file sizes and the number of classes and methods of the original
and extant libraries using OPAL. We also measured the capability footprint before and
after treatment using our capability footprint analysis from Chapter 5.
RQ1: Sufficiency of the Sliced Library Part Of all the 60 example applications,
only three applications experienced runtime failures. These were the applications for
jFin DateMath, log4j, and sf4j. These failures were in all cases due to removed classes
or methods that were accessed using reflection in library code. Our approach was not
able to detect these calls and therefore falsely concluced that the missing classes or meth-
ods were not used. When inspecting the source code of the three libraries, we found that
in the case of jFin DateMath the reflective call can be easily exchanged with a static
call. In case of log4j and sf4j, however, the use of reflection is an integral part of the
design of the library.
We can conclude that our approach works sound in the absence of the use of reflection
in the library code.
RQ2: Reduction in File Size and Program Elements Using the context of the appli-
cation benchmark our approach reduces the file size of the libraries in the experiment
by an average of 47%. As the detailed results presented in Table 8.1 show, the achieved
reduction varies widely depending on the usage in the application and the coupling of
the elements inside the library. However, the results clearly show that in every case a
reduction can be achieved, which conversely means that there was code in the original
library that was not used by the application.
While the number of classes was only reduced by an average of 32%, the number of
methods could be reduced by an average of 50%. Also the detailed results shown in
Table 8.2 indicate that in some cases (e.g., lucene-join, axion) the number of classes can
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only be reduced very little or not at all, while the number of methods can be reduced
significantly almost always.
RQ3: Removal of Capabilities Table 8.3 shows the capabilities that were effectively
removed from the library during the slicing process. This means that the library code
using these capabilities was sliced away leaving a library with a smaller capability foot-
print as before. In our motivating example of the jFin DateMath library (cf. Section 5.3),
the use of the REFLECTION capability was removed from the library. The CLASSLOADING
capability could not be removed as the library code used by the application makes use
of it.
While in some cases the footprint could not be reduced (e.g. for axion, log4j and
sf4j), other cases show a significant reduction of used capabilities (e.g. jFin DateMath,
checkstyle, lucene-highlighter, maven-core). The results also show that in some cases
the use of critical capabilities such as UNSAFE, CLASSLOADING, or REFLECTION can be
removed from library code. This means that vulnerabilities which might have been in
the original library code using these capabilities were removed as well, automatically.
8.6.1. Limitations
The call-graph algorithms we use cannot compute call edges stemming from reflection or
dynamic invocation and cannot detect any calls made from native code (i.e., call-backs),
as it is currently state-of-the-art for static analyses for Java. We assume the application
code to be free of reflective or native calls to the library. If this assumption does not hold,
we cannot guarantee a running application using the slice, because the slice would not
represent a sound overapproximation of the library usage in the application’s context.
We can, however, detect the use of reflection and native calls in the application or library
code and warn the developer about this issue.
However, as reflection is a very common mechanism in library configuration (e.g., log4j
configuration files), we suggest steps to include the information from other sources. In
the following, we describe two approaches to mitigate this issue.
When using reflection to configure libraries, two patterns can be regularly found for
object creation or method invocation: (a) The use of string constants in calls to reflection
facilities, or (b) the use of configuration files containing these strings. As classes have
to be uniquely identified, the use of fully-qualified class names (or a direct mapping to
them) can be safely assumed.
We suggest to use a string analysis to extract these class names from Java Byte-
code or from configuration files. While configuration files are simply parsed for strings
that match the criteria for fully-qualified class names, we suggest to use abstract inter-
pretation for the extraction of class names from Bytecode, as simple operations (e.g.,
concatenation) can be processed by the analysis. This way, we can extract class names
even if they are constructed from multiple constants. For both analyses, classes which
can be identified with the extracted fully-qualified class name are added to the set of
preserved entities, if they are found in the library. As we cannot infer the called methods
with this approach, we add all methods of the class to the set.
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Library Size Before [byte] Size After [byte] Reduction
antlr 1543365 735428 52%
axion 433896 391004 10%
cglib 283080 230381 19%
checkstyle 1008473 51297 95%
collections 610259 473494 22%
commons-beanutils 233857 195496 16%
commons-cli 41123 25326 38%
commons-codec 284184 108187 62%
commons-configuration 362679 269622 26%
commons-fileupload 69002 53677 22%
commons-io 185140 81821 56%
commons-lang 412740 164468 60%
commons-logging 61829 43019 30%
easymock 126646 66695 47%
gson 210856 195376 7%
guava 2256213 1808529 20%
guice 642741 582112 9%
gwt 32024115 3143100 90%
jFin DateMath 114267 38194 67%
jackson-annotations 39817 16517 59%
jackson-core 229860 189830 17%
jackson-databind 1138921 1011345 11%
jasml 116429 44303 62%
java-hamcrest 112929 95702 15%
javassist 723078 461721 36%
javax-mail 571104 418803 27%
jgroups 2311136 1886461 18%
joda-time 589289 332856 44%
jrat 2123190 316277 85%
jsoup 300844 250329 17%
junit 314932 42512 87%
log4j 489883 261539 47%
lucene-analyzers-common 1699874 1404812 17%
lucene-analyzers-icu 84364 28194 67%
lucene-analyzers-kuromoji 4596222 70548 98%
lucene-analyzers-morfologik 20371 6589 68%
lucene-analyzers-smartcn 3602586 35898 99%
lucene-analyzers-stempel 517090 15434 97%
lucene-classification 23790 4105 83%
lucene-codecs 476943 447057 6%
lucene-core 2562626 2339367 9%
lucene-demo 50700 7130 86%
lucene-facet 177221 114521 35%
lucene-grouping 107782 83033 23%
lucene-highlighter 138281 40048 71%
lucene-join 64019 50786 21%
lucene-memory 36076 24022 33%
lucene-misc 97172 62586 36%
lucene-queries 213026 184439 13%
lucene-queryparser 391514 135392 65%
lucene-spatial 126792 90841 28%
lucene-suggest 179007 72641 59%
maven-core 608173 67855 89%
maven-plugin 46108 10681 77%
mockito 1500011 493610 67%
slf4j 32121 15011 53%
sunflow 891444 158986 82%
testng 836806 110064 87%
weka 6555904 3132108 52%
xstream 531571 473181 11%
total: 60 ∅ 47%
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Library #C before #C after Reduction #M before #M after Reduction
antlr 937 453 52% 6706 2496 63%
axion 261 251 4% 3108 2186 30%
cglib 229 173 24% 1355 856 37%
checkstyle 477 50 90% 5872 96 98%
collections 431 372 14% 3861 2115 45%
commons-beanutils 137 127 7% 1332 891 33%
commons-cli 22 18 18% 211 110 48%
commons-codec 92 68 26% 718 369 49%
commons-configuration 194 152 22% 2208 1300 41%
commons-fileupload 49 45 8% 299 204 32%
commons-io 110 69 37% 1188 189 84%
commons-lang 217 109 50% 2911 700 76%
commons-logging 28 26 7% 337 209 38%
easymock 95 64 33% 765 137 82%
gson 165 152 8% 949 744 22%
guava 1690 1432 15% 12987 8692 33%
guice 475 420 12% 3100 2494 20%
gwt 5497 2448 55% 46599 18783 60%
jFin DateMath 62 30 52% 628 127 80%
jackson-annotations 52 17 67% 154 75 51%
jackson-core 85 69 19% 1597 1094 31%
jackson-databind 570 506 11% 6465 4581 29%
jasml 50 38 24% 265 78 71%
java-hamcrest 101 93 8% 719 362 50%
javassist 398 275 31% 3848 2172 44%
javax-mail 319 261 18% 2803 1508 46%
jgroups 1020 894 12% 9789 6584 33%
joda-time 245 220 10% 4422 2212 50%
jrat 1222 250 80% 8873 974 89%
jsoup 227 206 9% 1400 944 33%
junit 286 35 88% 1627 114 93%
log4j 314 184 41% 2358 816 65%
lucene-analyzers-common 526 372 29% 3245 1956 40%
lucene-analyzers-icu 28 23 18% 154 95 38%
lucene-analyzers-kuromoji 49 40 18% 271 217 20%
lucene-analyzers-morfologik 5 4 20% 32 30 6%
lucene-analyzers-smartcn 23 20 13% 119 108 9%
lucene-analyzers-stempel 20 11 45% 101 41 59%
lucene-classification 6 3 50% 31 7 77%
lucene-codecs 255 236 7% 1656 1540 7%
lucene-core 1631 1510 7% 10964 9162 16%
lucene-demo 12 4 67% 64 7 89%
lucene-facet 105 80 24% 613 315 49%
lucene-grouping 62 51 18% 272 211 22%
lucene-highlighter 81 36 56% 491 121 75%
lucene-join 35 35 0% 182 162 11%
lucene-memory 14 14 0% 135 123 9%
lucene-misc 56 47 16% 346 250 28%
lucene-queries 162 153 6% 977 681 30%
lucene-queryparser 248 94 62% 1514 388 74%
lucene-spatial 74 65 12% 436 287 34%
lucene-suggest 88 45 49% 581 108 81%
maven-core 372 48 87% 2840 144 95%
maven-plugin 25 9 64% 298 32 89%
mockito 647 353 45% 3750 1893 50%
slf4j 28 13 54% 332 78 77%
sunflow 255 113 56% 1811 495 73%
testng 546 69 87% 4059 221 95%
weka 2138 1103 48% 21255 9421 56%
xstream 437 388 11% 2664 1969 26%
total: 60 ∅ 32% ∅ 50%
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Library Removed Capability Usages
antlr NT, PR, GU
axion ∅
cglib FS
checkstyle CL, UN, FS, SY, GU
collections FS
commons-beanutils FS
commons-cli CL, UN
commons-codec CL, UN
commons-configuration ∅
commons-fileupload RF, SY
commons-io CL, RF, SY
commons-lang CL, FS
commons-logging ∅
easymock ∅
gson ∅
guava ∅
guice ∅
gwt NT, FS
jFin DateMath RF, FS, SY
jackson-annotations ∅
jackson-core CL, RF
jackson-databind ∅
jasml UN
java-hamcrest FS
javassist UN
javax-mail ∅
jgroups PR
joda-time ∅
jrat CB, PR
jsoup RF
junit CL, FS
log4j ∅
lucene-analyzers-common FS
lucene-analyzers-icu ∅
lucene-analyzers-kuromoji SC
lucene-analyzers-morfologik ∅
lucene-analyzers-smartcn ∅
lucene-analyzers-stempel SC
lucene-classification ∅
lucene-codecs ∅
lucene-core NT
lucene-demo CL, UN, FS, SY, SC, NA
lucene-facet FS, SC
lucene-grouping ∅
lucene-highlighter RF, NT, UN, FS, SY, SC, NA
lucene-join ∅
lucene-memory ∅
lucene-misc RF
lucene-queries ∅
lucene-queryparser RF, FS
lucene-spatial CL, UN, FS, SC, NA
lucene-suggest UN
maven-core CL, RF, UN, FS, SY, SC, NA
maven-plugin CL, UN, FS, SC
mockito SY
slf4j ∅
sunflow CL, RF, UN, SY
testng NT
weka CB, NT, PR
xstream ∅
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Another source for reflection usage information is runtime monitoring. If the applica-
tion uses reflection facilities to retrieve instances from classes or to call methods located
in the library, we can monitor these calls and add the respective methods to the set of
methods to be preserved in the slice. Ideally, the application has a set of representative
tests that can be run automatically. If the coverage of the tests is high enough to perform
any library usage, the runtime monitor will eventually collect all used classes and meth-
ods. This approach is very similar to the Play-out Agent from TamiFlex [BSS+11]. The
collected methods from the library, that were used during test execution, are added to
the set of preserved entities. After this step, the set of preserved entities should contain
any class and method necessary to run the application.
While the first approach uses purely static information from configurarion files or
program code, the second approach uses purely dynamic information collected from
application or test runs. In the first approach, class or method names constructed
during runtime cannot be collected, but might detect names that are not part of every
execution of the program and can be missed by the second approach. To provide a
conservative, yet safe, overapproximation of the necessary classes and methods for a
sound slice w.r.t. reflection we, therefore, suggest to use both approaches and construct
a union set of results.
8.6.2. Threats to Validity
As the slicing in the context-based setting is based on the usage of some library in an
application, the extent of usage inside the application is key to the effectiveness of the
slicing. In our study we use a set of applications constructed from examples given by
the original library authors which showcase the use of a particular feature or scenario
for the library. This means that the extent of usage of libraries in real-world application
might be different than in our set of benchmark applications. However, as we can safely
assume both cases (a lesser or a more intensive use) in real-world scenarios, the effect
might not be significant.
Also the set of removed capability usages is highly dependent on the usage scenario
of the library. The applications used for this study might not reflect common usage
scenarios for the respective libraries in practice.
8.7. Summary
In this chapter, we presented a concept for library slicing based on application usage-
context and on capability policy. We presented these two approaches in detail and
discussed the effects of over- and under-approximation on the resulting library slice.
Library slicing requires the developer of an application to develop a representative test
suite to cover all execution cases. While this is a good practice in general for maintaining
correct application behavior despite change, it can also be an efficient check whether the
library slice contains all the necessary original library code. We have shown that in a
library showcase scenario the approach can reduce libraries by a mean of 47% in file
size while removing critical capability usages if they are not on the possible execution
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path. The concept of library slicing can aid developers to mitigate the risk of shipping
unnecessary code that might be exploited and helps them actively reducing the attack
surface of their application.
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9. Future Work: Towards Full
Object-Capability Safety in Java
In order to perform operations, which have a measurable effect, a part of a program
needs two things: (1) control (i.e., the current program counter is set to an instruction
in the part), and (2) authority (i.e., the privileges necessary to perform the operation).
While control is only transferred explicitly through calls, branches, and throw operations,
authority can also be transferred implicitly using global state (so-called ambient author-
ity). Reasoning over isolation in the presence of ambient authority is hard bordering to
undecidable.
As Miller et al. [MYSI03] wrote:
The question of ambient authority determines whether subjects can identify
the authorities they are using. If subjects cannot identify the authorities
they are using, then they cannot associate with each authority the purpose
for which it is to be used. Without such knowledge, a subject cannot safely
use an authority on another party’s behalf.
Applied to a static assessment of authority isolation in a program, this means that
given a specific program point an analysis will not be able to enumerate the authority
an object possesses at this point. This can lead to excessive and implicit authority
transfer between objects and can foster vulnerabilities such as the Confused Deputy
(cf. Section 3.4).
We advocate to make authority transfer as explicit as possible. In order to achieve
this in Java, a strict application of the Object-Capability Model [MS03, Mil06] estab-
lishes rules, which disallow implicit authority transfer. In the Object-Capability Model
authority can only be obtained via four mechanisms: (1) By an initial state of the sys-
tem, (2) by parenthood (i.e., creating another object), (3) by endowment (i.e., passing
a capability via a parameter during creation of another object), or (4) by introduction
(i.e., passing a capability via a method call).
Java respects the Object-Capability Model to some extent, but violates it in some
language features. We systematically examine the Java language specification [GJSB09]
for these violations and derive a comprehensive list. As instances of these violations
can be found in almost every Java project including the Java Class Library (JCL), most
Java code is not object-capability safe. However, the amount of existing code is so large
that a cold start from zero would forbiddingly set back the current state of software
engineering. Therefore, we conclude that migration technologies towards more secure
software engineering methods are necessary.
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As a first step towards this migration, we implemented an analysis to detect instances
of Object-Capability-Safety Violations (OCaps Violations) in Java Bytecode. It reports
all direct instances of violations, which are: (1) The use of intrusive reflection (cf. Sec-
tion 3.3.2), (2) the use of static mutable state, and (3) the use of native methods. We
also implemented the ability for the analysis to compute the inverse transitive hull in
the call graph in order to find transitive effects of these violations. As Java programs
need to cross the boundary to the native implementation of the JCL in order to achieve
any effect on the system, transitive native calls are unavoidable. Therefore, the tran-
sitive analysis should be understood more as a means to study the extent of possible
vulnerabilities.
The Object-Capability Model has been covered to some length in scientific literature.
Many aspects of the model have been inspected and we show the current state of research
in Chapter 10. In this chapter, we present the design for a study on the Object-Capability
Model with the goal of discovering possible correlations between OCaps violations and
possible or known vulnerabilities. We conducted an exploratory experiment based on
this study design and find interestingly high correlations. However, the scope of this
first experiment is limited and, therefore, the findings can only provide motivation for
further research.
We also take a first look at possible program transformations in order to remove
capability violations from Java programs. Furthermore, we take a look at the entailing
maintainability problem when making every authority transfer in the program explicit.
The chapter is structured as follows. We first describe our inspection of the Java
Language Specification w.r.t. OCaps violations in Section 9.1 and present the resulting
analysis in Section 9.2. In Section 9.3, we explain our study design and our preliminary
experiment to motivate this study. We briefly take a look at possible program transfor-
mations to foster explicit authority transfer in Section 9.4 and summarize the chapter
in Section 9.5.
9.1. Java’s Capability Safety
At first sight, Java fulfills the requirements of the Object-Capability Model. References
in Java are unforgeable from programs written in the Java language or any other language
compiled to Java Bytecode. However, when the control flow of the program leaves the
fenced garden of the JVM’s heap control (i.e., native methods are being called) this
guarantee can not be given anymore. This is also important for the second requirement
of the Object-Capability Model: effective private state encapsulation. Programs written
in Java generally conform to this requirement, however, not only with direct memory
manipulations through native methods but also through reflection violating low-level
access control (cf. Section 3.3.2) encapsulation can be broken.
The third requirement for object-capability safety is mandated by four rules of au-
thority transfer in the model. Globally shared state is forbidden in an object-capability
safe language, as it creates ambient authority if objects can subvert the four transfer
rules.
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We systematically reviewed the Java Language Specification (JLS) [GJSB09] and the
Java Virtual Machine Specification [LYBB14] to find violations of the requirements and
rules of the Object-Capability Model. We found three fundamental violations, which we
explain in the following.
9.1.1. Native Method Calls
Java allows the definition of methods that defer their implementation to code written in
another language (§8.4.3.4 in the JLS). The Java Class Library makes heavy use of this
language feature. It declares over 4,000 native methods, which bind Java applications
to operating system facilities, perform mathematical operations, or implement reflection.
Native implementations are not bound to the restrictions the virtual machine puts in
place to ensure unforgeable references and encapsulation. The complete heap can be
read and modified. Object references can be constructed.
9.1.2. Shared Mutable State
Java allows the definition of static fields of any type or visibility in a class (§8.3.1.1
in the JLS). If static fields have the visibility modifier public, they can be read and
written from anywhere in the program. The field has become an ambient resource in the
program. Even if the field is marked with the final keyword and cannot be overwritten
with another object it might still be an ambient resource, as its type might be mutable.
For instance, a linked list shared this way allows the concatenation of new elements,
which can be read by different parts of the program.
Its visibility modifier only limits the scope of the availability of the ambient resource.
Even when set to private different objects of the same class can still collude using the
field. Therefore, we consider a field an ambient resource, if it is declared static and is
either not final or declared using mutable reference type.
9.1.3. Intrusive Reflection
Reflection is not defined in the Java Language Specification. It is handled as a part of
the Java Class Library in the package java.lang.reflect and is used for retrieving
reflective information on classes and objects. Additionally, package java.lang.invoke
is available for implementing dynamic invocation. While the former package has been
available in Java since version 1.1, the latter was added in version 1.7 for the sup-
port of dynamic languages in the JVM. Both APIs allow the subversion of the visiblity
access control model of Java. Once a reflective object was retrieved it is possible to
use the setAccessible method defined in java.lang.reflect.AccessibleObject to
deactivate the runtime checks for access modifiers inside the reflection handling code.
Subsequent read, write, and invoke operations are not constrained by the visibility de-
clared at the class, field or method definition. This breaks the encapsulation requirement
of the Object-Capability Model and we, therefore, consider any instance of this practice
as a violation.
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9.2. Detecting Violations
We implemented a static analysis based on Soot [VRCG+10] to find these violations in
Java Bytecode. It is designed as a whole-program analysis taking any public method as
an entry point.
The detection of native calls is the most straightforward of the three analysis modules.
We construct a call graph and report any caller of any native method.
For the detection of shared mutable state, we iterate over any class in the analysis set
and check the mutability of any static field declared in the class. We report all non-final
fields, as they are mutable. For all fields declared final, we inspect the declared type of
the field. We consider final fields of a primitive type as immutable. Furthermore, we
consider any final field as immutable, if the type is either a known immutable type1 or
composed of known immutable types and all methods of this type are free of side effects.
We report any static field that by this definition is either non-final or uses a mutable
type.
Our analysis module for intrusive reflection is applied to any method where a call
to the setAccessible method defined in java.lang.reflect.AccessibleObject is
found. This call is necessary to deactivate the runtime checks for visibility access control.
We then perform a simple flow analysis to determine two things: (1) Whether the
object, which was set accessible, depends on a parameter value of that method, and
(2) for private methods, whether a flow can be constructed from a public method to
the parameter value of the private method. Using these criteria we only address objects
which are controllable from a caller and not those created internally. We, thus, filter
out any use of intrusive reflection which depends on constant values (e.g., class name
constants) and which can effortlessly be transformed into a change in the design of the
program.
We also developed the ability to propagate the results of the three analysis modules
backwards along call edges in the call graph’s inverse transitive hull of each reported
method. This is especially interesting for native calls, because the strong dependency of
the Java platform towards its native implementation can be observed this way. For ex-
ample, we found that over 66% of the methods in the rt.jar file of the JCL2 transitively
use native functions.
9.3. A Study on Object-Capability-Safety Violations in Java
Code
The ruleset of the Object-Capability Model promises to foster programs, where authority
transfer is made explicit and, therefore, traceable. Together with tools for static anal-
1 java.lang.String, java.lang.Character, java.lang.Byte, java.lang.Short,
java.lang.Integer, java.lang.Long, java.lang.Float, java.lang.Double, java.lang.Boolean,
java.math.BigInteger, java.math.BigDecimal, java.lang.StackTraceElement, and all primitive
types
2Oracle Java version 1.7.0.21
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ysis and rigerous code review the adherence to these rules should produce more secure
software than current state-of-the-art. Conversely, we assume that vulnerabilities have
their root cause in violations to these rules.
In order to validate this assumption we designed a study to find correlations between
vulnerabilities and violations. While the data for violations is generated by our own
analysis, the data for vulnerabilities can be retrieved from multiple sources such as
vulnerability databases and static checking tools. If a strong correlation between vul-
nerabilities and violations of the Object-Capability Model exists, further studies on the
causility of this conjunction can be devised.
To ensure a sufficiently large experiment set, we use the Qualitas Corpus [TAD+10]
in the complete version 20130901. It consists of 111 Java libraries in different versions
(752 in total), 39,846 Java archive files, and 5,886,775 classes. Additionally, we created
a smaller corpus consisting of the JCL (version 1.2.2 update 6 until version 1.7.0 update
65 – 151 in total), the Apache Struts framework (version 1.1 to 2.3.16.3 – 48 in total),
and the Tomcat application server (version 3.0.0 to 8.0.9 – 199 in total). This corpus
consists of 12,281 Java archives and 3,188,372 classes. We created the second corpus
as for the projects included a sufficiently large dataset of known vulnerabilities can be
obtained, while for the first corpus this information is not available.
Datasets of known vulnerabilities (e.g., the National Vulnerability Database (NVD))
document the insecurity of a system over the course of multiple versions. As ver-
sion information was not consistently given in the machine readable part of the NVD,
we implemented a retrieval algorithm to enrich the dataset from the textual informa-
tion [GSWH15]. However, these datasets mostly capture the vulnerabilities for larger
projects such as the JCL. Information regarding vulnerabilities in smaller Java libraries
is rare. Therefore, we decided to include the results of static vulnerability checks into
the study. Tools such as FindBugs or Coverity search for known vulnerability patterns
in code. We use both data sources in the study to have a strong comparison in the
absence of a gold standard.
9.3.1. Preliminary Experiments
Using this study design, we conducted three preliminary experiments. In the first exper-
iment we used the smaller corpus containing only the JCL, Apache Struts, and Tomcat
to determine the correlation between the number of measured violations and the number
of known vulnerabilities from the NVD over the version history of the included projects.
We measured a moderate correlation of rs ≈ 0.41.
Using the same data set we conducted the second experiment, but used the number of
issues found by the FindBugs tool instead of the number of known vulnerabilities. We
configured FindBugs to only use the MALICIOUS CODE VULNERABILITY, CORRECTNESS,
MULTITHREADED CORRECTNESS, SECURITY, and DODGY CODE categories, as they include the
bug patterns for known vulnerabilities. We measured a strong correlation of rs ≈ 0.65
in this case.
In the third experiment we used the same configuration for FindBugs, but used the
Qualitas Corpus as the code base. In this experiment we measured a very strong corre-
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lation of rs ≈ 0.85.
9.3.2. Threats to Validity
Measuring the security or the insecurity of a system can only capture the ”known”.
Unknown vulnerabilities in the code are not included in our base data, thus, if our
analysis finds Object-Capability Model violations which may lead to vulnerabilities that
are yet unknown, the correlation would be lower. The indirection over bug finding tools
is also not optimal, as vulnerability data gets biased towards the recognized patterns.
The creation of a gold standard to evaluate against seems to be inevitable. This gold
standard should consist of carefully developed systems with known vulnerabilities but
are small enough to ensure the absence of unknown vulnerabilities.
We inspect the evolution of software projects over the course of multiple versions.
All of the inspected code bases grow in this process and, therefore, could include more
vulnerabilities as well as more violations than before. In the preliminary experiments
we could not exclude this effect so far. Normalizing the used data over the project size
would counter this effect.
9.4. Migrating Towards Explicit Authority Transfer
The violations we found in the Java language foster the creation of implicit authority
transfers that are hard to understand and hard to analyze. In order to fulfill the require-
ments of the Object-Capability Model instances of these violation have to removed from
the codebase. In the following we give advice how to proceed with these.
Given the current architecture of Java and current operating systems3 it would be
impossible to completely remove the ability to call native methods. However, we propose
to remove the ability to execute Java applications that use native methods not included
in the standard platform. This is already enforced for Java applets and could easily be
configured into the standard policy. The residual risk of exploitation of native code from
the Java side could be addressed with defensive programming and automated or manual
analysis of the native codebase of Java. Especially functions that reveal low-level details
such as pointer to the Java side should be redesigned. Application developers can refrain
from using custom native code or libraries that ship with native code.
The use of reflection can easily be limited to non-intrusive reflection (i.e. reflection
not violating encapsulation). Two options are available to the developer:
1. She either lifts the field or method accessed through intrusive reflection to an
accessiblity level visible to the caller or introduces a new method which provides
access to the requested field or method. For example, if a private field is read
through the use of intrusive reflection, she could introduce a getter to access the
field. Further access restrictions can be addressed at this point.
3A new approach to this problem is the Singularity project by Hunt et al. [GH07].
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2. She removes the access, if it is not permitted. For example, if a private field is
read through the use of intrusive reflection which should be available to the piece
of code accessing the information, she removes the field access.
We argue that in a well-designed system, the need for intrusive reflection does not exist
and instances of this practice should be considered as design smells w.r.t. security. The
presence of intrusive reflection always indicates a loophole in effective encapsulation and
can, as just presented, always be dealt with.
We found that static context and shared mutable state is prevalent in state-of-the-art
Java code. Removing it from Java code is, therefore, a sizeable task. In general, it is
used to transfer some form of authority from an object that created a capability to an
unknown set of other objects. For instance, the internal class sun.misc.Unsafe has a
static method getUnsafe() that provides the current instance of the class. Callers of
this method can be rewritten in such a way that they request the instance as a method
parameter or an internal field of the class. Applying this refactoring makes the authority
transfer explicit and traceable. Callers of the modified method will in turn be modified to
transfer the authority until its original creation is reached. However, this refactoring also
impairs the maintainability of the codebase, as new method (or constructor) arguments
have to be introduced and parameter values have to be passed along. The transfer of
authority gets muddled with the functional parameters and behavior of the program.
In the current language definition, however, it is the price to pay for explicit authority
transfer.
An alternative for explicit authority transfer might be cflow-based aspects as imple-
mented in AspectJ by Kiczales et al. [KHH+01]. An aspect can manage the transfer of
authority between parts of the program which are bound to the aspect by the use of
cflow pointcut designators. In this design the transfer of authority is explicit and local-
ized. It can easily be changed and adapted, yet, still can be controlled. To determine
the parts of the program where authority is transferred, the pointcut designators simply
need to be evaluated against the complete program. Any point that matches is a point
where authority is transferred.
9.5. Summary
The Java language and runtime in its current state is not capability safe, although it is
pretty close. We found three fundamental violations in the language and API specifica-
tion and developed a static program analysis to find instances of these violations in Java
Bytecode. We present a study design to explore the correlation between those violations
and vulnerabilies in the codebase. We use two different codebases in the design of the
study: The full Qualitas Corpus and a smaller corpus composed of multiple versions of
the JCL, Apache Struts, and the Tomcat application server. In three preliminary exper-
iments we found an indication for some correlation, but argue that the results are not
yet conclusive. In summary, the goal of object-capability safe Java applications presents
itself as desirable and achievable. However, the removal of implicit authority transfer
from Java code may entail maintainability issues.
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10. Related Work for Isolation
In this chapter we present related work that can provide isolation defenses for software.
We start with a review on approaches for program slicing, which can separate code
that supplies a specific behavior from the rest. We follow this with a review of current
work in the field of object-capability security. We conclude the chapter with a review of
sandboxing approaches. Its goal is to isolate possibly untrusted mobile or native code
from the rest of the system.
10.1. Slicing
The automated reduction of a program to its necessary parts has been a long standing
matter of interest. In our contribution presented in Chapter 8 we use it to achieve
effective isolation from code that is not used in an application context.
A classic approach to remove code is program slicing which is a rich field of research
and, therefore, we only present foundational work and works closely related to our use
of it.
The concept of program slicing was introduced by Mark Weiser [Wei81]. Its general
idea is to cut a program into parts (slices) based on subsets of program behavior in order
to find a set of statements that affect a particular point in the program. Automatic slicing
requires the specification of a slicing criterion, which describes what to include in the
new slice. Slicing has found many applications ranging from testing and debugging to
program comprehension and refactoring.
As Weiser was working on complete programs without functional decomposition, in
current terms his approach could be described as intraprocedural slicing. Horwitz et
al. [HRB90] extend Weiser’s concept to interprocedural slicing. This means that slices
can cross the boundary of procedure calls. As to be expected their main challenge is
the correct representation of calling context, which Horwitz et al. address with system
dependence graphs. These graphs are an extension of program dependence graphs which
adds information on procedures, parameters of procedures, calls, and returns.
In a recent study Kashima et al. [KII15] compared four different program slicing ap-
proaches. They examine Static Execution Before [JBGR08], Context-insensitive Slicing,
a hybrid approach of Static Execute Before and Context-insensitive Slicing, and Im-
proved Slicing [HS04] using applications from the Qualitas Corpus [TAD+10]. They
find that the hybrid approach scales best of the four inspected approaches and produces
smaller slices than Context-insensitive Slicing. The best approach for precision in their
evaluation is the Improved Slicing approach, yet, it does not scale as well as the other
approaches. Specifically it does not scale to the size of the Java Class Library.
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The Improved Slicing approach inspected by Kashima et al. was developed by Hammer
and Snelting [HS04]. They improve on previous algorithms for slicing programs in object-
oriented languages by adding sound support for object parameters. Their approach
deals with recursive data structures and is field- and object-sensitive. This makes their
algorithm very precise when compared to other approaches, as Kashima et al. have
shown.
Implementations for program slicing typically are limited to the scope of a specific
language. However, current software systems are composed of components written in
various languages. Binkley et al. [BGH+14] address this with Observation-Based Slicing
(ORBS). Their approach is based on actual statement removal and execution observa-
tion. It observes a variable’s behavior at a specific program point according to some
slicing criterion. In contrast to dynamic slicing, which bases its criterion on an observa-
tion of a untampered execution, observation-based slicing removes a statement first and
then observes the behavior during execution. They illustrate four algorithm variants
and apply them to real world cross-language code successfully.
Our slicing approach from Chapter 8 uses method-level slicing which is much more
coarse-grained than the approaches presented here. We made this choice in the assump-
tion that state-of-the-art Java libraries are already decomposed sufficiently, but plan to
investigate this assumption further. As in the ORBS approach, we also use execution
observation to validate possible slices. ORBS already closes the circle by using slicing
and execution repeatedly to produce a viable slice.
10.2. Object-Capability Security
The separation of privileges can help to make isolation provable in object-oriented pro-
grams. Miller et al. have demonstrated this with the Object-Capability Model [MS03,
Mil06] which we discuss in Section 2.4. Here, we will concentrate on work regarding its
application to isolation.
Two different object-capability secure language subsets for Java have been proposed
that support isolation. First, there is the older J-Kernel system by Hawblitzel et al.
[HCC+98, vECC+99] and, secondly, the newer Joe-E system by Mettler et al. [MWC10].
Since J-Kernel was constructed before the formulation of the Object-Capability Model
it was designed with a different goal and does not honor all object-capability rules.
Joe-E removes ambient authority from Java by only allowing static fields if they are
final, prohibiting the introduction of native methods, and restricting reflection. Both
approaches are constructive in their nature and, thus, require excessive change to the
complete system including the JCL, which might not be possible in industry environ-
ments.
In another article Miller et al. [MYSI03] present the differences of the Object-Capability
model compared to Access Control Lists (ACL) and clarify existing misconceptions about
object-capability security. They illustrate that object-capability security is very different
from ACLs by constructing and using two intermediary models. They also show that
object-capability systems can enforce confinement and revocability.
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A powerful property of object-capability-based systems is that abstractions can be
built over the primitives in the model to express more complex scenarios such as revoca-
tion. Toby Murray inspected the implementations of popular abstractions (or patterns)
in object-capability security [Mur08]. He used the CSP process algebra to formalize
the implementations of three patterns for object-capability safe languages and object-
capability-based operating systems. While the security properties of one pattern hold
entirely in both systems, another pattern had subtle differences and another pattern
fails to ensure its guarantees when moving it from the language to the operating system.
As the formalization only covers the current implementations it may still be possible to
implement this pattern for operating systems correctly. However, he was able to prove
this particular implementation insecure.
Maffeis et al. [MMT10] analyzed multiple JavaScript subsets for their isolation prop-
erties. Their goal is to secure so-called mashups, which are web applications composed
from code from multiple sources. In these applications the different components are free
to interact with the user and the originating website, but not with each other. The
authors show that Yahoo’s ADsafe and Facebook’s FBJS were vulnerable to attacks
breaking isolation. They developed language-based foundations on operational seman-
tics to show isolation proofs for the Cajita language in Google’s Caja system. They
found that a subset of object-capability safety they call authority safety is sufficient to
provide isolation. In authority safety, two rules are sufficient: (1) Only connectivity
begets connectivity and (2) the authority of a subject can only be changed by another
subject inside the bounds of the acting subjects authority. They formalize these rules
and prove them for a subset of JavaScript. Furthermore, they describe the first formal
model for capability safety and also show that capability safety implies authority safety.
Caja is the first fully object-capability safe system which is used in real-world software
systems and, therefore, highly relevant to compare against.
Drossopoulou and Noble [DN13, DN14] advocate capability policies to express how
capabilities in a system should be used. They observe that in current implementations
of object-capability language (e.g., Joe-E or E) the policies are implicit and interwo-
ven with the functional behavior of the program. They present a framework to specify
and reason about these policies in order to make policy definition and treatment ex-
plicit. The authors use this framework to reformulate the Escrow Example, a common
example where two mutually untrusting parties can exchange authority over a trusted
third party [ND14]. The example shows the power of the Object-Capability Model to
construct abstractions and still guarantee isolation.
Drossopoulou, Noble, and Miller [DNM15] extend the example with specifications
that allow for the expression of trust and risk. Trust in this context means that an
object trusts another object to adhere to a specification. Reasoning over trust here
is hypothetical in such a way that both options of trust and distrust are explored.
For example, if a specification describes the behavior of some method m, then it is
only called if the object is trusted to obey this specification. The authors model risk
introducing two predicates expressing ”may access” and ”may affect” relationships. With
specifications using these new expressivity they are able to prove policy fulfillment of
the implementation of the escrow example.
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In contrast to these constructive approaches presented in this Section, we chose an
analytical viewpoint in Chapter 9 and aim to collect motivation from practice for the
wider application of the Object-Capability Model to software and language design. The
work from Maffeis et al. and Drossopoulou et al. will help us in future work to describe
violations in a more formal fashion, while the works of Murray and Miller provide general
motivation that even complex scenarios can be addressed within the Object-Capability
Model.
10.3. Other Isolation Mechanisms
Several alternative mechanisms have been proposed in order provide isolation inside
the Java platform or inside of Java programs. Some of them have found their way into
commonly used products. We present them here to put our contributions into perspective
and to provide a comprehensive view on the security of the platform.
The general goal of sandboxing is to provide isolation of a trusted core from possibly
harmful code. For instance, the Java platform provides a sophisticated sandbox to
protect the Java Virtual Machine (JVM) from code running on it (cf. Section 3.3). We
will start specifically with approaches that have been proposed to protect the JVM
from native code (including its own) and then extend our view on sandboxes to other
platforms.
Yuji Chiba [Chi08] introduced a feature that detects and locates invalid memory ref-
erences to the JVM heap. The feature uses page protection, which prevents threads
executing native methods from referring to the JVM heap directly, as this should only
happen through the JNI. This is mandated by most common JVMs like Hotspot, which
is used in the OpenJDK. As opposed to mainstream operating systems, the protection
feature controls permissions by thread and not by process.
Siefers et al.’s “Robusta” [STM10] is a framework to provide safety and security for
Java applications and applets through software-based fault isolation which places the na-
tive code into a sandbox. Their sandboxing is based on Google’s Native Client extending
it with support for dynamic linking and loading of native libraries. Sun and Tan [ST12]
introduced “Arabica”, an enhancement of Robusta that is portable between different
Java VMs by avoiding modification of VM internals. Arabica relies on a combination of
the Java Virtual Machine Tool Interface (JVMTI) and a layer of stub libraries. With
SafeJNI, Tan et al. [TCSW06] developed a system which, by static and dynamic checks,
retro-fits native C methods to enhance their safety and captures safety invariants whose
satisfaction aims at guaranteeing a safe inter-operation between Java and native code.
Also, as Sun et al. [ST14] point out, the majority of the Top 50 Android apps are
shipped with native libraries. Building on their outstanding work for the Java Native
Interface [ST12, TCSW06, TC08, STM10], they build an isolation model for native
libraries in Android apps effectively protecting users from malicious or faulty native
code.
Cappos et al. [CDR+10] construct a Python-based sandbox with a small, isolated ker-
nel library. By this, they prevent attackers from leveraging bugs in the kernel library
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for privilege escalation. Moreover, De Groef et al. [DGNYP10] are concerned with the
integrity of the execution process itself. As they point out, Write-XOR-Execute protec-
tion mechanisms of operating systems (cf. Section 3.1) cannot be applied for applications
with Just-in-time compilation as the runtime needs to write into and execute the same
memory block. Their system separates sensitive from non-sensitive code and protect the
system by blocking sensitive code.
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11. Conclusion
In this chapter, we will present a brief overview over the findings from this thesis. We
start with a review of the results and contributions of this thesis and follow this with a
closing discussion.
11.1. Summary of Results
We contribute three analyses to the field of monitoring defense techniques in this the-
sis. They cover the full stack of a Java application from the application code down to
the native parts of the Java Class Library. However, we use rather different analysis
approaches and have made different findings on the layers of the application stack.
Automated Detection of Unsafe Programming Practices Our analysis to detect un-
safe programming practices reports the use of pointer arithmetic, pointer type casts,
dynamic memory management, and impure programming to the developer. The anal-
ysis scales to the size of the native codebase of the Java Class Library on commodity
hardware. We are, therefore, confident to use it in large-scale scenarios or when response
time is a key asset. It reliably points out hot spots that justify closer inspection and,
therefore, efficiently guides code reviews.
Prevalence of Unsafe Programming Practices in the JCL We used the previous anal-
ysis on the Java Class Library and found interesting results. While there were packages
of functions using all of the detected unsafe programming practices, we also found several
that were just using impure functions. As the main purpose of the JCL’s native part is
operating system binding, which naturally entails side effects, this was to be expected,
yet, the absence of other such practices is interesting. As our evaluation shows, there
seems to be a strong connection between vulnerabilities and the use of these practices.
Automated Detection of Capability Usage in Java Libraries We demonstrate an anal-
ysis to detect coarse-grained capability usages in Java libraries. These capabilities in-
clude file system or network socket access, but also Java facilities such as reflection. With
this analysis developers can make educated choices on library usage in their specific se-
curity context and decide whether to trust a library or not. As part of this analysis, we
provide a manually-created data set of native functions and their respective capability
provision for Java.
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Capability Usage in Common Java Libraries In our evaluation we applied the analysis
to 70 widely used Java libraries and found interesting discrepancies to their documen-
tation. Almost all of them were using features from sun.misc.Unsafe and reflection
facilities, which is in line with findings from Mastrangelo et al. [MPM+15]. Some of
them used class loading, which is unexpected for most libraries. We inspected these
results closer and found several open class loader vulnerabilities in libraries.
Efficient Infeasible Path Detection Our third analysis is targeting infeasible (or dead)
paths in Java code. These paths are either a consequence of technical necessities (such
as compilation), which makes them benign, and therefore irrelevant, or pointing towards
implementation defects stemming from various sources. In a study on the Java Class
Library, we identified ten categories of defects for the 258 bugs we found. As our approach
in not targeted towards the Java Class Library we are confident we find more categories in
other code as we are not detecting the cause, but the effect of the programming mistake.
This enables programmers to find various, very complex bugs using our analysis.
Detection of 258 Complex Data-Flow Dependent Bugs in the JCL As we applied
our analysis to the Java Class Library to categorize our findings, we found 258 previously
undetected bugs inside the JCL. Some of these bugs only impede the maintainability of
the code base, such as excessive checks, but some of them deactivate functionality or
lead to miscalculations.
Library Slicing for Attack Surface Reduction We extend our analysis for library ca-
pability footprints and present a method to slice libraries down the necessary part in
the context of an application. With this method we can reduce the size of a library on
average by 47% in an experiment using example code. Moreover, the approach removes
the use of capabilities and provides libraries with a smaller footprint, thus, honoring the
Principle of Least Privilege.
11.2. Closing Discussion
After summarizing the contributions and findings of this thesis, we will briefly relate
them to current trends and take a look at future challenges.
The areas of research where programming languages, software engineering, and secu-
rity intersect and converge have a huge potential to shape the security of future software
systems. Language and platform guarantees such as Java’s memory safety have already
helped to secure the operation of current systems and pushed buffer-overflow attacks off
the first place in vulnerability rankings. Also specialized analyses have been constructed
to address several buffer overflow related vulnerabilities. Yet, with the evolution of
software development new threats and challenges have to be tackled.
The execution of mobile code is still prominent, even with the drop in Java applet
usage. Cisco’s Annual Security Report 2016 [Cis16] names browser extensions as a
new but prominent source of vulnerabilities, yet, criminals still seems to exploit new
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vulnerabilities in Adobe Flash. We assume that mobile code will remain to be a desired
feature of software systems as the plugin paradigm remains to be a prestigious selling
point. As we have learned, sandboxing mobile code is important, yet also a process to
be expected to contain faults (cf. Section 3.3, Chapter 10, Chapter 4). Thus, second tier
monitoring and isolation schemes have to be used to provide effective protection from
malicious mobile code.
Another interesting observation Cisco’s report makes, is that web platforms (e.g.,
WordPress) get exploited more often than in the past. Exploiters use constructed values
as attack vectors to use vulnerabilities in the same way that Bratus et al. [BLP+11]
describe weird machines. As we also demonstrated in this thesis (cf. Chapter 4), attacks
against platforms even without the use of mobile code are possible and realistic. The
importance of input guarding and sanitization as well as the use of decidable input
languages remains to be an interesting topic.
A new trend in the commercialization of exploits is hard to overlook. Remotely con-
trolled ransomware uses a vulnerability of the target machine to achieve control in order
to encrypt the hard drive of the machine. The decryption key is only available on pay-
ment of a ransom over the untraceable Bitcoin currency. This new commercialization
scheme has given a new rise to machine exploitation and puts an even larger emphasis
on research of new defenses. As machine control has become a more valuable asset than
before, control-flow related issues should be prioritized over data-flow related issues.
Special care should be given to the topic of security when creating a new language or
runtime platform. As current compilers include much more checks than those created in
the beginning of the C language, so should compilers for new languages allow for more
and more code security guarantees when translating software to machine code. Type
systems play an important role in this endeavor and should enjoy a major emphasis in
language-based security research.
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12. Future Work
In this chapter we present further ideas for future work which are in an earlier stage as
those presented in Chapter 9. Nevertheless, we present sound and promising ideas that
provide interesting challenges. Naturally the ideas span the complete program stack
visited in this thesis.
Reliably Finding Guards and Sanitizers The precision of our approach presented in
Chapter 4 would greatly improve if we could reliably detect guard clauses and sanitizer
functions. Guard clauses are the conditions that protect the execution of sensitive oper-
ations. For instance, offset calculations on pointers can be used to direct the pointer to
memory locations that should not be accessible for the current function. A guard clause
is a condition that only permits the offset calculation if the offset is in well-defined
bounds. A sanitizer function in this example would take the provided offset as its input
and always return a valid offset regardless of the validity of the input value. A detection
may build on these observations and track the data flow of these input values in order
to find out if they are treated properly. Detecting these guards and sanitizers reliably
and rating their effectiveness in protecting a sensitive operation may reveal cases where
these safeguards are missing or are ineffective.
Analyze Native Binaries using Decompilation Recent advances in decompilation tech-
nology [YEGS15] opens the possibility for static analysis of programs in native binary
form. We plan to use such a decompiler as a first step and then use our analysis tech-
niques based on the LLVM platform to find possible vulnerabilities and used capabilities.
This enables us to apply our analyses on software where the source code is not avail-
able. However, the complete chain from binary code to LLVM bitcode must faithfully
reflect the operations found in the native binary otherwise it would render the findings
of the analysis unsound. The resulting analyses could also help in the identification and
inspection of malware and the security assessment of native implementations delivered
with Java libraries.
Analyze Critical Data Flows over Language Boundaries Despite its age and maturity
the Java platform still seems to be a rich source of exploitable vulnerabilities. As we
discussed in Chapter 4 some of these exploits target vulnerabilities in the native part of
the JCL but use delivery mechanisms that only allow them to use Java code. This means
that vulnerabilities in the native part have to be exploited using prepared values that
are passed as arguments to these functions. We plan to track these data flows in order
to find access paths that do not use proper access control checks and do not implement
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necessary guard clauses or sanitization routines. The output of such an analysis would
greatly help in the identification of loopholes in the security mechanisms of the Java
platform and would have a major impact on many users.
Two ideas can help to implement this analysis. First, as the callers of the native func-
tions in the JCL can be enumerated, it is possible to use a stored data flow abstraction
when crossing the language border. This allows to split the data flow analysis into parts
for each language in order to avoid having to build a common abstraction over both
programming languages. This in turn helps to fully leverage the guarantees given in
each language. Second, the detection of guards and sanitizer presented before as well
as the detection of unsafe programming practices can aid to produce meaningful results
that lead to reliable vulnerability detection.
Outlier Detection for FFI Calls Another idea is closely related to the previous idea.
Calls to foreign function interfaces (FFI) such as native functions in Java only work
safely on a subset on the values that can be passed to them not violating type safety
rules. For this reason callers employ guard clauses and sanitization functions to narrow
the set of possible values passed to these functions. However, callers might use different
techniques that result in different value sets for the same function. We performed a
preliminary study in the JCL and found interesting outliers for integer type parameter
ranges in calling native functions. We plan to implement an analysis that performs outlier
detection for FFI calls for all possible types. Developers can find possibly vulnerable
call path from these outliers by finding missing checks or faulty callers.
Extracting Capabilities from Native Code In our capability inference presented in
Chapter 5 we manually bootstrapped the algorithm with data extracted from the native
code base of the JCL. As this process has to be repeated for each release of Java we
would like to automate it. We plan to implement this in an automated analysis of
the JCL’s native source code using LLVM. Usage and proliferation of operating system
capabilities can be detected using this analysis making the process not only repeatable
for new versions of Java, but also applicable to native libraries shipped with other Java
libraries or to implement a capability analysis for completely native libraries.
Studies on the Practical Value of Our Work In all of our work presented in this thesis,
we target developers in their pursuit of developing secure systems. Up to this point we
evaluated our approaches by means of case studies, experiments regarding the precision
of the analyses, and proxies for developer expectations. After these necessary steps to
prove the validity of our approaches, we plan to conduct user studies with professional
developers in order to measure effects in real-world projects. All our our analyses have in
common, that they should make the detection of software flaws easier for the developer
to find. Through a set of bug finding scenarios we would like to find out if this is actually
the case.
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Automatic Vulnerability Remedies Recent work in automatic program repair [LSDR14,
LR15, LR16] has sparked our interest whether the same principles could be a applied to
automated vulnerability remedies as well. The idea is to take our findings from static
analysis and generate guard clauses or sanitizer functions removing the vulnerability
from the program code. While there is work on sanitizer placement [LC13], we found no
work on automated generation and placement of guards and sanitizers.
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Contributed Implementations and Data
In the course of the projects presented in this thesis, research prototypes have been
implemented and data has been sourced or collected. We provide these implementations
and data sets to enable other researchers to validate our work and to build new research
upon them. We believe this to be good scientific practice and encourage other researchers
to do the same.
Analysis for Unsafe Languages
The implementation of the analysis presented in Chapter 4 is provided as a module to
be compiled into LLVM. We provide the source code of the analysis here:
https://github.com/stg-tud/peaks-native
The StaticAnalyses folder contains the analysis code and a Makefile to include these
analyses in the compilation process of the opt tool. This is in compliance with the
standard process for LLVM version 3.5. The repository also contains a Tests folder
containing test cases for the analysis. Finally, the NativeCompilation.gmk file contains
the modified version of the OpenJDK8 build process based on the file shipped with build
132.
The full artifact can be inspected here:
http://www.st.informatik.tu-darmstadt.de/artifacts/peaks-native/
Analysis for High-Level Capabilities
We provide the implementation of the analysis presented in Chapter 5 here:
https://github.com/stg-tud/peaks-capmodel
The analysis and the evaluation tooling is written in Scala and is based on the OPAL
analysis framework [EH14]. It compiles down to Java Bytecode and will run on any
machine with the Java 1.8 runtime installed. We were successfully able to run it using
the Windows 8 and MacOS X 10.10.3 operating systems. It analyses any provided
library in Java Bytecode format and allows many command-line arguments. It can be
integrated into other project easily by means of white-box reuse.
We provide the full replication artifact at the following URL:
http://www.st.informatik.tu-darmstadt.de/artifacts/peaks-capmodel/
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Contributed Implementations and Data
For reproducing the evaluation charts and statistics you may need R1 and a standard
browser (we recommend using Firefox). The reproduction package contains the full set of
libraries from our evaluation but may need to connect to various websites in the process
to collect library documentation.
It also features the dataset created in our manual bootstrapping process in the file
NativeMethodsRT.csv.
Dead Path Analysis
We provide the source code of the analysis as part of the OPAL project here:
https://bitbucket.org/delors/opal
A binary version of the tool is available for download at:
http://www.opal-project.de/tools/bugpicker
It is able to operate on any artifact in Java Bytecode and presents the found issues in
a graphical user interface with further explanations. The tool is the frontend for many
different analyses. In order to replicate our results presented here, chose the Dead Path
Analysis.
Slicing Java Libraries
We provide the implementation of the slicing approach presented in Chapter 8 in the
same repository as the High-Level Capability Analysis:
https://github.com/stg-tud/peaks-capmodel
The implementation is written in Scala and is based on the OPAL analysis frame-
work [EH14]. It compiles down to Java Bytecode and will run on any machine with the
Java 1.8 runtime installed.
1http://www.r-project.org/
162
Bibliography
[AB01] Cyrille Artho and Armin Biere. Applying Static Analysis to Large-Scale,
Multi-Threaded Java Programs. In Proceedings of the 13th Australian Con-
ference on Software Engineering, ASWEC ’01, pages 68–75, Washington,
DC, USA, 2001. IEEE Computer Society.
[ABB+10] Jose´ Bacelar Almeida, Endre Bangerter, Manuel Barbosa, Stephan Krenn,
Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, and Thomas Schneider. Computer Security – ES-
ORICS 2010: 15th European Symposium on Research in Computer Secu-
rity, Athens, Greece, September 20-22, 2010. Proceedings, chapter A Cer-
tifying Compiler for Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge Based on Σ-
Protocols, pages 151–167. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg,
2010.
[ABEL05] Mart´ın Abadi, Mihai Budiu, U´lfar Erlingsson, and Jay Ligatti. Control-
flow integrity. In Proceedings of the 12th ACM Conference on Computer
and Communications Security, CCS ’05, pages 340–353, New York, NY,
USA, 2005. ACM.
[ADL+05] Dzintars Avots, Michael Dalton, V. Benjamin Livshits, Monica S. Lam,
V. Benjamin, Livshits Monica, and S. Lam. Improving software security
with a c pointer analysis. In In ICSE ’05: Proceedings of the 27th Inter-
national Conference on Software Engineering, pages 332–341. ACM Press,
2005.
[AF03] Mart´ın Abadi and Ce´dric Fournet. Access control based on execution his-
tory. In Proceedings of the Network and Distributed System Security Sym-
posium, NDSS 2003, San Diego, California, USA. The Internet Society,
2003.
[Akr10] Periklis Akritidis. Cling: A memory allocator to mitigate dangling point-
ers. In Proceedings of the 19th USENIX Conference on Security, USENIX
Security’10, pages 12–12, Berkeley, CA, USA, 2010. USENIX Association.
[ALS13] Stephan Arlt, Zhiming Liu, and Martin Scha¨f. Formal Methods and Soft-
ware Engineering: 15th International Conference on Formal Engineering
Methods, ICFEM 2013, Queenstown, New Zealand, October 29 – Novem-
ber 1, 2013, Proceedings, chapter Reconstructing Paths for Reachable Code,
pages 431–446. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2013.
163
Bibliography
[AP10] Nathaniel Ayewah and William Pugh. The Google FindBugs Fixit. In
Proceedings of the 19th International Symposium on Software Testing and
Analysis, ISSTA ’10, pages 241–252, New York, NY, USA, 2010. ACM.
[ARF+14] Steven Arzt, Siegfried Rasthofer, Christian Fritz, Eric Bodden, Alexan-
dre Bartel, Jacques Klein, Yves Le Traon, Damien Octeau, and Patrick
McDaniel. Flowdroid: Precise context, flow, field, object-sensitive and
lifecycle-aware taint analysis for android apps. In Proceedings of the 35th
ACM SIGPLAN Conference on Programming Language Design and Imple-
mentation, PLDI ’14, pages 259–269, New York, NY, USA, 2014. ACM.
[AS87] Bowen Alpern and Fred B. Schneider. Recognizing safety and liveness.
Distributed Computing, 2(3):117–126, 1987.
[AS12] Stephan Arlt and Martin Scha¨f. Joogie: Infeasible Code Detection for Java.
In CAV’12: Proceedings of the 24th international conference on Computer
Aided Verification. Springer-Verlag, July 2012.
[Bac02] Michael Bacarella. Taking advantage of linux capabilities. Linux Journal,
2002(97):4–, May 2002.
[BB13] Alberto Bacchelli and Christian Bird. Expectations, Outcomes, and Chal-
lenges of Modern Code Review. In Proceedings of the International Con-
ference on Software Engineering. IEEE, May 2013.
[BBC+10] Al Bessey, Ken Block, Ben Chelf, Andy Chou, Bryan Fulton, Seth Hallem,
Charles Henri-Gros, Asya Kamsky, Scott McPeak, and Dawson Engler. A
Few Billion Lines of Code Later: Using Static Analysis to Find Bugs in the
Real World. Commun. ACM, 53(2):66–75, February 2010.
[BG09] Ioannis G. Baltopoulos and Andrew D. Gordon. Secure compilation of a
multi-tier web language. In Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop
on Types in Language Design and Implementation, TLDI ’09, pages 27–38,
New York, NY, USA, 2009. ACM.
[BGH+14] David Binkley, Nicolas Gold, Mark Harman, Syed Islam, Jens Krinke, and
Shin Yoo. Orbs: Language-independent program slicing. In Proceedings
of the 22Nd ACM SIGSOFT International Symposium on Foundations of
Software Engineering, FSE 2014, pages 109–120, New York, NY, USA,
2014. ACM.
[BKLTM12] Alexandre Bartel, Jacques Klein, Yves Le Traon, and Martin Monperrus.
Automatically securing permission-based software by reducing the attack
surface: An application to android. In Proceedings of the 27th IEEE/ACM
International Conference on Automated Software Engineering, ASE 2012,
pages 274–277, 2012.
164
Bibliography
[Bla14] Mike Bland. Finding more than one worm in the apple. Communications
of the ACM, 57(7):58–64, July 2014.
[BLP+11] Sergey Bratus, Michael E Locasto, Meredith L Patterson, Len Sassaman,
and Anna Shubina. Exploit programming: From buffer overflows to weird
machines and theory of computation. USENIX; login, pages 13–21, 2011.
[BN05] Anindya Banerjee and David A. Naumann. Stack-based access control and
secure information flow. Journal of Functional Programming, 15(2):131–
177, 2005.
[BNR06] G. Barthe, D. Naumann, and T. Rezk. Deriving an information flow checker
and certifying compiler for java. In Security and Privacy, 2006 IEEE Sym-
posium on, pages 13 pp.–242, May 2006.
[Boe99] Barry W Boehm. Managing Software Productivity and Reuse. IEEE Com-
puter, 32(9):111–113, 1999.
[BSS+11] Eric Bodden, Andreas Sewe, Jan Sinschek, Hela Oueslati, and Mira Mezini.
Taming reflection: Aiding static analysis in the presence of reflection and
custom class loaders. In Proceedings of the 33rd International Conference
on Software Engineering, ICSE ’11, pages 241–250, New York, NY, USA,
2011. ACM.
[BSS12] Cristiano Bertolini, Martin Scha¨f, and Pascal Schweitzer. Infeasible code
detection. In Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Verified
Software: Theories, Tools, Experiments, VSTTE’12, pages 310–325, Berlin,
Heidelberg, 2012. Springer-Verlag.
[CBP+15] Nicholas Carlini, Antonio Barresi, Mathias Payer, David Wagner, and
Thomas R. Gross. Control-flow bending: On the effectiveness of control-
flow integrity. In 24th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security
15), pages 161–176, Washington, D.C., August 2015. USENIX Association.
[CC77] Patrick Cousot and Radhia Cousot. Abstract Interpretation: A Unified
Lattice Model for Static Analysis of Programs by Construction or Approx-
imation of Fixpoints. In Proceedings of the 4th ACM SIGACT-SIGPLAN
Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages, POPL ’77, pages
238–252, New York, NY, USA, 1977. ACM.
[CCF+09] Patrick Cousot, Radhia Cousot, Je´roˆme Feret, Laurent Mauborgne, An-
toine Mine´, and Xavier Rival. Why does astre´e scale up? Formal Methods
in System Design, 35(3):229–264, 2009.
[CCK11] Hong-Zu Chou, Kai-Hui Chang, and Sy-Yen Kuo. Facilitating Unreachable
Code Diagnosis and Debugging. 2011 16th Asia and South Pacific Design
Automation Conference ASP-DAC 2011, pages 1–6, February 2011.
165
Bibliography
[CDR+10] Justin Cappos, Armon Dadgar, Jeff Rasley, Justin Samuel, Ivan Beschast-
nikh, Cosmin Barsan, Arvind Krishnamurthy, and Thomas Anderson. Re-
taining sandbox containment despite bugs in privileged memory-safe code.
In Proceedings of the 17th ACM Conference on Computer and Communi-
cations Security, CCS ’10, 2010.
[CGK15] Cristina Cifuentes, Andrew Gross, and Nathan Keynes. Understanding
caller-sensitive method vulnerabilities: A class of access control vulnera-
bilities in the java platform. In Proceedings of the 4th ACM SIGPLAN
International Workshop on State Of the Art in Program Analysis, SOAP
2015, pages 7–12, New York, NY, USA, 2015. ACM.
[CHH+06] Brian Cole, Daniel Hakim, David Hovemeyer, Reuven Lazarus, William
Pugh, and Kristin Stephens. Improving Your Software Using Static Analy-
sis to Find Bugs. In Companion to the 21st ACM SIGPLAN Symposium on
Object-oriented Programming Systems, Languages, and Applications, OOP-
SLA ’06, pages 673–674, New York, NY, USA, 2006. ACM.
[Chi08] Yuji Chiba. Java heap protection for debugging native methods. Science
of Computer Programming, 70(2–3):149 – 167, 2008. Special Issue on Prin-
ciples and Practices of Programming in Java (PPPJ 2006).
[Cis16] Cisco Systems, Inc. Cisco 2016 annual security report. http://www.
cisco.com/c/m/en_us/offers/sc04/2016-annual-security-report/
index.html, 2016.
[CLN+00] Christopher Colby, Peter Lee, George C. Necula, Fred Blau, Mark Plesko,
and Kenneth Cline. A certifying compiler for java. In Proceedings of the
ACM SIGPLAN 2000 Conference on Programming Language Design and
Implementation, PLDI ’00, pages 95–107, New York, NY, USA, 2000. ACM.
[CPM+98] Crispin Cowan, Calton Pu, Dave Maier, Heather Hintony, Jonathan
Walpole, Peat Bakke, Steve Beattie, Aaron Grier, Perry Wagle, and Qian
Zhang. Stackguard: Automatic adaptive detection and prevention of buffer-
overflow attacks. In Proceedings of the 7th Conference on USENIX Security
Symposium - Volume 7, SSYM’98, pages 5–5, Berkeley, CA, USA, 1998.
USENIX Association.
[CW14] Nicholas Carlini and David Wagner. Rop is still dangerous: Breaking mod-
ern defenses. In 23rd USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 14),
pages 385–399, San Diego, CA, August 2014. USENIX Association.
[CZY+14] Yueqiang Cheng, Zongwei Zhou, Miao Yu, Xuhua Ding, and Robert H.
Deng. Ropecker: A generic and practical approach for defending against
ROP attacks. In 21st Annual Network and Distributed System Security
Symposium, NDSS 2014, San Diego, California, USA, February 23-26,
2014. The Internet Society, 2014.
166
Bibliography
[DD77] Dorothy E. Denning and Peter J. Denning. Certification of programs for
secure information flow. Commun. ACM, 20(7):504–513, July 1977.
[DEMDS00] Saumya K. Debray, William Evans, Robert Muth, and Bjorn De Sutter.
Compiler Techniques for Code Compaction. ACM Trans. Program. Lang.
Syst., 22(2):378–415, March 2000.
[DGNYP10] Willem De Groef, Nick Nikiforakis, Yves Younan, and Frank Piessens. Jit-
sec: Just-in-time security for code injection attacks. In Benelux Workshop
on Information and System Security (WISSEC 2010), 2010.
[DKA+14] Zakir Durumeric, James Kasten, David Adrian, J. Alex Halderman,
Michael Bailey, Frank Li, Nicolas Weaver, Johanna Amann, Jethro Beek-
man, Mathias Payer, and Vern Paxson. The matter of heartbleed. In
Proceedings of the 2014 Conference on Internet Measurement Conference,
IMC ’14, pages 475–488, New York, NY, USA, 2014. ACM.
[DN13] Sophia Drossopoulou and James Noble. The need for capability policies.
In Proceedings of the 15th Workshop on Formal Techniques for Java-like
Programs, FTfJP ’13, pages 6:1–6:7, New York, NY, USA, 2013. ACM.
[DN14] Sophia Drossopoulou and James Noble. Integrated Formal Methods: 11th
International Conference, IFM 2014, Bertinoro, Italy, September 9-11,
2014, Proceedings, chapter How to Break the Bank: Semantics of Capability
Policies, pages 18–35. Springer International Publishing, Cham, 2014.
[DNM15] Sophia Drossopoulou, James Noble, and Mark S. Miller. Swapsies on the
internet: First steps towards reasoning about risk and trust in an open
world. In Proceedings of the 10th ACM Workshop on Programming Lan-
guages and Analysis for Security, PLAS’15, pages 2–15, New York, NY,
USA, 2015. ACM.
[DVH66] Jack B. Dennis and Earl C. Van Horn. Programming semantics for multi-
programmed computations. Commun. ACM, 9(3):143–155, March 1966.
[DWW+10] Yu Ding, Tao Wei, TieLei Wang, Zhenkai Liang, and Wei Zou. Heap taichi:
Exploiting memory allocation granularity in heap-spraying attacks. In Pro-
ceedings of the 26th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference,
ACSAC ’10, pages 327–336, New York, NY, USA, 2010. ACM.
[EH14] Michael Eichberg and Ben Hermann. A Software Product Line for Static
Analyses: The OPAL Framework. In Proceedings of the 3rd ACM SIG-
PLAN International Workshop on the State of the Art in Java Program
Analysis, SOAP ’14, pages 1–6, New York, NY, USA, 2014. ACM.
[EHMG15] Michael Eichberg, Ben Hermann, Mira Mezini, and Leonid Glanz. Hidden
truths in dead software paths. In Proceedings of the 2015 10th Joint Meeting
167
Bibliography
on Foundations of Software Engineering, ESEC/FSE 2015, pages 474–484,
New York, NY, USA, 2015. ACM.
[EJJ+12] Sebastian Eder, Maximilian Junker, Elmar Ju¨rgens, Benedikt Hauptmann,
Rudolf Vaas, and Karl-Heinz Prommer. How Much Does Unused Code
Matter for Maintenance? In Proceedings of the 34th International Confer-
ence on Software Engineering, ICSE ’12, pages 1102–1111, Piscataway, NJ,
USA, 2012. IEEE Press.
[EL02] David Evans and David Larochelle. Improving security using extensible
lightweight static analysis. IEEE Software, 19(1):42–51, Jan 2002.
[FF06] Michael Furr and Jeffrey S. Foster. Polymorphic type inference for the jni.
In Proceedings of the 15th European Conference on Programming Languages
and Systems, ESOP’06, pages 309–324, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2006. Springer-
Verlag.
[FL02] Andrew Forward and Timothy C Lethbridge. The relevance of software
documentation, tools and technologies: a survey. In Proceedings of the 2002
ACM symposium on Document engineering, pages 26–33. ACM, 2002.
[FLL+02] Cormac Flanagan, K. Rustan M. Leino, Mark Lillibridge, Greg Nelson,
James B. Saxe, and Raymie Stata. Extended static checking for java. In
Proceedings of the ACM SIGPLAN 2002 Conference on Programming Lan-
guage Design and Implementation, PLDI ’02, pages 234–245, New York,
NY, USA, 2002. ACM.
[FMSW08] Matthew Finifter, Adrian Mettler, Naveen Sastry, and David Wagner. Veri-
fiable functional purity in java. In Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference
on Computer and Communications Security, CCS ’08, pages 161–174, New
York, NY, USA, 2008. ACM.
[Fra12] Ivan Fratric. Ropguard: runtime prevention of return-oriented program-
ming attacks. https://github.com/ivanfratric/ropguard, 2012.
[GE03] Li Gong and Gary Ellison. Inside Java(TM) 2 Platform Security: Archi-
tecture, API Design, and Implementation. Pearson Education, 2nd edition,
2003.
[GH07] Jim Larus Galen Hunt. Singularity: Rethinking the software stack. ACM
SIGOPS Operating Systems Review, 41:37–49, April 2007.
[GJSB09] James Gosling, Bill Joy, Guy Steele, and Gilad Bracha. The Java Language
Specification, 2000. Sun Microsystems, 2009.
[Gon98] Li Gong. Java security architecture (jdk1.2). Technical report, 1998.
[Gon11] Li Gong. Java security architecture revisited. Commun. ACM, 54(11):48–
52, November 2011.
168
Bibliography
[Gos95] James Gosling. Java intermediate bytecodes. In Papers from the 1995
ACM SIGPLAN Workshop on Intermediate Representations (IR’95), IR
’95, pages 111–118, New York, NY, USA, 1995. ACM.
[GPT+09] Emmanuel Geay, Marco Pistoia, Takaaki Tateishi, Barbara G Ryder, and
Julian Dolby. Modular string-sensitive permission analysis with demand-
driven precision. In ICSE ’09: Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE 31st Inter-
national Conference on Software Engineering, pages 177–187. IEEE Com-
puter Society, May 2009.
[Gri93] Martin L Griss. Software Reuse: From Library to Factory. IBM Systems
Journal, 32(4):548–566, 1993.
[GSWH15] Leonid Glanz, Sebastian Schmidt, Sebastian Wollny, and Ben Hermann. A
vulnerability’s lifetime: Enhancing version information in cve databases. In
Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Knowledge Technolo-
gies and Data-driven Business, i-KNOW ’15, pages 28:1–28:4, New York,
NY, USA, 2015. ACM.
[GYF06] Emmanuel Geay, Eran Yahav, and Stephen Fink. Continuous Code-quality
Assurance with SAFE. In Proceedings of the 2006 ACM SIGPLAN Sym-
posium on Partial Evaluation and Semantics-based Program Manipulation,
PEPM ’06, pages 145–149, New York, NY, USA, 2006. ACM.
[Har85] Norman Hardy. Keykos architecture. SIGOPS Oper. Syst. Rev., 19(4):8–25,
October 1985.
[Har88] Norm Hardy. The confused deputy:(or why capabilities might have been
invented). ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review, 22(4):36–38, 1988.
[HCC+98] Chris Hawblitzel, Chi-Chao Chang, Grzegorz Czajkowski, Deyu Hu, and
Thorsten von Eicken. Implementing Multiple Protection Domains in Java.
USENIX Annual Technical Conference 1998, 1998.
[HDG+11] Lars Heinemann, Florian Deissenboeck, Mario Gleirscher, Benjamin Hum-
mel, and Maximilian Irlbeck. Top Productivity through Software Reuse:
12th International Conference on Software Reuse, ICSR 2011, Pohang,
South Korea, June 13-17, 2011. Proceedings, chapter On the Extent and
Nature of Software Reuse in Open Source Java Projects, pages 207–222.
Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2011.
[HP04] David Hovemeyer and William Pugh. Finding bugs is easy. In OOPSLA
’04: Companion to the 19th annual ACM SIGPLAN conference on Object-
oriented programming systems, languages, and applications, 2004.
[HRB90] Susan Horwitz, Thomas Reps, and David Binkley. Interprocedural slicing
using dependence graphs. ACM Transactions on Programming Languages
and Systems, 12(1):26–60, January 1990.
169
Bibliography
[HREM15] Ben Hermann, Michael Reif, Michael Eichberg, and Mira Mezini. Getting to
know you: Towards a capability model for java. In Proceeding of the 10th
Joint Meeting of the European Software Engineering Conference and the
ACM SIGSOFT Symposium on the Foundations of Software Engineering,
ESEC/FSE’15, pages 758–769, New York, NY, USA, 2015. ACM.
[HS04] Christian Hammer and Gregor Snelting. An improved slicer for java. In
Proceedings of the 5th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGSOFT Workshop on Program
Analysis for Software Tools and Engineering, PASTE ’04, pages 17–22, New
York, NY, USA, 2004. ACM.
[Jax13] Jaxin. A java 6 killer – cve-2013-2465 (update, now with cve-2013-2463),
27.08.2013. http://wraithhacker.com/a-java-6-killer-cve-2013-2465/.
[JBGR08] J. Jasz, A. Beszedes, T. Gyimothy, and V. Rajlich. Static execute after/be-
fore as a replacement of traditional software dependencies. In Software
Maintenance, 2008. ICSM 2008. IEEE International Conference on, pages
137–146, Sept 2008.
[JSMHB13] Brittany Johnson, Yoonki Song, Emerson Murphy-Hill, and Robert Bow-
didge. Why Don’t Software Developers Use Static Analysis Tools to Find
Bugs? In Proceedings of the 2013 International Conference on Software
Engineering, ICSE ’13, pages 672–681, Piscataway, NJ, USA, 2013. IEEE
Press.
[KBC+14] Baris Kasikci, Thomas Ball, George Candea, John Erickson, and Madan-
lal Musuvathi. Efficient Tracing of Cold Code via Bias-Free Sampling.
USENIX Annual Technical Conference, pages 243–254, 2014.
[KHH+01] Gregor Kiczales, Erik Hilsdale, Jim Hugunin, Mik Kersten, Jeffrey Palm,
and William G. Griswold. An overview of aspectj. In Proceedings of the
15th European Conference on Object-Oriented Programming, ECOOP ’01,
pages 327–353, London, UK, UK, 2001. Springer-Verlag.
[KII15] Yu Kashima, Takashi Ishio, and Katsuro Inoue. Comparison of backward
slicing techniques for java. IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information and
Systems, 98(1):119–130, 2015.
[KO08] Goh Kondoh and Tamiya Onodera. Finding bugs in java native interface
programs. In Proceedings of the 2008 International Symposium on Software
Testing and Analysis, ISSTA ’08, pages 109–118, New York, NY, USA,
2008. ACM.
[Koz99] Dexter Kozen. Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science 1999: 24th
International Symposium, MFCS’99 Szklarska Poreba, Poland, September
6–10,1999 Proceedings, chapter Language-Based Security, pages 284–298.
Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, 1999.
170
Bibliography
[KPK02] Larry Koved, Marco Pistoia, and Aaron Kershenbaum. Access rights anal-
ysis for Java. ACM Sigplan Notices, 37(11):359, November 2002.
[KRS94] Jens Knoop, Oliver Ru¨thing, and Bernhard Steffen. Partial Dead Code
Elimination. In Proceedings of the ACM SIGPLAN 1994 Conference on
Programming Language Design and Implementation, PLDI ’94, pages 147–
158, New York, NY, USA, 1994. ACM.
[LA04] Chris Lattner and Vikram Adve. LLVM: A Compilation Framework for
Lifelong Program Analysis & Transformation. In Proceedings of the 2004
International Symposium on Code Generation and Optimization (CGO’04),
Palo Alto, California, Mar 2004.
[Lam77] L. Lamport. Proving the correctness of multiprocess programs. IEEE
Transactions on Software Engineering, SE-3(2):125–143, March 1977.
[LC13] Benjamin Livshits and Stephen Chong. Towards fully automatic placement
of security sanitizers and declassifiers. In Proceedings of the 40th Annual
ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT Symposium on Principles of Programming Lan-
guages, POPL ’13, pages 385–398, New York, NY, USA, 2013. ACM.
[Ler01] Xavier Leroy. Computer Aided Verification: 13th International Conference,
CAV 2001 Paris, France, July 18–22, 2001 Proceedings, chapter Java Byte-
code Verification: An Overview, pages 265–285. Springer Berlin Heidelberg,
Berlin, Heidelberg, 2001.
[Lev96] Elias Levy. Smashing the stack for fun and profit. Phrack magazine,
7(49):14–16, 1996.
[LHBM14] Johannes Lerch, Ben Hermann, Eric Bodden, and Mira Mezini. Flowtwist:
Efficient context-sensitive inside-out taint analysis for large codebases.
In Proceedings of the 22Nd ACM SIGSOFT International Symposium on
Foundations of Software Engineering, FSE 2014, pages 98–108, New York,
NY, USA, 2014. ACM.
[LR15] Fan Long and Martin Rinard. Staged program repair with condition syn-
thesis. In Proceedings of the 2015 10th Joint Meeting on Foundations of
Software Engineering, ESEC/FSE 2015, pages 166–178, New York, NY,
USA, 2015. ACM.
[LR16] Fan Long and Martin Rinard. Automatic patch generation by learning
correct code. In Proceedings of the 43rd Annual ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT
Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages, POPL 2016, pages
298–312, New York, NY, USA, 2016. ACM.
[LSDR14] Fan Long, Stelios Sidiroglou-Douskos, and Martin Rinard. Automatic run-
time error repair and containment via recovery shepherding. In Proceedings
171
Bibliography
of the 35th ACM SIGPLAN Conference on Programming Language Design
and Implementation, PLDI ’14, pages 227–238, New York, NY, USA, 2014.
ACM.
[LT09] Siliang Li and Gang Tan. Finding bugs in exceptional situations of jni
programs. In Proceedings of the 16th ACM Conference on Computer and
Communications Security, CCS ’09, pages 442–452, New York, NY, USA,
2009. ACM.
[LT11] Siliang Li and Gang Tan. Jet: Exception checking in the java native inter-
face. In Proceedings of the 2011 ACM International Conference on Object
Oriented Programming Systems Languages and Applications, OOPSLA ’11,
pages 345–358, New York, NY, USA, 2011. ACM.
[LT14] Siliang Li and Gang Tan. Exception analysis in the java native interface.
Science of Computer Programming, 89, Part C(0):273 – 297, 2014.
[LWH+10] Byeongcheol Lee, Ben Wiedermann, Martin Hirzel, Robert Grimm, and
Kathryn S. McKinley. Jinn: Synthesizing dynamic bug detectors for foreign
language interfaces. In Proceedings of the 31st ACM SIGPLAN Conference
on Programming Language Design and Implementation, PLDI ’10, pages
36–49, New York, NY, USA, 2010. ACM.
[LYBB14] Tim Lindholm, Frank Yellin, Gilad Bracha, and Alex Buckley. The Java
virtual machine specification. Pearson Education, 2014.
[LZC+10] Z. Li, Z. Zhuang, Y. Chen, S. Yang, Z. Zhang, and D. Fan. A certifying
compiler for clike subset of c language. In Theoretical Aspects of Software
Engineering (TASE), 2010 4th IEEE International Symposium on, pages
47–56, Aug 2010.
[MCG+99] Greg Morrisett, Karl Crary, Neal Glew, Dan Grossman, Richard Samuels,
Frederick Smith, David Walker, Stephanie Weirich, and Steve Zdancewic.
Talx86: A realistic typed assembly language. In In Second Workshop on
Compiler Support for System Software, pages 25–35, 1999.
[Mee10] Haroon Meer. Memory corruption attacks the (almost) complete history.
Blackhat USA.(Jul. 2010), 2010.
[Mil06] Mark Samuel Miller. Robust composition: towards a unified approach to
access control and concurrency control. PhD thesis, 2006.
[MM07] Fabio Martinelli and Paolo Mori. Enhancing java security with history
based access control. In Alessandro Aldini and Roberto Gorrieri, editors,
Foundations of Security Analysis and Design IV, volume 4677 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pages 135–159. Springer Berlin Heidelberg,
2007.
172
Bibliography
[MMT10] Sergio Maffeis, John C. Mitchell, and Ankur Taly. Object capabilities and
isolation of untrusted web applications. In Security and Privacy (SP), 2010
IEEE Symposium on, pages 125–140, May 2010.
[MMZ08] Federico Maggi, Matteo Matteucci, and Stefano Zanero. Detecting Intru-
sions through System Call Sequence and Argument Analysis. IEEE Trans-
actions on Dependable and Secure Computing, 7(4):381–395, 2008.
[MNZZ] Andrew C. Myers, N. Nystrom, L. Zheng, and S. Zdancewic. Jif: Java
information flow. http://www.cs.cornell.edu/jif/.
[MPM+15] Luis Mastrangelo, Luca Ponzanelli, Andrea Mocci, Michele Lanza, Matthias
Hauswirth, and Nathaniel Nystrom. Use at your own risk: The java un-
safe api in the wild. In Proceedings of the 2015 ACM SIGPLAN Interna-
tional Conference on Object-Oriented Programming, Systems, Languages,
and Applications, OOPSLA 2015, pages 695–710, New York, NY, USA,
2015. ACM.
[MS03] Mark S. Miller and Jonathan S. Shapiro. Advances in Computing Science
– ASIAN 2003. Progamming Languages and Distributed Computation Pro-
gramming Languages and Distributed Computation: 8th Asian Computing
Science Conference, Mumbai, India, December 10-12, 2003. Proceedings,
chapter Paradigm Regained: Abstraction Mechanisms for Access Control,
pages 224–242. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2003.
[MS13] Tilo Mu¨ller and Michael Spreitzenbarth. Frost: Forensic recovery of scram-
bled telephones. In Michael Jacobson, Michael Locasto, Payman Mohassel,
and Reihaneh Safavi-Naini, editors, Applied Cryptography and Network Se-
curity, volume 7954 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 373–388.
Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2013.
[MSL+08] Mark S Miller, Mike Samuel, Ben Laurie, Ihab Awad, and Mike Stay. Safe
active content in sanitized javascript. Technical report, 2008.
[Mur08] Toby Murray. Analysing object-capability security, in. In Proceedings of
the Joint Workshop on Foundations of Computer Security, Automated Rea-
soning for Security Protocol Analysis and Issues in the Theory of Security
(FCS-ARSPA-WITS’08, pages 177–194, 2008.
[MW10] Adrian Mettler and David Wagner. Class properties for security review in
an object-capability subset of java: (short paper). In Proceedings of the 5th
ACM SIGPLAN Workshop on Programming Languages and Analysis for
Security, PLAS ’10, pages 7:1–7:7, New York, NY, USA, 2010. ACM.
[MWC10] Adrian Mettler, David Wagner, and Tyler Close. Joe-e: A security-oriented
subset of java. In NDSS, volume 10, pages 357–374, 2010.
173
Bibliography
[MWCG99] Greg Morrisett, David Walker, Karl Crary, and Neal Glew. From system f
to typed assembly language. ACM Trans. Program. Lang. Syst., 21(3):527–
568, May 1999.
[Mye99] Andrew C. Myers. Jflow: Practical mostly-static information flow control.
In Proceedings of the 26th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT Symposium on Prin-
ciples of Programming Languages, POPL ’99, pages 228–241, New York,
NY, USA, 1999. ACM.
[MYSI03] Mark Miller, Ka-Ping Yee, Jonathan Shapiro, and Combex Inc. Capability
myths demolished. Technical report, 2003.
[ND14] James Noble and Sophia Drossopoulou. Rationally reconstructing the es-
crow example. In Proceedings of 16th Workshop on Formal Techniques for
Java-like Programs, FTfJP’14, pages 5:1–5:6, New York, NY, USA, 2014.
ACM.
[Nec97] George C. Necula. Proof-carrying code. In Proceedings of the 24th ACM
SIGPLAN-SIGACT Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages,
POPL ’97, pages 106–119, New York, NY, USA, 1997. ACM.
[Ner01] Nergal. Advanced return-into-lib(c) exploits: Pax case study. Phrack, 58,
2001.
[NL04] George C. Necula and Peter Lee. The design and implementation of a
certifying compiler. SIGPLAN Not., 39(4):612–625, April 2004.
[NLR10] Nomair A. Naeem, Ondrˇej Lhota´k, and Jonathan Rodriguez. Practical ex-
tensions to the ifds algorithm. In Proceedings of the 19th Joint European
Conference on Theory and Practice of Software, International Conference
on Compiler Construction, CC’10/ETAPS’10, pages 124–144, Berlin, Hei-
delberg, 2010. Springer-Verlag.
[NMRW02] George C. Necula, Scott McPeak, Shree Prakash Rahul, and Westley
Weimer. Cil: Intermediate language and tools for analysis and transfor-
mation of c programs. In Proceedings of the 11th International Conference
on Compiler Construction, CC ’02, pages 213–228, London, UK, UK, 2002.
Springer-Verlag.
[NNH99] Flemming Nielson, Hanne R. Nielson, and Chris Hankin. Principles of
Program Analysis. Springer-Verlag New York, Inc., Secaucus, NJ, USA,
1999.
[ora14a] Secure coding guidelines for java se. http://www.oracle.com/
technetwork/java/seccodeguide-139067.html, 2014.
[Ora14b] Oracle. Java native interface specification, 06.08.2014.
http://docs.oracle.com/javase/8/docs/technotes/guides/
jni/spec/jniTOC.html.
174
Bibliography
[Pap12] Vasilis Pappas. kbouncer: Efficient and transparent rop mitigation. Tech-
nical report, 2012.
[Par72] D. L. Parnas. On the criteria to be used in decomposing systems into
modules. Commun. ACM, 15(12):1053–1058, December 1972.
[PBN07] M. Pistoia, A. Banerjee, and D.A. Naumann. Beyond stack inspection: A
unified access-control and information-flow security model. In Security and
Privacy, 2007. SP ’07. IEEE Symposium on, pages 149–163, May 2007.
[Pro14] LLVM Project. Llvm language reference manual, 30.07.2014.
http://llvm.org/docs/LangRef.html.
[PS11] E´tienne Payet and Fausto Spoto. Static Analysis of Android Programs. In
Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Automated Deduction,
CADE’11, pages 439–445, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2011. Springer-Verlag.
[RHS95] Thomas Reps, Susan Horwitz, and Mooly Sagiv. Precise interprocedural
dataflow analysis via graph reachability. In Proceedings of the 22Nd ACM
SIGPLAN-SIGACT Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages,
POPL ’95, pages 49–61, New York, NY, USA, 1995. ACM.
[RTC] John Rose, Christian Thalinger, and Mandy Chung. Jep 176: Mechani-
cal checking of caller-sensitive methods. http://openjdk.java.net/jeps/
176.
[Rus81] J. M. Rushby. Design and verification of secure systems. In Proceedings of
the Eighth ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles, SOSP ’81,
pages 12–21, New York, NY, USA, 1981. ACM.
[Sch11] Fred B. Schneider. Blueprint for a science of cybersecurity. Technical report,
Cornell University, 2011.
[SE13] Widura Schwittek and Stefan Eicker. A study on third party component
reuse in java enterprise open source software. In Proceedings of the 16th
International ACM Sigsoft Symposium on Component-based Software En-
gineering, CBSE ’13, pages 75–80, New York, NY, USA, 2013. ACM.
[SHR+00] Vijay Sundaresan, Laurie Hendren, Chrislain Razafimahefa, Raja Valle´e-
Rai, Patrick Lam, Etienne Gagnon, and Charles Godin. Practical virtual
method call resolution for java. In Proceedings of the 15th ACM SIGPLAN
Conference on Object-oriented Programming, Systems, Languages, and Ap-
plications, OOPSLA ’00, pages 264–280, New York, NY, USA, 2000. ACM.
[SM03] A. Sabelfeld and A. C. Myers. Language-based information-flow security.
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, 21(1):5–19, Jan 2003.
175
Bibliography
[SMH01] Fred B Schneider, Greg Morrisett, and Robert Harper. A Language-Based
Approach to Security. In Computer Aided Verification, pages 86–101.
Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, March 2001.
[Smo95] Gert Smolka. The Oz programming model. In Jan van Leeuwen, editor,
Computer Science Today, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 1000,
pages 324–343. Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1995.
[SPBL13] L. Sassaman, M. L. Patterson, S. Bratus, and M. E. Locasto. Security
applications of formal language theory. IEEE Systems Journal, 7(3):489–
500, Sept 2013.
[SRC84] J. H. Saltzer, D. P. Reed, and D. D. Clark. End-to-end arguments in system
design. ACM Trans. Comput. Syst., 2(4):277–288, November 1984.
[SS75] Jerome H Saltzer and Michael D Schroeder. The protection of information
in computer systems. Proceedings of the IEEE, 63(9):1278–1308, 1975.
[SSNW13] Martin Scha¨f, Daniel Schwartz-Narbonne, and Thomas Wies. Explaining
Inconsistent Code. the 2013 9th Joint Meeting, pages 1–11, August 2013.
[ST12] Mengtao Sun and Gang Tan. Jvm-portable sandboxing of java’s native
libraries. In Sara Foresti, Moti Yung, and Fabio Martinelli, editors, Com-
puter Security – ESORICS 2012, volume 7459 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 842–858. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2012.
[ST14] Mengtao Sun and Gang Tan. NativeGuard: protecting android applications
from third-party native libraries. In WiSec ’14: Proceedings of the 2014
ACM conference on Security and privacy in wireless & mobile networks.
ACM Request Permissions, July 2014.
[STM10] Joseph Siefers, Gang Tan, and Greg Morrisett. Robusta: Taming the native
beast of the jvm. In Proceedings of the 17th ACM Conference on Computer
and Communications Security, CCS ’10, pages 201–211, New York, NY,
USA, 2010. ACM.
[STP+14] Felix Schuster, Thomas Tendyck, Jannik Pewny, Andreas Maaß, Martin
Steegmanns, Moritz Contag, and Thorsten Holz. Research in Attacks,
Intrusions and Defenses: 17th International Symposium, RAID 2014,
Gothenburg, Sweden, September 17-19, 2014. Proceedings, chapter Evaluat-
ing the Effectiveness of Current Anti-ROP Defenses, pages 88–108. Springer
International Publishing, Cham, 2014.
[SVR05] Fred Spiessens and Peter Van Roy. The oz-e project: Design guidelines
for a secure multiparadigm programming language. In Multiparadigm Pro-
gramming in Mozart/Oz, pages 21–40. Springer, 2005.
176
Bibliography
[TAD+10] Ewan Tempero, Craig Anslow, Jens Dietrich, Ted Han, Jing Li, Markus
Lumpe, Hayden Melton, and James Noble. Qualitas Corpus: A Curated
Collection of Java Code for Empirical Studies. In 2010 Asia Pacific Software
Engineering Conference (APSEC2010), pages 336–345, December 2010.
[Tan10] Gang Tan. Jni light: An operational model for the core jni. In Proceed-
ings of the 8th Asian Conference on Programming Languages and Systems,
APLAS’10, pages 114–130, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2010. Springer-Verlag.
[TC08] Gang Tan and Jason Croft. An empirical security study of the native code
in the jdk. In Proceedings of the 17th Conference on Security Symposium,
SS’08, pages 365–377, Berkeley, CA, USA, 2008. USENIX Association.
[TCSW06] Gang Tan, Srimat Chakradhar, Raghunathan Srivaths, and Ravi Daniel
Wang. Safe java native interface. In In Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE
International Symposium on Secure Software Engineering, pages 97–106,
2006.
[TM07] Gang Tan and Greg Morrisett. Ilea: Inter-language analysis across java
and c. In Proceedings of the 22Nd Annual ACM SIGPLAN Conference
on Object-oriented Programming Systems and Applications, OOPSLA ’07,
pages 39–56, New York, NY, USA, 2007. ACM.
[VBKM00] John Viega, J. T. Bloch, Yoshi Kohno, and Gary McGraw. Its4: a static
vulnerability scanner for c and c++ code. In Computer Security Appli-
cations, 2000. ACSAC ’00. 16th Annual Conference, pages 257–267, Dec
2000.
[vECC+99] Thorsten von Eicken, Chi-Chao Chang, Grzegorz Czajkowski, Chris Haw-
blitzel, Deyu Hu, and Dan Spoonhower. J-Kernel: A Capability-Based
Operating System for Java. In Computer Aided Verification, pages 369–
393. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, 1999.
[VL13] J Vanegue and S K Lahiri. Towards Practical Reactive Security Audit
Using Extended Static Checkers. In 2013 IEEE Symposium on Security
and Privacy (SP) Conference, pages 33–47. IEEE, 2013.
[VRCG+10] Raja Valle´e-Rai, Phong Co, Etienne Gagnon, Laurie Hendren, Patrick Lam,
and Vijay Sundaresan. Soot: A java bytecode optimization framework. In
CASCON First Decade High Impact Papers, pages 214–224. IBM Corp.,
2010.
[WAF00] Dan S. Wallach, Andrew W. Appel, and Edward W. Felten. Safkasi: A
security mechanism for language-based systems. ACM Trans. Softw. Eng.
Methodol., 9(4):341–378, October 2000.
177
Bibliography
[WALK10] Robert N. M. Watson, Jonathan Anderson, Ben Laurie, and Kris Kenn-
away. Capsicum: Practical capabilities for unix. In Proceedings of the 19th
USENIX Conference on Security, USENIX Security’10, pages 3–3, Berke-
ley, CA, USA, 2010. USENIX Association.
[Wei81] Mark Weiser. Program slicing. In Proceedings of the 5th International
Conference on Software Engineering, ICSE ’81, pages 439–449, Piscataway,
NJ, USA, 1981. IEEE Press.
[XP98] Hongwei Xi and Frank Pfenning. Eliminating array bound checking through
dependent types. In Proceedings of the ACM SIGPLAN 1998 Conference
on Programming Language Design and Implementation, PLDI ’98, pages
249–257, New York, NY, USA, 1998. ACM.
[YEGS15] Khaled Yakdan, Sebastian Eschweiler, Elmar Gerhards-Padilla, and
Matthew Smith. No more gotos: Decompilation using pattern-independent
control-flow structuring and semantic-preserving transformations. In 22nd
Annual Network and Distributed System Security Symposium, NDSS 2015,
San Diego, California, USA, February 8-11, 2014. The Internet Society,
2015.
[Yel95] Frank Yellin. Low level security in java. In In Proceedings of the 4th
International World Wide Web Conference, 1995.
[YPC+10] Yves Younan, Pieter Philippaerts, Lorenzo Cavallaro, R. Sekar, Frank
Piessens, and Wouter Joosen. Paricheck: An efficient pointer arithmetic
checker for c programs. In Proceedings of the 5th ACM Symposium on In-
formation, Computer and Communications Security, ASIACCS ’10, pages
145–156, New York, NY, USA, 2010. ACM.
178
